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Since the reform in the 1980s, the Chinese electric power industry has experienced 
rapid expansion in both capacity and outputs, which is surprising since the industry is 
still under a plan control. The shortage of supply is a common problem in a plan 
economy according to the conventional wisdom. But China provides very different 
experience that challenges the wisdom. Why? This thesis attempts to understand why 
the plan-controlled industry can achieve such rapid growth over a short period of time.  
The study pursues its investigation through exploring three issues: the price and cost 
structures, the pricing setting and the capacity expansion with reference to OECD 
experience. By comparing power prices of China with the West, we find that China 
has successfully kept its household prices as lower as its industrial prices, while the 
OECD economies are reverse, a lower power price for the industry but higher for the 
household users. The finding shows that the plan increases consumers‟ welfare more 
than the market does. With further investigation to the cost structure of Chinese power 
plants with reference to the UK experience, we find that the Chinese power producers 
have lower variable costs than the Western plants, but similar overheads costs. To 
further explain such finding, we studied a sample of 100 coal-fired power plants from 
2003 to 2005 for their pricing behaviour. We find that the firms adopt a high cost 
strategy to bargain with the state for higher plan prices, because of the 
one-firm-with-one-plan-price policy. This causes a soft price constraint on costs, 
which inevitably protects high cost firms, driving up the total costs of the firm, and 
providing a lower incentive to the firm to improve their cost efficiency. The firms are 
planned by the state for their outputs. Will the state plan affect the capacity of power 
supply in favour? The study argues yes, because (1) entry is free and capacity 
investment is under firm‟s autonomy, (2) the firms are very responsive to capacity 
utilization and demand in choosing their capacity investment, and (3) the firms seek 
more profits through seeking more plan outputs that are linked with capacity. 
Therefore, the firms do not compete in prices but the capacity of power generation. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1.  Context and background 
After 30 year‟s economic reform and development, China has become the third largest 
economy in the world by 2009, and its nominal GDP reached $4,909 billion, just 
behind the US ($14,256 billion) and Japan ($5,067 billion), according to the World 
Bank.  To fuel its production and to improve its living standards, demand for 
electricity power has been soaring in China.  By 2007, China became the second 
largest power producer and consumer in this world, just behind the US (3.8 million 
GWh), where over 2.8 million GWh of electricity was supplied and consumed within 
China, i.e. equal to around 16% of the total electric power produced in the world 





In contrast, 30 years ago China suffered economic shortages, and its industries 
experienced limited capacity, high costs, and low efficiency.  In order to increase 
industrial supply and power as well, the market-oriented reform has been introduced 
to the Chinese industry and the power sector in 1985.  One reform was to break 
down the old Central Electricity Generating Board into five central state-owned 
power producers and two grids companies in the early 2000s.  And in 2002, the 
on-grid price was also introduced.  Under such restructuring, the Chinese electric 
power sector was significantly improved its strength and made impressive 
advancement.   
 
However, the market mechanism has not been fully implemented in the Chinese 
electric power sector yet.  The transmission, distribution and retail functions are still 
                                                             
1 http://www.ce.cn/macro/more/201002/01/t20100201_20901602.shtml, visited on 22nd September, 2010.   
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bundled together.  The price competition has not yet come into place.  Both the 
price and output of the power generation are still under the control of the state.  
These have resulted in cost inefficiency in power plants.  Against this, many studies 
advocated market liberalisation like what the developed countries have adopted.     
 
The UK is the pioneer of restructuring its electricity industry in the West.  Unlike 
China trying to raise the electricity price in the name of reducing the cost burden of 
generators, the UK reform mainly aims to lower down electricity price, and to provide 
a secure and reliable power supply.  In the past, the state-owned Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) was separated into four companies, while in the UK the 
Area Electricity Boards were replaced by twelve regional electricity retailers.  The 
Electricity Pool was also established as the trading mechanism in the UK.  In order 
to promote competition, the decentralised New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
(NETA) was introduced to replace the Electricity Pool in 2001.  In 2005, NETA was 
extended into the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA).  By the end of 2008, the market concentration in the UK becomes more 
separated, where there were 32 major power producers in the UK (United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics 2009).  During the same period, the UK government also promotes 
the development of CCGT plants to reduce the electricity prices further.   
 
However, in order to prevent the potential market manipulation, the UK doesn‟t 
completely give up the right to intervene the electricity market, where the price cap 
regulation remains as the proper resorts of the regulation at proper time (Bower, 2002).  
Jamison (2007) even thinks that the price-cap regulation adopted by the UK is 
superior to the rate-of-return regulation adopted by the US, in terms of improving 
generation efficiency.  However, we should admit that the price-cap regulation may 
not be suitable in all situations.  For example, the retail price cap ruined the power 
retailers in California in 2001.  It implies that even the market-oriented mechanism 
still exposes to the various risks, and a good electric power supply system should be a 
mixture of competition with proper regulation.   
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Obviously, without thorough understanding and proper supervision, the ill-designed 
market mechanism will weaken the power industry, and so the whole economy of a 
nation.  Therefore, it‟s necessary for policy makers in China to take more balanced 
approach to the Chinese power industry from the view of both regulatory plan and 
market advantages, before taking the future action of reform.  That‟s one major 
argument that this thesis intends to develop.   
 
Again, there is one thing we would like to highlight.  There could be a most 
preferential at a time, but there would not be a perfect one forever.  Even the best 
practice still needs continuous improvement in response to changes in the world.   
 
1.2.  Motivation 
The main topic of this thesis is the “the reform of the Chinese electric power industry 
and its impact on China‟s industry and economy”.  This thesis attempts to investigate 
the price and cost structures, the pricing behaviour, the drivers for the power 
consumption, and the capacity expansion of Chinese electric power supply, with 
reference to international experience, in particular, OECD and UK‟s ones.  There are 
several motivations for us to undertake this study, and they are as follows:   
 
1) This study is derived from a consultancy study about the cross-border acquisition 
for China Power International Development (CPID) Ltd., i.e. one of the big five 
power producers in China.  From this project, we collected the valuable data 
from both sides of the acquirer and the target, and also the background 
information of the two different countries.  The project recommends that it‟s a 
best strategy for the power producer to takeover high-value assets and businesses 
from the target firm to improve its own competitiveness.  The consultancy 
project gives us a direct perception about power plants in China and the UK.  In 
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order to obtain a comprehensive understanding about power generation industries 
in both countries at a wider and deeper view, we extended the project to this 
academic study.  It‟s also a good opportunity for us to make an interim review 
about background, achievements, the current development and the missions of the 
electric power reform in China‟s electricity reform.   
 
2) China has been carrying out its economic reform in its electric power supply 
sector.  However, the market mechanism may fail, such as the California 
electricity crisis (in 2000), the market manipulation observed in the UK power 
market (OFGEM, 1996).  However, most previous studies, which advocated 
market-oriented reform for the Chinese power industries, hardly referred those 
failures to the policy makers in China.  However, it doesn‟t mean that such 
failure lessons learnt by the West will not repeat in China in the future when the 
Chinese power market is liberalised.  Thus, with the reference to the international 
cases, it‟s a need for us to extend the existing studies to develop an argument on 
how market liberalisation should be cautiously regarded, in particular, for China‟s 
future reform in the sector.  
 
3) When confronted to the global financial crisis, it‟s a critic time for us to review 
China‟s power supply policy and renew our knowledge about the current situation.  
With the up-to-date data collected at the aggregated level and the plant level, it 
enables us to access current policy and practice, which can help identify 
improvements in terms of policy of the future reform and industry restructuring.     
 
1.3.  Methodology and main data employed for research  
1.3.1.  Methodology 
In this thesis, we employed various research techniques in pursuing our analysis, 
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including statistical description, economic modelling, econometric test and even case 
studies.  The appropriate robustness tests are performed to check the validity of the 
models that we built up.  For econometrics, we employed both panel data estimation 
models and time-series estimation respectively, to process data accordingly.   
 
In more detail, for cost and price structure study in Chapter 3, our analysis is mainly 
on the basis of comparatively statistical description using sample data collected from 
various sources.   
 
We also performed case studies to examine the price and the cost structure between 
the UK and Chinese leading power plants in 2004 and 2005.  The largest coal-fired 
power plants in the UK, Drax, is selected and compared to the five coal-fired power 
plants and also the group of Chinese International Power Development Corporation 
(CIPD), which is one of the big-five power producers in China.  All the selected 
samples are the most advanced coal-fired power producers in the two countries.   
 
The calculations, tables and charts in this chapter are prepared with Microsoft Excel, 
Microsoft Visio and STATA for our analysis of cost and price structure.   
 
Further, we developed a pricing theory to characterise the pricing behaviour of power 
generation companies.  For this study, a panel-data regression on three-year‟s data is 
performed to test the pricing model with a group of variables, including the regional 
output, the average cost of the rival plants, the regional market share of the plant, the 
cost of the plant, the cost of capital, the inflation of the fuel price, and the load factor.  
Besides, following adjustments are made to the models: 1) A series of dummy data are 
included to test the individual effects upon the explained variable, i.e. the state of the 
profit of the plant, the location of the plant and the affiliation of the plant.  2) In 
order to present a better linear relationship, all of those variables are converted into 
the logarithm except the dummies.  3) In order to avoid the loop causality in the 
model, the regional market share, the costs of the plant and the load factor have a 
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lagged one year. 4)  The extreme observations have been removed from the dataset 
before running the regression.  The Hausman test is performed to the price model to 
decide whether to choose the fixed-effect model or the random-effect model.  The 
robustness tests are performed to check the validity of the models, where the cost of 
capital is separated into interest rate and the depreciation rate. 
 
To address the link between electricity consumption, economic growth and capacity 
of power production, Chapter 5 uses a two-stage estimation to investigate the 
questions raised.  We employ time series estimation techniques to verify 
appropriateness of data for time-series model estimation.  This includes Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (unit-root tests) and Granger Causality test etc.  The demand and 
supply functions are specified and the multivariate models are built to examine the 
direct and indirect factors such as power demand affecting the capacity expansion in 
China.  This research is conducted in a comparative way with a reference to the other 
six OECD countries.   
 
The unit root test, causality test and the time-series regression are performed by using 
STATA.   
 
1.3.2.  Data sources 
Data used in supporting this study can be classified into three categories that are 
shown as follows: 
1) The aggregate-level data: 
a) The data of the real GDP, the power production, the power consumption, the 
installed capacity of the UK and China from 1991 to 2007 are collected from the 
Department of Trade and Industry of the UK (DTI) and the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China respectively;   
b) The industrial and household electricity prices of the OECD countries from 2000 
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to 2004 are extracted from the Electricity Information 2006, and the Chinese 
prices come from the Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 
2005;  
c) The coal prices in the UK and China from 2000 to 2005 come from Electricity 
Information 2007, and China Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and Energy Data 
2005 respectively.   
d) The exchange rates are collected from DataStream; 
e) And, the Purchase Power Parity conversion rates are collected from the 
International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database April 2007”; 
f) The financial data, including the sales figure, the costs and some quantitative 
variables are obtained from the Chinese power plants database prepared by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2008; 
g) The data of the output and the capacity of the power plants in the five southern 
provinces are collected from the China Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and 2006, 
issued by China Electric Power Press. 
 
2) The plant-level data: 
a) The financial and operational data of Drax and Uskmouth in 2004 and 2005 are 
collected from the relevant annual reports, DTI‟s website and also the FAME.  
The financial and operational data of Chinese International Power Development 
Corporation from 2003 to 2005 are collected from their annual reports in relevant 
years;  
b) The data of the energy efficiency of the UK and Chinese power plants from 1962 
to 2006 are extracted from the Department of Trade and Industry of the UK, and 
the “Review of Assumptions as to Changes in the Electricity Generation Sector in 
Nautilus Institute‟s Clean Coal Scenarios Report” (Xie, 2002) and “Energy Data 
2005” (Wang, 2005) respectively;  
c) The indicative cost breakdown for the UK household and industrial & commercial 
customers in 2002 are prepared on the basis of the information from “Gas and 
Electricity Price Projections” (OXERA, 2004), “The New Electricity Trading 
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Arrangements in England and Wales” (National Audit Office, 2003) and 
Electricity Information 2006;   
d) The data of the average labour cost of the Chinese power producers from 1999 to 
2005 are collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China; 
 
3)  Other market-level data: 
a) The average on-grid electricity prices in China from 2000 to 2004, collected 
from “Electricity Market and Electricity Price Supervision Report 2005” 
(CPNN, 2005); 
b) The provincial on-grid electricity price of the Chinese coal-fired power plants 
in 2005, collected from “Risk Analysis of the Coal-fired Power Generation in 
China 2006”;  
c) The financial and operational data of the UK power plants, i.e. Drax( 2004) 
and Uskmouth (2006), obtained from their annual reports and FAME;  
d) The regional GDP per capita across China in 2005, obtained from the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China in 2008. 
 
4)  Time-series data 
In Chapter 5, we use a set of time-series data of seven countries for the modelling.  
The seven countries are China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.  
The sources of those data are listed as below:   
a) The data of the Real GDP and the percentage of the industrial value-added out 
of the real GDP are obtained from the UN data and the World Bank databases 
respectively.  And the industrial value-added is calculated by multiplying the 
two variables;   
b) The real electricity price index of the OECD countries and China are obtained 
from Electricity Information 2009 and National Bureau of Statistics of China 
respectively.  The electricity price of the OECD countries and China refers to 
the industrial and household price, and the price of Chinese electric power 
industry respectively.  As they are all the end prices, it‟s justified to regard 
  9 
those prices as comparable;  
c) The data of the power consumption, the power exports, and the net capacity of 
all those seven countries up to 2006 are collected from the Electricity 
Information 2009.  In terms of the latest data in 2007 and 2008, the Chinese, 
French and the UK figures come from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, the International Energy Agency, and the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change of the UK respectively.   
 
5)  Other industrial supplementary data supporting the study.  They are:  
a) The percentage of GDP by type of expenditure, from the UN data; 
b) The gross industrial output of light and heavy industries in China from 1999 to 
2007, obtained from the National Statistics Bureau of China; 
c) The production of the iron and steel (metric tonnes) and the cement and glass 
(metric tonnes) from 1990 to 2006, from the World Steel Association and the 
US Geological Survey Minerals Information Team;  
d) The power consumption by types of usage from 1990 to 2006, from the 
National Statistics Bureau of China and the Electricity Information 2009;   
e) The energy consumption and the value-added by the types of the industries in 
China from 1997 to 2007, from the National Statistics Bureau of China;  
f) The energy efficiency of the energy-intensive products in China, from the 
National Statistics Bureau of China and “China End Use Energy Consumption 
and Energy Efficiency in 2007” (Wang, 2009); 
g) The market share of the main power producers in the European Union and 
China in 2008, obtained from Eurostat and the websites of the Chinese 
big-five generators; 
h) The capacity of the large power plants in the UK and China from 2005 to 2008, 
obtained from the Department of Energy and Climate Change of the UK and 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the China Economic Information 
Network. 
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1.4.  Analytical structure and arguments 
The whole thesis is structured into six parts.  The first chapter is the introduction.  
The second chapter is the general background of the Chinese power sector. This 
introduction is followed by further exploring details of the industry in terms of its cost 
and price structure in Chapter 3.  Having discussed the price structure, we then move 
to address an issue about pricing electricity for sales by coal-fired plants.  We find 
that at the firm level, the firm‟s price and output is fixed by the plan that is expected 
to meet demand with supply at an aggregate level.  So, the production shall be 
responsive to demand for power.  The state breaks down demand and allocates these 
to individual firms to produce according to the plan.  For any demand in excess of 
the plan, the state takes discretion to allocate them to individual firms either at a 
pre-planned price or at adjusted plan price.  The point is that, given plan price, the 
aggregate supply is expected to respond to a change in aggregate demand.  Then this 
expectation leads us to ask what determines demand and so production at an 
aggregate level.  Chapter 5 investigates this question: the demand for power 
consumption ― its determinants and its impact on change in supply in the long-run.  
Chapter 6 will conclude the findings and arguments of the thesis.  For arguments 
discussed in each chapter, they are highlighted as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 
This chapter draws a general background about the Chinese electric power industry.  
It covers a wide scope of different fields, including the history of the reform, the 
power supply, the network, electricity price control and the link to the coal price.  It 
attempts to provide the facts for the readers to gain a fundamental knowledge and the 
direct perception of the topics studied in the main chapters of this thesis.   
 
Chapter 3 
Many previous studies focused on the background and history of the power sector 
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reform in China (Li and Dorian, 1995; Andrews-Speed and Dow, 2000; Hafsi and 
Tian, 2005; Xu and Chen 2006; Yao, Bin and Wu 2006; Hang and Tu, 2007; Yang, 
2008).  The common view among them is that China should introduce competition, 
privatisation and liberalisation into the power sector for three main reasons:   
 
1) The plan mechanism encourages the high generating cost, and then leads to the 
low thermal efficiency and the heavy environment damages (Wu and Li, 1995; Li 
and Dorian, 1995; Andrews-Speed and Dow, 2000);  
2) The power sector cannot be separated from the economic transformation of the 
whole country.  The plan mechanism makes the low profit for the power 
producers, and could be difficult to attract sufficient investment into the power 
generation sector to fuel the economic development (Yeoh and Rajaraman, 2004; 
Hafsi and Tian, 2005; Wang, 2007);  
3) The market-oriented mechanism will encourage the technology advance and the 
optimisation of the resources allocation.  (Lin 2004; Andrews-Speed and Dow, 
2000; Wang 2006). 
 
Those papers promote a market-oriented mechanism to the Chinese policy makers 
without stating the potential risk of market failure and its possible impacts on the 
industry that this has been experienced by the US and noticed by the Western 
researchers.   
 
California electricity crisis in 2001 is a good lesson about the failure of the liberalised 
power market.  (Woo, 2001; Hogan, 2002; Woo, Lloyd and Tishler, 2003).  The 
similar risks also exist in other Western countries, such as the UK.  Some studies 
investigated the UK electricity market reform and argued that the dominant generators 
could obtain the extra gain from the market by market manipulation (Wolak and 
Patrick, 1996; OFGEM, 1999; Sweeting, 2007).  As to the UK retail electricity 
market, the previous studies also found that the liberalisation of the power sector 
didn‟t protect the benefit of the small consumers as expected (Thomas, 2003; Graham, 
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2006; OXERA, 2004).  Moreover, through a series studies, Pollitt and his colleagues 
delivered the point that the liberalisation and privatisation of the power sector without 
proper regulation would harm the total outputs of other industries.  Those studies do 
reveal another side of the market-oriented mechanism in the power sector, but 
unfortunately they do not refer to the Chinese case.   
 
Therefore, can a market approach really work in China?  Can it stimulate the 
improvement of supply, productive efficiency and impacts on growth as asserted?  In 
order to address this question, this chapter makes a comprehensive and direct 
comparison of the price and cost structure of the power supply between China and 
Western countries.  With public information at the aggregated level and also the 
private information at the plant level, it clearly shows the benefits and risks of both 
the plan system and the market system of the power sectors.  And the case study is 
also a feature of this study, which provides the first-hand, intuitive and valuable 
information about the UK coal-fired power plants, with the cross reference to the 
leading Chinese plants.  The whole chapter attempts to deliver a good understanding 
of the industry with an international reference to the study.   
 
This chapter generally consists of two parts.  The first part is the general comparison 
of the electricity price schemes between the China and the OECD member countries, 
with a further discussion about the different power sector structures under the plan 
mechanism and market-oriented system.  The second part is largely a specific 
firm-level case study, which carries out an item-to-item comparison of the cost 
structure between the top Chinese and UK plants.  In short, this chapter studies the 
cost and price structure of the Chinese power supply with the reference to cases in the 
West.   
 
In the first part, it begins with an overall description and comparison about the 
different tariff schemes in the OECD member countries and China over the period 
from 2000 to 2004.  It clearly shows that the industrial users in China do not pay 
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power less than those in the OECD member countries, but those households do.  In 
another aspect, it also clear reflect the truth that the current plan price mechanism 
employed in China does protect the benefits of the household users, while the OECD 
member countries secure their industrial competiveness at the expenses of those small 
end-users who are blocked from the whole market.   
 
Then the discussion is narrowed to the comparison of the liberalisation of the 
electricity industries between the UK and China, so as to find out the reason behind 
such phenomenon.  In terms of the power sector structure in China and the UK, it 
clearly shows that both two countries have adopted the vertical unbundling process 
during the reform of their power sectors.  However, the full vertical separation and 
the competition mechanism have been implemented in the UK power system, while 
the governmental control over the production volume and the electricity prices still 
remain in the Chinese power system.   
 
With the illustration of the aggregated historical data of electricity prices from both 
the UK and China, it shows that neither market competition in the UK nor the plan 
system in China could effectively restrain the upward trends of the tariffs caused by 
the inflated fuel price.  However, due to the segment of the wholesale and retail 
market in the UK power sector, small users take more pains from the higher price 
inflation than the large users.  By contrast, in China, the growth of the tariffs for 
small consumers has been effectively limited to the same level of the industrial price 
growth.  Besides, the dominant generators could also exert considerable market 
power in the UK power market (Sweeting 2007).  Based on this observation, we 
argue that the plan, rather than liberalisation, could better protect the small consumers 
such as householders for their benefits, especially low income group of consumers.   
 
In the second part of the chapter, two top thermal plants from both China and the UK 
are selected for a case study.  The unit cost of the two in 2004 and 2005 are 
decomposed and then an item-to-item comparison is performed.  Together with other 
  14 
supporting evidence of the aggregated data, several interesting findings appear.  First, 
the UK and the Chinese coal-fired generators in similar size have almost equal 
thermal efficiency.  Second, the UK generator has greater earning ability than the 
Chinese generator, but the latter one has the cost advantage over the former one.  
Third, compared to the UK generator, it could be more difficult for the Chinese 
generator to transfer the variable cost to the electricity price, due to the plan control of 
the state.  So control of the cost transfer to final users shows another advantage of 
state plan than market.   
 
This chapter includes the comprehensive comparison at the country level and also the 
specific case study at the firm level and then provides the evidence to argue that the 
plan mechanism can be able to deliver an effective power supply system.  First, the 
state plan mechanism does protect the benefits for the small users better than the fully 
liberalised market, according to the findings of our international comparison.  
Second, the plan regulation in China can promote sufficient growth of the power 
supply to match its fast growing power demand over the past two decades.  Thirdly, 
the partial plan also can stimulate technological advances, and thus reduce the gap of 
the thermal efficiency between the top Chinese and the UK generators, which is the 
evidence shown in recent years.  Fourth, according the UK experience, the fully 
liberalised market may not be perfect for the power-generating industry, where the 
dominant producers can exercise their market power to erode the competitiveness of 
other industries.  The market-oriented power supply system can fail in delivering the 
reliable power supply at a competitive price.  As a whole, this chapter on the 
market-oriented reform on the power sector in China argues that fully-liberalised 
market has some disadvantages when compared with the Chinese reformed plan 
system in terms of welfare production.   
 
Chapter 4 
In the preceding chapter, we find that market is not superior to the reformed plan in 
the power industry.  So what‟s the rationale behind such argument?  This chapter 
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attempts to answer how plan prices are formed in terms of pricing behaviour of a firm.   
  
There are a number of previous papers examined the pricing behaviour of the Western 
power producers (Green and Newbery, 1992; Wolak and Patrick, 1996; Ofgem‟s 
report, 1999; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Woo, Lloyd and Tishler, 2003; Lopez, 
2004).  One of the recent studies (Sweeting, 2007) showed that the dominant 
producers “could have increased their short-run profits by submitting lower bids and 
increasing their output”, which suggests that “generators exercised considerable 
market power in the late 1990s despite falling market concentration”.  However, 
most of the western studies are based on the oligopoly model, which may not be able 
to explain the Chinese situation, because the Chinese power sector is still under the 
plan control rather than a liberalised market economy.   
 
There are also a plenty of articles about the Chinese power sector (Li and Dorian 1995, 
Andrews-Speed and Dow 2000, Hafsi and Tian 2005, Xu and Chen 2006, Hang and 
Tu 2007 and Yang 2008).  Wang (2007) in his paper suggested the link between the 
electricity prices and the fuel prices.  Liu, Wang and Song (2007) suggested that the 
power plant would be paid according to “the guaranteed rates of return and total costs 
of the plant”.  Unfortunately, most of them didn‟t use the quantitative methods to 
measure the pricing behaviour of the Chinese power firms.  Lam‟s study (2004) is 
the only paper among them, which provides the empirical estimation of the pricing 
behaviour of the Chinese power firms.  By adopting the cross-sectional data for the 
year 1998, he claimed that “the electricity prices across China are mainly determined 
by short run cost factors, like fuel costs and investment expenditure.”  However, 
Lam employed the catalogue price rather than the on-grid price for his model, because 
the power generators were not separated from the grids before 2002.  It means that 
the dependent variable in Lam‟s study not only includes the ex-factory prices but also 
the prices of the transmission and the distribution, which only examined the situation 
before the power producers was separated from the transmission business.   
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Against the background above, this study is aimed to fill up a research gap of study in 
pricing behaviour of Chinese power producers, using ex-factory on-grid prices to 
estimate southern Chinese provinces over the period from 2003 to 2005.   
 
Unlike the West, the Chinese power sector is facing a reformed plan system.  The 
plan price is formed on the basis of certain pre-determined formula and then adjusted 
on the basis of the particular cost condition of each plant.  It‟s reasonable to assume 
that the state planner plans an aggregate price in order to maximise the total output of 
the whole industry for given resources available at time.  Under the assumption that 
the higher cost technology has the dominant effect on setting up a plan price.  On the 
basis of this assumption, a price can be explained by both the output of supply and the 
cost of individual generator.  Under the special institutional arrangement of the 
one-price-for-one-plant, the firm is expected to play a high cost strategy, where the 
state planner sets up a higher price for accommodating generator‟s higher costs.  In 
other words, costs would be a central factor to affect the plan price of the power 
generators in China.  In order to test this expectation, a price function is developed 
by including the variables of the total regional output, the average unit cost of rivals, 
the cost of capital, the fuel cost, the unit cost of the individual generator, and also the 
dummy variables to identify the location and the affiliation of those observations.  
We test these cost-related factors.  And the load factor is added in into the second 
model to test if there is any existence of a soft price constraint.  Besides, the robust 
tests are also specified for the models. 
 
Through our econometric tests on the pricing model, we find that the negative 
relationship between the profitability and the price.  This indicates that the 
high-costs plants get the bargaining power to the government to grant them with 
higher price in selling their high cost electricity.  This also implies that there is no 
market competition at all in selling power in China.   
 
Moreover, we also find a positive relationship between the lagged regional market 
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share and the profit margin.  It means that the large producers have more bargaining 
power to negotiate with the state for more planned output, and more output will help 
the firm improve utilisation of capacity and so profit.  Another interesting finding is 
that the negative relationship between the price and total output of power.  This 
empirical phenomenon implies that the state intends to plan a low price in favour of 
economic growth.     
 
Chapter 5 
There are two important issues in assessing supply of power: pricing producer‟s 
outputs and capacity of firms.  Having studies the pricing, the thesis also investigates 
what determines capacity expansion in China‟s power supply.  Due to lack of 
firm-level data, we study the capacity issue at a regional level with reference to 
OECD experience.   
 
There are many previous studies (Ramcharran, 1990; Stern, 1993; Ghosh, 2002; 
Hondroyiannis, Lolos and Papapetrou, 2002; Shiu and Lam, 2004; Crompton and Wu, 
2005; He, Zhao, Li and Huang, 2006; Yoo, 2006; Yoo and Kim, 2006; Lee and Chang, 
2007; Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 2007; Yuan, Zhao, Yu and Hu, 2007; Yuan, 
Kang, Zhao and Hu, 2008; Abosedra, Dah and Ghosh, 2009; Apergis and Payne, 2009; 
Wolde-Rufael, 2009) estimating the power consumption with explanatory forced 
economic growth, using the error correction model.  However, the error correction 
model only tests the causality relationship between the power consumption and the 
GDP but ignored other potential factors.  Bianco, Manca and Nardini (2009) tested 
the electricity prices in addition to the real GDP.  And the results showed that the 
power consumption was relevant to the GDP rather than the electricity prices in Italy.  
Wu (2009) performed a similar work with the Chinese provincial data in 2004.  He 
employed the multivariate linear model to test the GDP, the electricity price, the 
population, and the economic structure upon the power consumption, and found the 
negative impact of the electricity price and the positive impact of the other three upon 
the dependent variable.  Those studies hold a common assumption that power 
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consumption drives power production, so that consumption in a key determinant for 
production and so production capacity as well.   
 
Rosen (2007) made a very comprehensive description about the Chinese energy sector, 
from the driving demand, energy supply system, and global impacts, including the 
electricity industry.  It suggested that the heavy industry is driving the energy 
demand in China at the moment, and also claimed that “strong corporate interests on 
both the supply and demand sides” encourages the capacity expansion in China.  
Kroeber (2008) discussed the issue of the power generation capacity in China, from a 
wide scope covering the demand, the supply, the ownership, the pricing and the profit 
distribution of the entire power supply system.  And he concluded that it would only 
encourage “the construction of more unneeded generating capacity”, by “simply 
raising end-user electricity prices”.  Again, Ma, Oxley, Gibson (2009) presented the 
situation capacity building and claimed that “although capacity building in the 
electricity production sector increased rapidly in China, it remains the case that it still 
cannot meet the rising demand for electricity.”  However, those studies didn't employ 
statistical data to pursue econometric verification of their arguments on what drives 
capacity of power supply in China.   
 
In order to extend the previous studies in this field, the thesis performs the following 
tasks: 
1) It examines a group of direct and indirect factors, which would affect the capacity 
expansion in China, through rigorous econometric tests;   
2) It compares Chinese case with other international cases, which provides a 
comparative understanding of Chinese experience;   
3) It uses the latest time-series data up to 2006, rather than the cross-sectional data 
in one year, to provide the up-to-date results of tests.   
 
Following the introduction, it‟s a comprehensive description about the power demand 
and supply in China, from the point of view of economic development, power 
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consumption pattern, installed capacity, international power trades and the electricity 
prices, with an international comparison to other six OECD countries.  It reveals the 
facts that the power-intensive industries dominate China‟s economic growth at the 
moment.  To satisfy the fast growing demands for power, the state planner adopts the 
option of building up more power plants.  Thus, such energy strategy makes China 
as one of biggest power consumers in this world, with increasing power-intensity in 
recent years.   
 
A two-stage-estimation approach is performed, to identify the direct and indirect 
factors for the capacity expansion of the power supply in China and also other six 
OECD countries.  In the first stage, the demand function is specified to test both the 
long-run and short-run relationships impact of the determinants on the power 
consumption.  In the second stage, the power supply function is specified, where the 
power consumption and several other variables are tested to explain the capacity 
expansion.  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test is performed as a criterion 
to identify the stationarity of those time-series variables of all the seven countries.  
The Granger causality tests are also performed to confirm the validity of the empirical 
model.  In terms of the OECD countries, the real GDP is employed as the proxy of 
the demand in the second stage.  In terms of China, both the real GDP and the power 
consumption are tested along with other variables, such as load factor and electricity 
prices.   
 
There are several findings are obtained from our estimation results.  In terms of 
those OECD countries except Germany, the economic structure didn‟t show a positive 
relationship with the power consumption in the long run.  But, in China, both the 
economic development and structure have the positive impact upon the power 
consumption.  And, an increase in the long-run plan price, but not the short-run price 
adjustment, would have negative impact on the power consumption in China.  This 
finding is consistent with our argument developed from the pricing study that the state 
intends to plan a low price in favour of growth of economy.  Our estimation also 
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shows the positive relationship between the supply capacity and the economic growth 
in China.  It suggests that the increase in power consumption can change the 
capacity utilisation of the power industry to promote further investment in capacity, 
which is a generic phenomenon across different countries including China.  
Moreover, it also suggests that the change of end prices would not have any impact on 
the growth of the capacity in China, which confirms our argument that the 
competition of the Chinese power plants is not in the price but in the capacity.   
 
One implication of our findings is that, by taking into account the current global 
financial crisis, it could be reasonable for the state to limit its high growth of the 
generation capacity and also close more small and inefficient plants, so as to 
restructure the power industry in China.  Otherwise, it may cause the massive 
overcapacity problem in the foreseeable future, if the current trend of the capacity 
expansion investment continues.   
 
1.5.  Summary and contributions 
Although the power sector in China has never been fully liberalised from the plan 
mechanism, it has achieved a rapid development since 1980s.  Therefore, this thesis 
tries to explain the rationale behind such phenomenon, through study of three topics 
of the Chinese power supply with an international reference, i.e. the price and cost 
structure, the pricing behaviour and the capacity expansion.   
 
Through the comparison of the price schemes between China and the West, we 
discover that China has successfully kept its household prices at a relatively low level 
just as its industrial prices, while the West countries tried to provide the competitive 
industrial prices at the expense of the household users.  With the further insight into 
the cost structure of both the UK and Chinese power plants, we also find that the 
Chinese generators actually have various cost advantages over their West peers, but 
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with a relatively lower profit margin.  Thus, it could bring down the overall level of 
the electricity price in China.  Again, it also suggests that the Chinese power supply 
under the plan mechanism would effectively protect the benefits of small consumers, 
compared to the West.   
 
In such a situation, the state wants to set a proper electricity price to balance the 
interests of different groups in China.  In other words, the plan price should be high 
enough to encourage the power production, but should not be too high for other 
industries.  The empirical evidence shows that the state planner allows part of the 
cost inflation to be passed to the grids, but doesn‟t tolerate the inefficient power 
generation.  Although the inflation of the fuel costs and the cost of capital are 
covered by the electricity prices, the generator still needs all kinds of way to lower 
down its overall generation costs to yield higher profits and also to meet the given 
output requirements.  Besides, the evidence also shows that the large plants would 
gain high the profit margin.  It implies that the state planner would give the 
production priority to the large plants with higher efficiency.  Those findings could 
perfectly explain the rapid growth of the output and the great advance in the thermal 
efficiency of the Chinese power supply for the last three decades.   
 
As there is no competition in the price, it‟s assumed that the power plants in China 
would compete with each other in the capacity expansion.  The capacity built in 
China is heavily driven by the power demand and the load factor, while the economic 
growth has significant and positive impact upon power consumption.  In order to 
smooth the swing from the power shortage to power surplus in short-term, one 
strategy is to change the economic structure of China.   
 
As becoming the second largest power consumer in the world, it‟s important for China 
to improve its overall power profile.  To achieve this, one option for China is to 
convert its heavy-industry-oriented economy to an energy-efficient pattern.  Some 
studies advocate that the price reform could be an alternative way to reach the same 
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target.  However, our evidence shows that the price increase would have very limited 
effect.  Moreover, if most of the price inflation falls on the household users, their 
benefits will be damaged, just as experienced by the West.   
 
Although the price increase is welcomed by the power firms in China, it‟s found that 
there is no direct link between the price and the capacity.  In fact, the Chinese power 
firms earn higher profit through higher outputs in the context of the fast growing 
economy.  Because the price and outputs of the power firm are still controlled by the 
state, the only way for the Chinese power firm to take up larger market share is to 
have larger share of supply capacity.  Such arrangement encourages the competition 
in the capacity in China‟s power generation industry.  It could be especially true in 
the economic-booming period.  But, it normally takes around two years to finish the 
construction of a new power plant.  The on-going economic downturn would 
eventually lead to an undesired result, where the newly-built supply capacity would 
become excessive and idle, and it could be difficult for the investment to earn 
sufficient return.   
 
Overall, this study intends to present a view of the pro and con of both the plan 
mechanism and the market mechanism.  With our data and international comparison, 
it extends and challenges the current prevailing view about the Chinese power supply.  
The Chinese reformed plan system is effective in terms of promoting small users‟ 
benefits, economic growth, and the power supply.  The study reminds the policy 
maker of the risks and problems of the electricity market in the West, which are 
ignored by most of the Chinese studies about the power supply.  Thus, it intends to 
provide the meaningful and helpful implications for the market-oriented reform of the 
Chinese power supplies in the future.   
 
 
  23 
Chapter 2.  The Overview of the Electric Power 
Industry in China 
2.1.  Introduction 
As the second largest power producer in the world, China produced over 3.4 billion 
MWh electric power in 2008, and consumed the equivalent.  The Chinese electricity 
sector, which was dominated by the coal-fired plants, has expanded dramatically for 
about three decades to power its fast growing economy.   
 
The state has reformed the electricity sector by opening its entry to the market and 
commercialise state-owned power companies.  Although the restriction upon 
capacity investment has been removed, the output and price of the electricity are still 
on the hand of the government.  Furthermore, the grids have been separated from the 
power generation, the vertical unbundling has not yet finished.   
 
This chapter attempts to provide a comprehensive overview about the Chinese power 
sector, with the discussion and implication for the policy makers about the 
market-oriented reform in the power generation and transmission sectors in the next 
step.  It covers a wide range of topics, including the reform history, the power 
generation, the power transmission, the electricity price control and the conflicts 
between the coal and electricity prices, on the basis of the previous studies, the 
historical events, the latest news and the fresh data.   
 
This chapter is structured into seven parts.  The first part is the introduction herein.  
The second part reviewed the history of the electric power sector reform in China.  
The third part describes the current status of the power generation sector, and the 
ownership of the generation capacity.  The fourth part describes the power 
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transmission sector, with the reference to the special distribution of the energy sources 
in China.  The fifth part is about the governmental control of the electricity price.  
The sixth part is about the coal supply and the price conflicts between the coal and 
power producers.  The last part presents the summary and conclusion.   
 
2.2.  The electric power sector reform in China 
Since the 1980s, the state planner has committed to carry out a gradual reform to 
establish the market mechanism in the electricity sector.  However, there are 
different models of power supply system in the world, even in the western countries.  
We should notice that there is no best or universal model in management of power 
supply.  All countries keep on evolving their power supply system gradually, in order 
to match up the technology advances and the environmental changes.  Among those 
different models, England was the one of the pilots to carry out the vertical 
unbundling reform of its electric power sector.  Thus, it has been chosen as the 
benchmark to compare with the market-oriented reform in China throughout this 
study.   
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Table 2.1  Bundling and Unbundling in the Western Countries 
Separation of Transmission and Generation Separation of Distribution and Retail Country 
























Source: Nanbu, T., (2003), "System Technology and Market Mechanism: System Design of the Electric Power 
Liberalisation", Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, pp.39. 
Notes: 1) Distribution could be different in different states. 
 
The electric power sector in China has experienced a series of reform, since the 
establishment of the new republic.  According to Yeoh and Rajaraman (2004), there 
are four periods in the history of the Chinese power industry, which take it from the 
plan mechanism towards the market-oriented reforms.   
 
Stage 1 (between 1949 and 1985) 
  26 
A British, R.W. Little, founded the first power plant in China in 1882
2
.  Before 1949, 
the Chinese electricity industry was invested by various investors, including private, 
government and foreign funds, but most of the electric assets were held by foreigners 
(Yang, 2006).  Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has come to power and all 
of the industries were owned and managed by the government, under the “centrally 
planned” economy of the Soviet model.  The electric power industry was not an 
exception.  Between 1949 and 1978, it became “a vertically integrated state-owned 
utility” (Yang, 2006).  The Ministry of Electricity in the central government was the 
highest controller and was supported by “the regional, provincial, municipal, and 
county power bureaus” (Yeoh and Rajaraman, 2004).  It means that the power 
generation, transmission, distribution and retail are all planned, managed, regulated 
and owned by the central government.   
 
The government also set “the directive price” by different catalogues for the end users, 
such as the illuminating price, non-industrial price, the common-industrial price, and 
the big-industrial price. The price setting procedures were opaque (Yang, 2006).  The 
price only covered the operational costs and the asset depreciation of the plants and 
the grids (Wang, 2006), and it is irrelevant to the supply-and-demand equilibrium.  
The “on-grid price” and the profit didn‟t exist, as they were not allowed under the 
framework of the plan economy.   
 
As the power supply could only be funded by the central government, the insufficient 
governmental investment resulted in the national-wide power shortages for a long 
period.  Besides that, the electric power industry was also suffered by the syndrome 
of the plan economy, such as the low productivity, and the management dilemma.  
After 1978, China started the economic reform, which multiplied the seriousness of 
the power shortages.  After 7 years, the government eventually decided to launch the 
reform of the electric power industry, so as to provide sufficient power supplies for 
                                                             
2 “The history of the early development of the electric light in China, starting from Shanghai”, 
http://info.lamp.hc360.com/2009/08/10114957376.shtml, visited on August 3, 2010. 
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the booming economic development.   
 
Stage 2 (between 1985 and 1997) 
Since 1985, the state has issued a series of policies to encourage the investment into 
the power sector to increase the capacity of the generation and the output of the 
electricity.  During this period, the reform was characterised by the following 
features:   
1) First, the state issued the notice of “Provisional Regulations on Promoting 
Fund-Raising for Investment in the Power Sector and Implementing Different 
Power Prices” to sweep the restrictions upon the market entry.  Since then, 
besides the central government, the local governments, the private and foreign 
investors were all allowed to invest into the power sector, and the independent 
power producers (IPPs) were then created.   
2) The new “guidance price” were introduced, which not only covered the 
operational costs and depreciation, but also included a certain profit margin for the 
generator.  The price could be set on the basis of the particular situation of each 
plant, which is known as the “one-price-for-one-plant” scheme.  Such pricing 
arrangement is treated as a kind of incentive for the plants to provide more outputs.  
But, the old “directive price” was not immediately cancelled at the same time.   
3) The taxation rebate was allowed, as preferential condition.   
 
Overall speaking, this reform achieved great success, as the development of the 
electric power sector started to accelerate in China.  From 1985 to 1997, the total 




Stage 3 (between 1997 and 2002) 
In order to separate the administrative authority from the enterprise, the Ministry of 
Electricity was replaced by the State Electric Power Corporation.  The administrative 
authority of the Ministry of Electricity was transferred to the State Economic and 
                                                             
3 The calculation is based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.   
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Trade Committee, while the managerial responsibility together with most of its assets 
was completely transferred to the State Electric Power Corporation (SEPC).  Thus, 
the State Electric Power Corporation became a tycoon of power supply in China.  It 
held almost all of the regional power generators throughout China, except those in 
Guangdong, Hainan, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.  It also held all the transmission and 
a large proportion of the distribution networks in this country.  It means that the State 
Electric Power Corporation played the roles of both the generator and the grid.  But, 
some independent power producers still existed, outside of the State Electric Power 
Corporation.  The structure of the power supply system during that period can be 
simplified into the chart Figure 2.1: 
 
As the independent power producers were separated from the networks controlled by 
the State Electric Power Corporation, it implies that the concept of the “on-grid price” 
was forming.  Actually, any new plant built after 1997 started to use the so-called 
“average on-grid price” over its useful life, which covered the operational costs, the 
interests, the taxation and also the reasonable return on capital.  But, those prices still 
needed the government approval, just as the “directive price” and the “guidance price” 
before.  The State Electric Power Corporation even conducted an experiment on the 
separation of the power plants from the grids with the competitive on-grid price in 
Zhejiang, Shandong, Shanghai, Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces.  But the 
experiment was eventually halted by the central government in 2000, as it couldn‟t 
overcome “the problem that both the power plants and the grids are owned by the 
same provincial power companies” (Liu and Zheng, 2010).   
 
Stage 4 (after 2002) 
In 2002, the State Council of China issued a decree of “System Reform Plan of 
Electricity Industry”, of which the objectives were “to break the monopoly, introduce 
competition, improve the efficiency, reduce the costs, improve the pricing mechanism, 
optimising the resources allocation, promote the power development, push forward 
the establishment of the national-wide grids, and construct a healthy electricity market 
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under the governmental supervision.” (The Chinese electricity industry report 2005).  
In order to achieve those objectives, this reform fell on two points, i.e. first, the split 
between the generator and the grid; and second, the introduction of the competitive 
on-grid price.   
 
In December 2002, the State Electric Power Corporation was further divided into two 
state-owned grid companies, and five state-owned power producers (Figure 2.2).  In 
May 2003, the State electricity Regulator Commission was established as the national 
regulator of the power industry, so as to separate the administrative authority from the 
regulating.  Thus, the aim of separating the generator from the grid was largely 
achieved.  The on-grid price between the independent power producers and the grids 
formally came into being and finally replaced the “guidance price” and the “directive 
price”.  However, as the power transmission, distribution, and retails were still 
controlled by the grids, there were no transmission price and the distribution price.  
The two grids were criticised as the regional monopolies without sufficient 
cross-regional transmission facilities.   
 
The on-grid price and the end price were still set by the government.  As to the 
plants, the price is set as “one-price-for-one-plant”.  The end price was classified by 
different catalogues, and would be very different among different classification and 
region.  In 2005, the on-grid price was split into “capacity tariff” and “volume tariff”, 
to avoid the boosting the fuel costs (China Electric Power Yearbook 2006).  However, 
such arrangement was suspended later on, as the power stations soon colluded 
together and then bid a high price that the grids companies couldn‟t afford (Wang 
2006). 
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Figure 2.1  The Relationship between the State Electric Power Corporation and 
the Independent Power Producers 
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Figure 2.2  The Separation of the State Electric Power Corporation in 2002 
Source: Ni (2005) 
 
So far, the electric power sector in China has achieved a series of great success.  The 
private and foreign investments are allowed to flow into the power sector, so that the 
social resources could be effectively utilised for the power supply.  The power 
generation and the network are separated.  And the on-grid price and the end price 
are formed, which promotes the efficiency and profitability of the power producers.  
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The administrative authority and the managerial responsibility are also separated, 
which is an important step to build up a market-economic supervision system.   
 
The reformed plan system of the power industry in China is different from the former 
soviet one.  The former soviet system was a full planning system.  Both supply and 
demand were planned according to information provided by the firm.  In contrast, 
demand for power is not planned and it is observable information from market by the 
state.  The state plans aggregate output according to the expected market demand, 
and then divides the aggregate output to individual firms according to their capacity.  
The firm has an incentive to report true capacity that determines how much it can 
produce.  The capacity is not planned.  In short, the state plans outputs for the firm 
according to market demand and capacity, and the firm decides capacity.  The price 
is determined according to the bargain between an individual firm and the state rather 
than the bargain between the producers and the buyers.   
 
If demand in excess of the plan appears, the firm with spare capacity can be called to 
produce more either the plan price or at a negotiable price between the firm and the 
grid, or between the local government of the firm in the region and the local 
government of the end users.   
 
As the Chinese power firms has established modernised corporate governance, the 
incentive for the power firms is to seek more profits through producing more planned 
outputs.  The plan output is linked with capacity, and capacity is set by the firm.  So 
firms compete with capacity and the state provides planed output according to 
capacity at the firm level and market demand at an aggregate level. If the firm makes 
a loss, it can be covered by a higher price to some extent.  But the management will 
lose their profit-linked bonus.  Also, the management faces the risk of replacement 
by the government for performance failure.  This profit-oriented incentive also can 
help reduce the agency costs of the management in the power firms.   
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For the cost information, the distortion is limited.  The accounting and auditing 
practice in China is similar with the UK.  The accounting transactions are recorded 
according to General Accepted Accounting Practice, which compatible to the 
International Accounting Standards.  There are also the independent audit firms to 
perform the annual financial auditing for the firm.  So, it‟s less likely for firms to 
make serious and widespread information distortion in China.  In another aspect, the 
total costs can be inflated due to the high cost strategy.  However, this does not mean 
every item of costs to be infected.  In the thesis, it is informed that the overhead 
costs, such as depreciation, are overstated when compared with the UK companies.  
For material costs, this is decided by the market and the price of coal is not subject to 
the choice of the power producing firms.   
 
For the investment into the power generation sector, the funds mainly come from the 
loan of the banks in line with normal commercial norm.  The decision of the loan 
falls in the hand of bank itself.  The bank will assess the projected return of the new 
plant, according to the size of the capital, the plan price, the output, the construction 
period and etc.  The bank can decline the loan application for a new power plant 
which is small and inefficient.  To get more output allocation from the state, the 
investors have to build large and efficient power plant, which constitutes the 
competition in the capacity expansion.   
 
Both state banks and power corporation are ultimately owned by the state.  The 
ownership is separated from the management that is responsible for profitable 
operation for owners.    
The separation can be ensured to a large extent by introducing a legal system to 
regulate owners of the firm on one hand, and by restructuring owners into a mixed set 
of state and private investors on another.  This modern corporate-governance can 
help operational independency of banks from the state effectively.   
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Although the entry and investment into the power industry is free, it‟s unlikely for the 
investors to build up new small inefficient coal-fired power plants at the moment.  
The government also has the plan to shut down the small inefficient coal-fired power 
plants in recent years.  This is partly required by environmental protection to reduce 
pollution, and partly by economics of scale.   
 
However, such market-oriented reform still has a long-way to go.  The transmission 
and distribution are all owned by the grids and haven‟t separated.  The price and the 
output are still under the governmental control.  The national-wide wholesale market 
has not been built for the price competition and free trades.  Wu and Fu (2005) 
claimed that “the greatest challenge in the restructuring of China‟s power industry is 
to ensure that the market rules send the right signals to ensure a proper level of 
generation investment”.  Simply speaking, the Chinese power industry has not 
cleaned its heavy red colour of the plan economy.   
 
2.3.  The power generation and consumption in China 
The basics of the Chinese power supply 
So far, China has been the second largest electric power producer and consumer in the 
world.  In 2008, Chinese power producers supplied around 3,433 billion kWh 
electric power (National Bureau of Statistics of China), equal to 83% of the US power 
supply, or 880% of the UK power supply (International Energy Agency).   
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Capacity Growth to 
Power Supply Growth 
1991 9.85% 9.05% 1.09 
1997 7.48% 5.09% 1.47 
1998 9.07% 2.07% 4.38 
1999 7.75% 6.51% 1.19 
2000 6.88% 10.98% 0.63 
2004 12.60% 14.79% 0.85 
2005 15.36% 13.16% 1.17 
2006 22.34% 14.54% 1.54 
2007 14.68% 14.87% 0.99 
2008 12.69% 5.45% 2.33 
Average 10.36% 10.02% 1.24 
Source: Calculated on the data from National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Since the 1985, the development of the power supply in China has run on the fast 
tracks.  As shown on Table 2.2, during the period from 1991 to 2008, the average 
growth rate of both the capacity and the generation is around 10%.  However, the 
growth of the capacity exceeds the generation in recent years.  For example, the ratio 
of the capacity growth to the generation growth was 1.17 in 2005 and then reached up 
to 2.33 in 2008.  In 1998, such ratio was even 4.38.  The interesting thing is that 
1998 was the hard time of the Asian financial crisis, and 2008 was on the first stroke 
of global economic downturn.  It means that the power supply is more sensitive to 
the economic fluctuation than the capacity expansion in China.  It also clearly 
indicates that the capacity built in recent years would be too much for the gloomy 
economy in the foreseeable future.   
 
Table 2.3  The Mix of the Chinese Power Supply (2008) 
 
Total Hydro Coal-fired Nuclear and other 
Capacity (MW) 803,800.00 165,360.00 620,170.00 18,270.00 
% 100.00% 20.57% 77.15% 2.27% 
Output (billion kwh) 3,433.40 563.30 2,779.30 90.80 
% 100.00% 16.41% 80.95% 2.64% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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China heavily replies upon the coal-fired plants for its power supply.  In 2008, China 
had a total generation capacity of 803,800 MW, of which 77% was coal-fired plants.  
Actually, the coal-fired plants produced over 80% of the total power in China.  The 
hydro is the second important energy source for the power generation.  In 2008, 
around 16% of the power generated in China came from the hydro power.  From 
1990 to 2008, the capacity of the coal-fired plants increased by six times, and 
coal-fired power generation increased by around 5.6 times.   
 
Table 2.4  The Mix of the Power Supply in the UK and US (2008) 
 




     
Generation 100% 1% 31% 46% 22% 
Capacity 100% 5% 30% 35% 30% 
US 
     
Generation 100% 6% 48% 22% 24% 
Capacity 100% 8% 31% 40% 22% 
Source: the UK data from the Digest of the United Kingdom of Energy Statistics 2009; the US data from the 
Electric Power Annual 2008 
 
Such kind of structure of the power generation in China is very different form the 
Western countries.  In the West, the gas-fired plant plays a very important role in the 
field of the power supply.  In the UK, the gas-fired and coal-fired plants produced 46% 
and 31% of the total power supply respectively in 2008.  In the US, the power 
generated by gas-fired plants also took up around 22% of the total power supply in the 
same year.  Compared to China, the structure of the power supply in the West is 
much more diversified.   
 
Obviously, such heavy reliance upon and rapid growth of the coal-fired power plants 
in China indicate that the state planner failed in diversifying the power supply in 
terms of different generation technologies, and also failed to meet up its commitment 
of implementing more clean-energy facilities in the environmental protection issue.  
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According to Dubash (2003), around 32% of the CO2 and 24% of the NOx emission in 
the world came from the electricity sector in China in 1998.   
 
According to Rosen and Houser (2007), “the annual sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, 
the principal cause of acid rain, have grown by 30 percent since 2000”, and caused 
“over $60 billion in direct economic damage in 2005”.  According to Liu and Zheng 
(2010), only 15% of the Chinese power plants have installed the flu gas 
desulphurisation (FGD) system in 2006, and even fewer are in operation.  According 
to Rosen and House (2007), over half of the FGD capacity was built in 2006, after the 
state issued an incentive policy to allow the plants to pass the cost of the installation 
and operation of FGD equipment to the grids.  Besides, the full commitment to the 
Kyoto protocol is regarded as an important step for China to amend its profile of the 
greenhouse gas emission.  The state planner should put the International Emissions 
Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint 
Implementation (JI) into the consideration of the approval of the new plant in China.  
Thus, the environmental costs can be effectively recognized in the total cost of the 
power generation.     
 
The power demand and economic development in China 
In 2009, China consumed around 3.6 billion MWh electric power and created around 
12,439 billion Yuan industrial value added.  However, the growth of the power 
consumption has been decreased from 15.15% in 2006 to 6.77% in 2009.  And the 
growth of the industrial value added dropped to 14.72% in 2009 from 21.88% in 2006.  
It clearly shows that the recent economic downturn has an adverse effect on industrial 
activities in China and hence the demand for power.   
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Table 2.5  The Power Consumption and the Industrial Value Added 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Power Consumption (Billion MWh) 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.7 
Growth 
 
15.15% 10.82% 8.76% 6.77% 
Industrial Value Added (Billion Yuan) 7,072.98 8,620.42 9,502.02 10,842.72 12,439.31 
Growth 
 
21.88% 10.23% 14.11% 14.72% 
Source: the Development Research Centre of the State Council 
 
Normally, the consumption and supply of the electric power are almost equal to each 
other at an aggregate level.  But, at a provincial aggregate level, the situation 
becomes complex, due to the transmission among different regions.  In order to 
measure the power sufficiency, we divide the power production by the power 
consumption of each province, as shown in Table 2.6.  If the ratio is larger than one, 
it means that the province is a net exporter of power.  If the ratio is smaller than one, 
it means that the province is a net importer of power.  If the ratio is close to one, it 
means that the province is mainly reliant on its own power supply.  In 2007, the ratio 
of self-sufficiency of twenty provinces falls in the range of 0.85 to 1.25.  It means 
that most of the provinces are of the power self-sufficiency.  However, certain large 
municipalities and the economy-advanced provinces have lower self-sufficiency of 
power, while the energy-rich provinces normally turn to be a net exporter of the power.  
For example, Shanghai has an industrial value added per capita of 24,050 Yuan in 
2007, and the ratio of the power self-sufficiency was only around 0.68.  In Guizhou, 
the industrial value added per capita was only 1,960 Yuan, but the ratio was as high as 
2.13.   
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Figure 2.3  The Power Consumption and the Industrial Value Added 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value added, the power generation and power consumption from the 
Development Research Centre of the State Council; the population data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.   
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Table 2.6  The Power Self-sufficiency and the Industrial Value-Added at Provincial Level in China 




Industrial Value Added per 
Capita (1000 Yuan) 
Power Generation 
to Consumption 
Industrial Value Added per 
Capita (1000 Yuan) 
Beijing 0.32 11.32 0.34 11.17 
Tianjin 0.83 21.25 0.79 22.63 
Hebei 1.49 5.63 0.76 6.14 
Shanxi 1.43 6.16 1.28 6.69 
Inner Mongolia 2.89 6.73 1.63 7.99 
Liaoning 0.83 8.99 0.78 10.00 
Jilin 1.10 5.15 1.06 5.83 
Heilongjiang 1.11 6.64 1.09 7.10 
Shanghai 0.72 24.27 0.68 24.05 
Jiangsu 0.91 13.40 0.89 14.49 
Zhejiang 0.97 11.55 0.90 12.18 
Anhui 1.13 2.86 1.10 3.24 
Fujian 1.04 7.44 1.04 8.19 
Jiangxi 0.99 2.66 0.88 3.08 
Shandong 1.17 11.98 1.05 13.34 
Henan 1.18 4.50 1.04 5.18 
Hubei 1.60 4.05 1.58 4.57 
Hunan 1.08 3.12 0.92 3.55 
Guangdong 1.45 11.36 0.88 12.22 
Guangxi 1.49 2.24 1.11 2.55 
Hainan 1.75 2.43 1.14 2.86 
Chongqing 0.73 2.98 0.77 3.39 
Sichuan 1.49 3.29 1.01 3.83 
Guizhou 2.95 1.84 2.13 1.96 
Yunnan 2.03 2.69 1.36 2.80 
Tibet 1.16 0.74 1.03 0.83 
Shaanxi 1.15 4.30 1.12 4.74 
Gansu 1.04 2.95 0.99 3.20 
Qinghai 1.22 4.36 1.04 4.79 
Ningxia 1.02 4.30 1.02 4.57 
Xinjiang 1.36 5.58 1.03 5.82 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value added, the power generation and power consumption from the 
Development Research Centre of the State Council; the population data from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Another interesting finding is that the average electricity price would be higher in the 
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province with higher economic power efficiency.  For example, in 2007, the average 
end price of Shanghai was 0.66 Yuan/kWh in Shanghai, while the industrial value 
added per unit of power consumed was 4.16 Yuan/kWh.  But, in the same year, the 
electricity price in Qinghai was only 0.30 Yuan/kWh, and the economic power 
efficiency was around 0.93 Yuan/kWh only.  Therefore, it means that the 
economic-advanced provinces would attract the power supply from other provinces 
with higher end prices, in order to balance their lower power self-sufficiency.   
 
  
Figure 2.4  The Electricity End Price and the Economic Power Efficiency 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value-added, the electricity end price the power generation and 
power consumption are obtained from the Development Research Centre of the State Council. 
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Table 2.7  The Electricity End Price and the Economic Power Efficiency at Provincial Level in China 
 2006 2007 
Province 
Industrial Value Added per Unit of 
Power Consumed (Yuan/kWh) 
Average End 
Price (Yuan/kWh) 
Industrial Value Added per Unit of 
Power Consumed (Yuan/kWh) 
Average End 
Price (Yuan/kWh) 
Beijing 2.93 0.53 2.74 0.63 
Tianjin 5.27 0.53 5.10 0.54 
Hebei 4.05 0.44 2.11 0.46 
Shanxi 2.03 0.41 1.68 0.42 
Inner Mongolia 3.41 0.35 1.73 0.34 
Liaoning 3.18 0.51 3.16 0.52 
Jilin 3.51 0.49 3.44 0.53 
Heilongjiang 4.44 0.48 4.32 0.52 
Shanghai 4.46 0.65 4.17 0.66 
Jiangsu 4.22 0.59 3.74 0.59 
Zhejiang 3.44 0.57 2.82 0.57 
Anhui 2.72 0.50 2.57 0.51 
Fujian 3.04 0.49 2.93 0.49 
Jiangxi 2.88 0.51 2.63 0.52 
Shandong 5.61 0.48 4.83 0.49 
Henan 3.19 0.43 2.68 0.43 
Hubei 2.79 0.52 2.63 0.53 
Hunan 3.04 0.50 2.57 0.51 
Guangdong 6.44 0.68 4.00 0.69 
Guangxi 3.33 0.45 2.19 0.46 
Hainan 3.76 0.62 2.55 0.61 
Chongqing 2.26 0.51 2.14 0.53 
Sichuan 3.40 0.47 2.64 0.49 
Guizhou 2.10 0.38 1.35 0.39 
Yunnan 3.61 0.39 2.05 0.39 
Tibet 1.59 0.51 1.60 0.51 
Shaanxi 3.19 0.42 2.78 0.43 
Gansu 1.52 0.36 1.36 0.37 
Qinghai 1.06 0.29 0.93 0.31 
Ningxia 0.68 0.36 0.63 0.38 
Xinjiang 4.83 0.42 3.10 0.45 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value-added, the electricity end price the power generation and power 
consumption are obtained from the Development Research Centre of the State Council. 
 
The ownership of the Chinese power producers 
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As the entry restriction upon the power sector was removed in the first wave of the 
reform, the ownership structure of the power generation became diversified, due to 
the massive and various investments.  The private firms and the foreign-invested 
plants have been allowed to operate in China since then.  In 2004, there are 2,956 
power companies (over 4,000 power plants) in the power generation sector, according 
to the statistics of the Bureau of National Statistics of China.  However, 75.78% of 
those plants are small plants with the installed capacity below 50MW.  As the power 
plant in small size normally has lower thermal efficiency, a large number of small and 
medium-sized plants will definitely lower down the overall thermal efficiency of 
China.  In order to improve its overall thermal efficiency, China has to shut down the 
massive small plants and build more large plants to supply the power.  By the end of 
June 2009, China has closed down 7467 small generators, with a total capacity of 54 
million kW
4
.   
 
Table 2.8  China’s “Big Five” in 2006 
 
Huaneng Datang Huadian Guodian CPI Total 
Value of Asset (million RMB) 285,572 226,616 196,100 187,972 181,165 1,077,425 
Market Share (%) 12.90% 10.23% 8.86% 8.49% 8.18% 48.66% 
Installed Capacity (million KW) 57.18 54.06 50.05 44.45 35.50 241.24 
Capacity Share (%) 9.17% 8.67% 8.02% 7.13% 5.69% 38.68% 
Total Generation (TWH) 2,820.35 2,516.21 1,995.11 2,259.10 1,725.04 11,315.81 
Generation Share (%) 9.90% 8.83% 7% 7.93% 6.05% 39.71% 
Source: Qing Zhang, Regulatory Framework for the Electricity Industry in China (PPT presentation) 
 
As mentioned above, the monopoly of the State Electric Power Corporation has 
already been broken down, after continued reform.  In 2006, the “big five” 
generators only took up around 38.7% of the total capacity and 39.7% of the total 
power generation.  It‟s interested that the concentration in both the capacity and 
generation in China is much smaller than the West, given the whole industry is under 
the plan system.  For example, in Italy, the biggest five power companies took up 
68.7% of total capacity (European data from Eurostat).   
                                                             
4 http://www.chinatibetnews.com/guonei/huanbao/2010-06/07/content_481668.htm, visited on August 9, 2010. 
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The reason why the Chinese power industry is less concentrated than those European 
countries might be that most European countries are much smaller.  Compared to the 
US, the top ten power companies only take up around 23.72% of the total capacity
5
.   
 
Table 2.9  The Power Generation Capacity by Ownership (2007) 
 
2007 Year End 
Net New Capacity installed 
2004-2007 
 GW % of Total GW % of Total 
Big Five 304 43 138 42 
Local Governments 288 40 131 40 
Central government agencies 79 11 40 12 
Private/foreign 43 6 20 6 
Source: Kroeber (2007) 
 
Furthermore, we could find that the Chinese power supply actually is based on “two 
pillars”.  One pillar refers to those “big five” power corporations, which are 
controlled directly by the central government.  They took up around 43% of the total 
capacity at the end of 2007.  Another important pillar refers to those plants 
controlled by the local government, which accounted for 40% of the total capacity.  
The rest capacity can be attributed to the other ownership, such as the central 
government agencies, the private and foreign investments.   
 
During 1990s, China experienced the honeymoon with the foreign-invested power 
companies (Woo, 2005).  The state planner arranged several institutional 
arrangements for the foreign-direct-investment into the Chinese power sector, such as 
“the cooperative joint ventures, wholly-owned foreign ventures, equity joint ventures, 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects, build-operate-own (BOO) projects, commercial 
loans, and stock and bond investments in existing Chinese power enterprises” (Turner, 
1997).  By June 1998, there were 24 foreign invested plants with a total capacity of 
4.9 GW in operation, and another 12 plants with a total capacity of 9.0 GW under 
construction (Blackman and Wu, 1998).   
                                                             
5 It‟s calculated by the Form EIA-860 Annual Electric Generator Report 2009, from US Electricity Information 
Administration. 
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Woo (2005) found three reasons why China attracted the foreign investment into its 
power sector.  The first reason was to seek the foreign capital, because of the tight 
fiscal budget of China in late 1980s and early 1990s.  The second one was to transfer 
the advanced generation technology from the developed countries.  Actually, over 40% 
of the foreign invested plants were larger than 300 MW (Blackman and Wu, 1998).  
The third reason was to introduce the competition, so as to increase the economic 
efficiency of the power generation sector.   
 
However, the foreign investments started to quit the Chinese market since 2002.  
Blackman and Wu (1998) claimed that the “the central government intentionally put 
in place of three "barriers" to FDI, i.e. ownership restrictions, rate of return 
restrictions, and project approval requirements -- in order to limit foreign ownership 
of strategic infrastructure and, perhaps more important, to limit local control of FDI.”  
Thus, by 2007, the private and foreign invested plants only accounted for 6% of the 
total capacity in China, which was rather insignificant.  According to Wee and Wee 
(2003), “despite the promising opportunities generated by China‟s tremendous power 
development needs, reports show that many foreign investors are either substantially 
scaling back operations in the industry or avoiding new exposure to Chinese power 
projects.” 
 
2.4.  The power transmission in China 
The basics of the power transmission in China 
After 2002, the two grids companies were split off from the State Electric Power 
Corporation, i.e. the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) and the South China 
State Grid Corp (SCSG).  Again, the State Grid Corporation consists of five regional 
grid companies.  It means that the power network in China actually has been divided 
into six regional grids.  Those grids are playing a dominating role in the transmission, 
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distribution, wholesale and retail of the electric power.  Interestingly, the power 
shortages in China are found to be characterised by both the regional and seasonal 
features (Liu and Zheng, 2010).  For example, the power plants in the north need to 
operate at full capacity in winter to meet the peak demands for heating, while the 
power shortages occur in the south and the east in summer when demand for air 
conditioning is soaring.   
 
Table 2.10  The Regional Power Grid Companies and Their Service Territories 
Grids Territory 
State Grid Corporation of China 
- North China Power Grid Co. Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia (part), Shandong 
- Northeast China Power Grid Co. Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia (part) 
- East China Power Grid Co. Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian 
- Central China Power Grid Co. Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan 
- Northwest China Power Grid Co. Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
South China State Grid Corporation Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Guizhou, Yunnan 
Source: Ni (2005) 
 
So far, China has already had the largest power network in the world
6
.  In 2007, the 
total length of the circuit of the transmission facility in China exceeded 1.1 million 
kilometres.  However, it doesn‟t mean that China owns an advanced and powerful 
network to transmit the electricity anywhere easily within its territory.  Unlike the 
rapid development of the generation sector, the lack of investment in grid assets has 
harassed China‟s electric power industry for a long time.  By 2007, the circuit above 
220kv only took up 29.7% of the total length in China.  The high-voltage and the 
extra-high-voltage facilities are even less.   
 
Although China has successfully promoted the rapid expansion of power supply 
capacity, it‟s a not easy to achieve a similar success in the power transmission sector.  
As the end prices are planned by the government, the profits of the grids would be 
easily eroded in front of the increasing on-grid price, which is linked to the coal price.  
                                                             
6 “The Prospect of the Chinese Power Network”, 
http://www.zdoy.cn/news/w10186232.asp?lanid=9561&n=1&o=4, visited on August 5, 2010. 
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Thus, it could be difficult to attract investments into the transmission sector. 
 
Another reason could be the regional barrier to the establishment of a unified 
nation-wide power transmission system, which could not be easily offset by the local 
and private incentives and initiatives (Liu and Zheng, 2010).  Actually, the 
interconnection only took up 1% of the total length of the transmission network in 
2007.  Definitely, it would make the nationwide transmission in difficulty.   
 
Table 2.11  The Length of the Transmission Circuit of Chinese Grids in 2007 
Unit: km Total 750kv 500kv 330kv 220kv Above 220kv Below 220kv 
Whole Country 1,106,345 141 96,574 15,493 216,159 328,367 777,978 
Interconnection 11,099 0 10,899 0 200.00 11,099 0 
Source: Chinese Electricity Yearbook 2007, page 743. 
 
Fortunately, this situation has been change recently.  It‟s the first time for the 
investment into the grids exceeds the power generation, due to the stimulus package 
of 4000 billion RMB unleashed by the government (Southern Grid Network 2009) in 
2009.   
 
The distribution of the energy resources and the generation capacity 
The coal is the most important energy source in China.  Over 80% of the power and 
70% of the total energy is supplied from coal (Liu and Zheng, 2010).  Actually, 
China is the largest coal producer in the world, and its coal reserve is sufficient to 
sustain its economic growth for more than 100 years, according to the estimation by 
Fairley (2007).  However, the coal reserves as well as other energy resources are 
distributed unevenly in China.  The northern China has 64% of the coal reserves, and 
the south-western China has over 70% of the hydro reserves (See Table 2.12).  
However, major power users are in the eastern coastal areas of China.  Thus, it 
should be the best option to generate the power in the resource-rich areas and then 
transmit it to the high-demand areas.   
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Table 2.12  The Regional Distribution and Structure of the Energy Resources in China 
Region Total (%) Coal (%) Hydro (%) Oil and Gas (%) 
North 43.9 64 1.8 14.4 
Northeast 3.8 3.1 1.8 48.3 
East 6 6.5 4.4 18.2 
Middle 5.6 3.7 9.5 2.5 
Southwest 28.6 10.7 70 2.5 
Northwest 12.1 12 12.5 14.1 
Source: http://www.sgcc.com.cn/dlkp/dlhb/kpzs/sbdssjbzs/61091.shtml  
 
Although the nationwide transmission network was established in 2005, the facilities 
of the grids are far from the adequacy.  As mentioned above, China only 
implemented 11,099 kilometres interconnection of the network among those six 
regions in 2007.  Within the State Grid Corporation of China, there were eight 500 
KV AC lines, three +/- 500 KV DC lines, and 120 KV DC line, with 12660 MW 
transmission capacity.  And there was only one +/- 500 KV DC line with 3000 MW 
transmission capacity between the State Grid Corporation of China and the South 
China State Grid Corporation.  Obviously, such network facilities are too weak to 
undertake the long-distance transmission of the power.  And, the transmission ability 
between two state-owned grids was especially vulnerable.   
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Figure 2.5  The Grid Interconnection in China (2007) 
Source: Liu and Zheng (2010) 
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Actually the power transmitted among different regions is very limited, due to the 
inadequacy of the long-distance transmission facilities.  In 2006, only 2.03% of the 
total power generated in China was transmitted among the different grid regions.  It 
also implies that the power demand in China is largely satisfied by the local supply, 
rather than the pooling of the whole country.   
 
Table 2.13  The Power Transmitted between Regions in China 
Unit: billion kwh 2006 
Percentage of 
the total power generated 
From Northeast to North 3.26 0.11% 
From Middle to East 23.81 0.84% 
From North to East 11.15 0.39% 
From Middle to South 19.67 0.69% 
Sum 57.89 2.03% 
Total power generated 2850.00 100.00% 
Source: The report of the analysis and advice of the development of the Chinese grids in 2007 
 
In another aspect, it means that the power plants have to be built in the high-demand 
areas, rather than concentrated in the energy-rich areas.  For example, the northern 
region owns over 64% of coal reserves, but only has 13% of the coal-fired capacity 
and 14% of the coal-fired power.  The south-western region has 70% of hydro 
reserves, but only produces 15.7% of the hydro power.  On the contrary, the eastern 
region has only 6.5% coal reserves, but has over 14.5% coal-fired capacity and 14.5% 
of coal-fired power.  It obviously shows that the capacity distribution doesn‟t overlap 
with the distribution of the energy sources in China.  And China allocates more 
capacity for the coastal regions, where the industry is concentrated.   
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Table 2.14  The Distribution of the Regional Installed Capacity and the Power Generation of China (2007) 
 
Installed Capacity 
Unit: % Total Coal-fired Hydro Nuclear Wind Other 
State Grid Co. of China 45.09% 45.65% 42.31% 36.41% 48.00% 21.52% 
North 10.45% 13.08% 1.47% 0.00% 9.15% 1.20% 
Northeast 4.52% 5.02% 2.57% 0.00% 20.28% 2.18% 
East 13.30% 14.50% 7.96% 36.41% 7.38% 14.30% 
Middle 12.47% 9.69% 24.59% 0.00% 0.22% 1.05% 
Northwest 3.81% 3.35% 5.72% 0.00% 10.97% 2.79% 
South China State Grid Co. 10.35% 8.70% 15.38% 27.17% 4.01% 56.96% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 Power Generation 
Unit: % Total Coal-fired Hydro Nuclear Wind Other 
State Grid Co. of China 45.09% 45.84% 42.16% 34.21% 47.73% 32.13% 
North 11.75% 13.92% 0.47% 0.00% 9.35% 1.93% 
Northeast 4.67% 5.29% 1.44% 0.00% 19.68% 1.82% 
East 13.39% 14.25% 5.81% 34.21% 6.76% 23.47% 
Middle 11.21% 8.64% 27.99% 0.00% 1.09% 0.99% 
Northwest 4.08% 3.74% 6.45% 0.00% 10.84% 3.93% 
South China State Grid Co. 9.81% 8.33% 15.67% 31.59% 4.54% 35.73% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Chinese Electricity Yearbook 2008 
 
Again, the local power demand will be satisfied by the local suppliers, rather than the 
power transmitted from other regions.  In order to measure the reliance upon the 
local supply, we calculate the ratio of the power consumption to the power generation 
for each of those six regions.  If the ratio is larger than one, it means that the power 
is transmitted from other regions to the particular region.  If the ratio is less than one, 
it means that the particular region is transmitting the power to others.  Actually, we 
find that the ratio of each region is close to one.  It means that all the six regions 
heavily rely upon the local power supply, rather than the power transmitted between 
different regions.  Although China has almost kept its balance of power consumption 
and production within each region, it has some imbalance between provinces as we 
have shown in Table 2.6.   
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Unit Billion kwh Billion kwh 
 
State Grid Co. of China 2,581.99 2,544.24 1.01 
North 712.05 662.80 1.07 
Northeast 261.75 263.54 0.99 
East 798.28 755.49 1.06 
Middle 582.84 632.47 0.92 
Northwest 223.38 229.94 0.97 
South China State Grid Co. 564.13 553.60 1.02 
Source: Chinese Electricity Yearbook 2008 
 
The provincial level of imbalance between power consumption and production can 
cause a structural shortage of power supply in a region due to a low transmission 
capacity.  For example, there is only one trunk transmission line linking the coal-rich 
area in the north and the industrial area in the south (Kroeber, 2008).  One of the 
direct solutions for such problem is to transport the coal from the northern and 
western provinces to the eastern part of this country, through railway, road, and freight.  
However, it would put significant burden on the existing transportation system, 
increase the fuel costs and also result in the instability of supply.  Those are just the 
unique problems harassing the independent power producers in the coastal regions 
(Woo, 2005).  Liu and Zheng (2010) believed that it could be one of the reasons for 
the power shortages in China.  Kroeber (2008) had the similar understanding and 
claimed that the inadequate investment into transmission sector is the very reason for 
China facing “the electricity shortfall of at least 5% nationwide”, “although China has 
adequate generation capacity”.   
 
The projected development of the grids in China 
Obviously, the development of the long-distance power transmission cannot be slid 
over.  The central government determined to build a unified national grid system to 
ease the less optimism of the capacity distribution and also the localised electricity 
shortages after 2010.  The unified national grid would be based on the middle grid, 
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and connected with other regions around.  According to Liu and Zheng (2010), three 
regional “corridors” of the grids will also be built, i.e. northern, central and southern 
corridors, and they will transmit the electric power nationwide from the west to the 
east.  The integrated national grid will also allow the electricity to be sold 
nationwide at the market determined rates.  According to Liu and Zheng (2010), the 
State Grid Corporation of China would spend 800 billion RMB from 2006 to 2010 to 
upgrade its network facilities, which was expected to “increase the sale of electricity 
to 2,200 billion kilowatt-hours during the same period”.  According to Lou and Gui 
(2007), the Chinese government is aiming to remove such bottleneck of the 
transmission in the current five-year plan with the “1.25 trillion” RMB investment 
into the network facilities.  Obviously, the state will accelerate the development of 
the grids in the near future.   
 
The critical technology for China to build the nationwide grid is the Ultra High 
Voltage (UHV) transmission system (Liu and Zheng, 2010).  The UHV system can 
be classified into the UHVDC and the UHVAC again.  The UHVDC and UHVAC 
refer to the ±800KV direct currency and 1000KV alternating currency respectively.  
So far, a pilot UHV transmission line, called Jindongnan-Nanyang-Jingmen (JNJ), has 
been put into operation since 2006.  The JNJ line connects the North China Power 
Grid with the Central China Power Grid from the Shanxi Province to Henan Province 
with a total length of 640 kilometres.  According to Liu and Zheng (2010), the State 
Grid Corporation of China announced the a further investment of 600 billion RMB to 
build another 15 UHV projects before 2020, in order to link the newly built hydro 
power plants in the southwest to the industrial and residential regions in the east.   
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Table 2.16  The Completed, Under construction, and Proposed UHV projects in China 
Project Distance (km) Voltage (kV) Capacity Start Year Completion Year 
JNJ 654 1000 (AC) 6000 MW 2006 2009 
YG 1438 ±800 (DC) 5000 MW 2006 2010 
XS 1907 ±800 (DC) 6400 MW 2007 2010 
JS 2096 ±800 (DC) 7200 MW 2009 2012 













Sources: Liu and Zheng (2010) 
Notes: JNJ: Jindongnan-Nanyang-Jingmen; YG: Yunnan-Guangdong; XS; Xiangjiaba-Shanghai; JS: Jinping-Sunan; 
NG: Nuozhadu (Yunnan)-Guangdong; LG: Lijiang (Yunnan)-Guangdong; YG: Yongping (Yunnan)-Guangdong 
 
The UHV system is regarded as having strong ability of the long-distance 
transmission with high energy efficiency.  The implement of such technology could 
significant reduce the number of the required transmission corridors.  It would be 
also helpful in environmental protection issue.  The UHV system is also a 
fundamental factor to build up a nationwide electricity wholesale market in the future.  
But, Liu and Zheng (2010) also pointed out that the implement of the UHV network 
would be contradict with the institutional reform plan to break the monopoly set by 
the central government in 2002.  According to the spirit of the reform plan, the 
regional grids under the State Grid Corporation of China will be converted to “the 
independent share-holding companies” to attract the further investment.  A unified 
UHV grid would be expected to reinforce the relationship between the transmission 
and distribution and make it even more difficult to separate the transmission and 
distribution functions apart.  The massive investment required for the nationwide 
UHV projects may also drain out the social resources from improving the 
interconnection between different regional grids.  However, the fragment market 
may also result in the less economy-of-scale.  The best option to balance those issues 
would be “the UK model”, where the grid changed its role as the electricity pool to 
the electricity transporter merely.   
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2.5.  The electricity price control in China 
The price control of the electric power 
A series of reform actions brought the Chinese electric power sector into a kind of 
transitional status, which is different from the traditional plan mechanism, but still far 
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Figure 2.6  The Supply Chain of the Coal-fired Power Plants in China 
 
Under such institutional mechanism, the National Development & Reform 
Commission (NDRC) plays an important role in the supply chain of the electric power.  
The electricity coal refers to the coal supplied to the power producers by plan.  The 
on-grid price refers to the price between the independent power producers and the two 
state-owned grids companies.  The catalogue price refers to the price between the 
grids and the end users.  The price of the electricity coal, the on-grid price and the 
catalogue price are all controlled by the NDRC.  Besides that, the output of the 
individual power producer is also set by the government.  But, it should be noticed 
that, the coal supplier is not fully under the plan mechanism and also can sell the coal 
on the market freely at the market price.  The industrial end users on the supply 
chain are opened to the market competition.  Moreover, the diversified investments 
are allowed to participant in capacity build.  Overall speaking, the government still 
takes significant intervention into the supply chain of the electric power, although not 
every aspect any more.  Thus, the transitional Chinese power industries are still 
painted with the colour of plan mechanism heavily, 
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The state planner designed and then adjusted the structure and arrangements of the 
existing system to maintain the balance between the development, stability, and 
reform (Ngan 2009).  The biggest conflict in the supply chain of the electric power is 
the inflation of the coal price (Lin, 2004).  According to Liu and Zheng (2010), “the 
conflicts between the market coal and the plan electricity intensified due to the virtual 
elimination of the plan coal when the National Annual Coal Price Negotiating 



















Reform of the Electric Power Sectorf r  f t  l tri  r t r
 
Figure 2.7  Institutional Bodies involved in the Reform of the Electric Power Sector in China  
Source: Liu and Zheng (2010) 
 
To solve this problem, the state also intends to reform the power sector by setting up 
reform work place shown in Figure 2.7.  However, the electricity price reform has 
encountered several obstacles in the middle of the way.  The relevant interest groups 
are reluctant to give up their existing privileges and dominant power in the pricing 
reform (Liu and Zheng, 2010).  For example, the state-owned grids refuse to their 
monopolistic position in the power sector, and the NDRC is reluctant to give up the 
job of price setting.  Zhao (2009) also mentioned that the provincial governments are 
not willing to lose the control and authority over the power producers as well.   
 
According to Liu and Zheng (2010), there are three institutional bodies involved in 
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the reform of the electric power sector.  The National Development & Reform 
Commission is taking the charge of the pricing reform.  The State Assets Supervision 
& Administration Commission is taking the charge of the grids reform.  And the 
State Electricity Regulatory Commission is taking the charge of the regulatory reform.  
In order to coordinate the work with those bodies, the Electric Power Reform Work 
Group was established in 2002 under the National Development & Reform 
Commission, and transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission later on.  Obviously, under such dispersed structure, it could be very 
difficult for the State Electricity Regulatory Commission to implement the reform 
directly, smoothly and efficiently.  Such kind of thing looks especially weird in a 
socialist country governed by a communist party.  Thus, it‟s necessary to establish a 
centralised and strong reform body to carry out the further steps of the electric power 
reform.   
 
The features of the electricity price scheme in China 
As mentioned above, the planned electric power sector is designed to provide a 
growing, stable and affordable power supply to fuel the economic development in 
China.  It should be noticed that the plan price of the electricity takes important 
functions in this system.  And the electricity price scheme has several unique 
features, shown as the following:   
 
1) The “dual-track” system of the coal price 
From 1993 to 2007, the Chinese coal industry implemented a so-called “dual-track” 
price scheme.  The coal supplied to the market directly would be charged at the 
market price, while the “electricity coal” supplied to the power producers would 
be charged at the plan price.  Normally, the plan price is lower than the market 
price by around 21% (Energy Data 2005).  Such “dual-track” system is originally 
designed to help lower down the electricity price.  However, it‟s obvious that the 
coal producers are reluctant to fulfil the state plan of supplying the electricity coal 
to the power producers.  Thus, the power producers have to purchase the coal 
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from the market at the market price from time to time, so as to satisfy the rapid 
growth of the power demand.  However, the “on-grid” price of the electricity is 
also under the plan of the government, which could be too low to cover the full 
market price of the coal.  In one hand, such arrangement effectively restricted the 
inflation of the fuel cost and hence the electricity price of the power producers.  
In another hand, it also became an incentive to the power companies to build more 
capacity to obtain more quota of the electricity coal under the plan.  Thus, the 
periodical power shortage and the excess capacity would co-exist in China.   
 
 
2) The discriminated electricity price 
Currently, the state planner categorises and sets eight different “catalogue prices” 
for the end power users in China.  Those catalogue prices are the household price, 
the illuminating price (non-household), the non and common industry price, the 
big industry price (as “the industry price”), the commercial price, the agricultural 
price, and irrigation price for the poor areas and wholesale price (only applied to 
the local grids and certain very large enterprises).  The state planner has several 
considerations in setting the catalogue prices.  The first one is the affordability.  
For example, the users in poor areas may only need to pay twice as low as the 
common household users, and the agricultural users are paying much lower price 
than the industrial users.  From 2000 to 2004, the industrial price increased by 
around 23%, while the agricultural price only increased by 11%.  In another hand, 
the average price would be higher in the economic-developed coastal provinces 
and relatively lower in the poor regions in the western part of the country.  For 
example, in 2006, the average end price in Guangdong was 2.87 Yuan/kWh, while 
it‟s only 0.58 Yuan/kWh in Qinghai.  Lam (2004) studied the cross-sectional data 
in 1998 and found out that the regional income level in China has the positive 
relationship with the regional average catalogue price.  The second consideration 
is the benefits of the small consumers.  Fortunately the state planner keeps the 
household price at the same level with the industrial price.  However, in the West, 
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the household users‟ benefits could be sacrificed to keep the competitiveness of 
the industrial users.  The third consideration is the energy efficiency.  The end 
price is also set to in a way to encourage the energy-saving industries, and 
suppress the energy-consuming ones.  For example, the state planner 
implemented the discriminated price for the cements, steel, and aluminium 
industries, so as to encourage the energy efficiency improvement of those 
industries.   
 
3) The cost-oriented pricing 
In China, the basic composition of the electricity price includes the cost, the 
taxation and the regulated profit margin.  Lam (2004) found that there was a 
positive relationship between the catalogue price and the generation cost.  
Actually, the “one-price-for-one-plant” policy has been applied to most of the 
power plants in China for long time.  The ex-factory price is based on the cost 
and the technology of a particular plant, such as the fuel cost, the transport cost, 
the labour cost.  After 2004, the unified “pole on-grid prices” are issued and 
applied to the newly-built plants.  The pole prices are set by the state on the basis 
of the average cost of the plants by the different types and regions.  Nevertheless, 
the pole price is still a kind of cost-based price.  Therefore, the individual plants 
in China are selling the electricity at different prices, which reflects their general 
cost condition in a particular region.  The plan price is part the strategy of the 
economic development of China (Chapter 4), since the power supply is critical to 
the industrialisation of the country.  The state has a strict control over 
cost-pass-through from power firms to the grid firm.  Usually, it allows 70% of 
an increase in fuel or coal cost to be passed through to the grid firm or the 
end-user price.   
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2.6.  The coal supply for the power generation in China 
The supply and consumption of the coal in China 
As the coal-fired power plants consist of over 77% of the total capacity in China, the 
coal supply is critical to the power sector and even the economic development.   
 
Table 2.17  The Outputs of Coal in China 
 
Output                               Net Imports/(Exports) 
 




1996 1,396,699 2.64% -33,268 -2.38% 
1997 1,387,531 -0.66% -28,717 -2.07% 
1998 1,332,029 -4.00% -30,711 -2.31% 
1999 1,363,997 2.40% -35,766 -2.62% 
2000 1,384,185 1.48% -52,886 -3.82% 
2001 1,471,527 6.31% -87,469 -5.94% 
2002 1,550,400 5.36% -72,638 -4.69% 
2003 1,834,899 18.35% -82,931 -4.52% 
2004 2,122,611 15.68% -68,050 -3.21% 
2005 2,349,518 10.69% -45,553 -1.94% 
2006 2,528,551 7.62% -25,167 -1.00% 
2007 2,691,643 6.45% -2,171 -0.08% 
2008 2,802,000 4.10% -5,094 -0.18% 
Source: China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2009 
 
From 1980 to 2008, the coal output in China increased dramatically from 620 million 
tonnes to 2,802 million tonnes, by around four times.  From 1995 to 2008, the 
compound annual growth rate of the coal output is around 9.64% in China.  The 
interesting thing is that China still has a minor net export of the coal for many years, 
although the electricity coal is in tight supply from time to time.  The net coal export 
reached up to around 5.9% of the total output in 2001, and then dropped to 0.08% in 
2007.  The self-sufficient rate of the coal supply in China is much higher than the 
UK.  In 2008, over 71% of coal supplied in the UK can be attributed to the net 
imports (DUKES 2009).   
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Table 2.18  The Distribution of the Coal Outputs in China (2008) 
Region % Region % Region % Region % 
Shanxi 23.02% Sichuan 3.39% Gansu 1.44% Guangxi 0.16% 
Inner Mongolia 17.92% Hebei 2.91% Jilin 1.42% Zhejiang 0.00% 
Shaanxi 8.62% Yunnan 2.87% Jiangxi 1.18% Guangdong 0.00% 
Henan 7.60% Xinjiang 2.40% Jiangsu 0.87% Tianjin 0.00% 
Shandong 4.90% Liaoning 2.32% Fujian 0.84% Shanghai 0.00% 
Anhui 4.16% Hunan 2.20% Qinghai 0.46% Hainan 0.00% 
Guizhou 4.04% Chongqing 1.67% Hubei 0.38% Tibet 0.00% 
Heilongjiang 3.48% Ningxia 1.54% Beijing 0.21%     
Source: China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2009 
 
As mentioned above, the coal reserves in China is distributed unevenly.  From the 
table above, we could find that the Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Henan, 
Shandong are top five coal-producing provinces in 2008, which altogether account for 
62.44% of the total coal output in China.  Most of the coal outputs are produced in 
the western and northern part of China.  And the economic-advanced coastal 
provinces produce a few coal, such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, Tianjin, and Shanghai.  
Thus, the coal is mainly shipped from the west to the east and from north to the south 
in China (Ma, Oxley and Gibson, 2009).   
 
  60 
 
Figure 2.8  The Coal Consumption by Usage in China and the UK (2008) 
Source: Chinese data from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2009; the UK data 
from the Digest of the United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2009 
 
In China, the power generation sector consumes the largest proportion of the coal 
supplied.  In 2008, over 48% of the coal was supplied to the power plants in China.  
Then another 23% of the coal was used in the industries directly.  In the UK, the 
percentage of the coal used for power consumption is even higher.  It was 83% in 
2008.  But the UK industries only consumed 3% of the coal directly.  Thus, it 
implies that the UK imports the coal mainly for the purpose of power generation, 
while China uses its domestic coal for the electricity generation and also the industrial 
production.   
 
Table 2.19  The Percentage of the Energy Production of China and the UK (2008) 
 
Coal Oil Natural Gas Primary electricity 
China 81.03% 11.28% 4.32% 3.37% 
UK 15.87% 39.04% 40.07% 5.94% 
Source: Chinese data from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2009; the UK data from the Digest of 
the United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2009 
 
In another aspect, the coal is the most important energy resource in China, as it 
accounted for over 80% of the total energy production in 2008.  But in the UK, the 
coal only took up 15.87% of the total energy, below the natural gas and the oil.  Thus, 
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supply of coal, and such reliance is much heavier than any other kinds of energy 
sources.   
 
Table 2.20  The Concentration and Ownership of the Chinese Coal Industry 
Concentration ratio 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CR4 9.54 13.56 13.71 14.65 15.59 17.47 18.3 18.85 20 
CR8 14.71 20.8 20.78 21.59 23.31 24.5 25.41 26.18 27.9 
Production share (%) 
        
Central government 53.82 55.95 50.49 47.25 47 47.61 48.01 48.15 52.27 
Local government 19.44 20.18 18.88 16.25 14.86 13.55 13.72 13.41 14.72 
Township 26.94 23.87 30.63 36.8 38.14 38.84 38.27 38.44 33.01 
Source: Liu and Zheng (2010) 
Notes: CR4 means four-firm concentration ratio, CR8 means eight-firm concentration ratio. 
 
Despite of the rapid growth, the Chinese coal industry has a much fragmented market 
concentration.  In 2008, the four-firm concentration ratio was only 20, and the 
eight-firm concentration ratio didn‟t exceed 30%.  Compared to the situation in the 
UK, the top-five firms accounted for over 79% of total output of coal in 2004
7
.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese coal industry becomes more and more concentrated, as the 
CR8 rose by around 13.19% from 2000 to 2008.  As the market concentration of the 
coal sector is smaller than the power generation sector, it implies that the large power 
producers should have greater bargaining power than the coal producers in the coal 
price negotiation.  However, with the consolidation of the coal market, the 
bargaining power of the power producers is losing.   
 
However, we noticed that the largest UK coal producer is much smaller than the 
Chinese one.  In 2009, the top coal producer in the UK, UK Coal, produced 6.9 
million tonnes of coal (around 40% of total output in the UK), while the top coal 
producer in China, Shenghua, produced 328 million tonnes of coal (around 10% of 
the total output in China).  The output of the former one only equals to 2.1% of the 
                                                             
7 Concentration ratios for businesses by industry in 2004, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/economic_trends/ET635Mahajan_Concentration_Ratios_2004.pdf, visited on 
August 13th, 2010. 
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latter one.  In 2009, the top US produced 189.2 million tons of coal, represents 17.6% 
of the total coal production.  The total coal production in the US was 1.075 billion 
tonnes, equal to 35% of China
8
.  This indicates that the market size matters for the 
concentration of the industry.   
 
From Table 2.16, we also can find that the importance of the small coal mines owned 
by township had been increasing dramatically over the past ten years, because of the 
growing demand for the coal from the Chinese industries.  From 2000 to 2007, the 
production share of the small coal mine increased from 26.94% to 38.44%.  Actually, 
over 90% of them are small coal mines
9
.   
 
Table 2.21  Coal Mine Accidents and Deaths in China 
Year Number of accidents Deaths Death rate per million tons of coal 
2000 2,863 5,798 5.8 
2001 3,082 5,670 5.11 
2002 4,344 6,995 4.93 
2003 4,143 6,434 4 
2004 3,639 6,027 3.01 
2005 3,341 5,986 2.73 
2006 2,945 4,746 1.99 
2007  3,770 1.44 
2008  3,210 1.18 
2009 1,616 2,631 0.89 
Source: State Administration of Work Safety, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=1155 
 
However, there are lots of headaches associated with the small coal mines, such as the 
inefficiency of production, the coal mine accidents, the poor corporate governance, 
and the damages to the environment.  From Table 2.17, we could find that China is 
suffering heavy casualties in the coal production.  During the period from 2002 to 
2004, more than six thousands of workers died in the coal mine accidents each year.  
It should be noticed that over 73% of the deaths come from the accidents in the small 
                                                             
8 Major U.S. Coal Producers, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/table10.html, visited on 19th March, 
2010.    
9 Coal power in China, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal_power_in_China, visited on August 13th, 2010.   
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coal mines
10
.  It‟s justified to say that the coal supply in China is not only paid by 
money, but also by lives.   
 
Table 2.22  Number of Mines Remaining in Shanxi at the End of 2010 
City in Shanxi Province Number of mines 
Taiyuan  50 













Therefore, in recent years, the state plans to close and restructure the small coal mines, 
to improve the overall safety records, the corporate governance, and also the 
production efficiency.  As the largest coal-producing province, Shanxi should be the 
first one to restructure the regional coal mines to bring down the death toll of the coal 
mine accidents.  The state plans to consolidate the output capacity to build up large 
mines with safer and better facilities.   It‟s planned to establish three enterprise 
groups with the output capacity over 100 million tonnes, four groups with the output 
capacity over 50 million tonnes, and ten groups with the output capacity over 10 
million tonnes.  The coal mines with the output capacity below 900 thousand tonnes, 
and the coal companies with the output capacity below 3 million tonnes are all 
ordered to be closed.  Thus, the total coal mines have been reduced from 4,878 in 
2003 to 2,598 in 2008, and only 1,000 mines will remain at most by the end of 2010
11
.  
From the point of view of the whole country, more than 12 thousands small coal 
                                                             
10 http://cn.chinagate.cn/economics/2009-01/20/content_17156964.htm, visited on August 13th, 2010. 
11 http://xz.daynews.com.cn/2009/0329/article_44868.html, visited on August 14th, 2010. 
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mines have been closed since 2005
12
.  According to Table 2.17, the death toll has 
been reduced to 2,631 in 2009, by around 63% since 2002.  And the death rate per 
million tonnes of coal was only 0.89, which was the lowest record in the past ten 
years.  However, it‟s reasonable to expect the raise of the coal price in future, as the 
state is building dominant coal suppliers who would naturally and easily gain the 
market power under the market mechanism, if in the absence of proper regulation.   
 
The reform of the coal price in China 
Generally speaking, the reform of the coal industry in China experienced five stages 
towards a market mechanism
13
.   
  
                                                             
12 http://msn.biz.smgbb.cn/MsnFinance/postPage/2009/09/18/posting_common_7c7c0b4a-c0c2-4d97-8f50-9b492bb155c8_1.shtml, 
visited on August 13th, 2010. 
13 http://xcyszx.blog.163.com/blog/static/316139200912562623264/, visited on August 14th, 2010. 
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Table 2.23  The Timeline of the Coal Price Reform in China 
Period Pricing mechanism Pricing regime 
1949 – 1992 
Stage 1 
Plan mechanism 1) Ministry of Coal Industry; 
2) State Pricing Bureau 
1993 – 1997  
Stage 2 
Dual-track system 
Gradual introduction of the market price with the exception of 
the electricity coal, of which the price was set by the state 
planner. 
1) State Development and Planning 
Committee;  
2) Annual Electricity Coal Convention;  
3) The government coordination 
1998 – 2001 
Stage 3 
Dual-track system 
Further development of the market mechanism 
2002 – 2006 
Stage 4 
Dual-track system 
1) Market price with gradual abolishment of the state 
guidance price 
2) Encouraging the meetings between the supply and the 
demand sides 





2007 – 2008 
Stage 4 
The abandonment of the National Annual Coal Price 
Negotiating Conference 
2009 –  
Stage 5 
The cancelation of the 2010 Coal TV Conference  
Source: http://xcyszx.blog.163.com/blog/static/316139200912562623264/ 
 
Until 1992, the quota and the price of the coal output are in the hand of the 
government, i.e. the Ministry of Coal Industry and the State Pricing Bureau.  After 
1992, the market-oriented reform of the coal industry was launched in China, and the 
power of the Ministry of Coal Industry was transferred to the State Development and 
Planning Committee.  The market price of coal was also introduced into practice, in 
order to tie in with the price reform at that time.  But, the plan price of the electricity 
coal was retained.  The price of the electricity coal was negotiated on the Annual 
Electricity Coal Convention, under the guidance price set by the State Development 
and Planning Committee, with the governmental coordination.  Such kind of the 
pricing mechanism is known as dual-track system.  From 1998 to 2001, the state 
carried out further development of the market mechanism in the coal industries.  In 
the stage four, the state guidance of the electricity coal was relieved gradually and the 
negotiated price between the supply and demand sides was encouraged by the 
government.  However, the government still took significant effect upon the 
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negotiation between the supply and demand sides upon the price of the electricity coal, 
where the price cap would be put to restrict the sudden jump of the price of the 
electricity coal.  During this period, the National Development & Reform 
Commission took the regulatory responsibility.  In 2007, the “National Annual Coal 
Price Negotiating Conference” was abandoned, and replaced by the coal TV 
conference instead, which was cancelled by the NDRC two years later.  Since 2009, 
the market price has been fully applied to the coal industry, and the government 
declared the cease of the control over the price of the electricity coal.   
 
Table 2.24  The Price of the Coal and Electricity in China (1997-2004) 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Average market coal price 
(Yuan/Tonne) 
166 160 142 140 150 167 178 206 
Average electricity coal 
price (Yuan/Tonne) 
137 133 121 120 123 137 145 161 
Differences (Yuan/Tonne) 29 26 21 19 27 30 33 44 
Differences % 21.17% 19.55% 17.36% 15.83% 21.95% 21.90% 22.76% 27.33% 
Average electricity price (Yuan/kWh) 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.46 
Growth of the average  
electricity coal price % 
-2.92% -9.02% -0.83% 2.50% 11.38% 5.84% 11.03% 
Growth of the industrial  
electricity price % 
  2.15% 6.04% 5.70% 7.29% 
Source: the coal price from Lin, Dong and Li (2004), and the electricity price from the Electricity Market and 
Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005 
 
Such decentralised and market-oriented reform of the coal industry attempts to foster 
a free competitive environment to boost the coal supply to support the rapid economic 
growth in the past two decades.  However, it‟s reasonable to expect a great rise in the 
coal price for the power generators if the governmental price control would be fully 
removed.  As mentioned above, the guidance price of the coal was gradually 
abolished since 2002.  And it clearly shows that the growth of the electricity coal 
price jumped from 2.50% in 2001 to 11.38% in 2002.  In another aspect, because of 
the governmental control, the growth of the electricity price from 2001 to 2004 was 
always lower than the coal price, despite of the coal-power linkage.  For example, in 
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2002, the former one was lower than the latter one by 5.34%.  Actually, the market 
coal price is lower than the electricity coal price by around 21% on average, due to 
the government control.  If the government loses the control over the price of the 
coal supplied to the power producers, it‟s very likely that the power generators would 
face considerable pressure of the fuel price hikes immediately.  According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China
14
, over 40% of the power producers made 
losses in early 2008, when the coal industry achieved an average profit growth of 
66.8%.  Moreover, the State Grid Corporation of China only achieved a profit of 
9.66 billion RMB in 2008, i.e. a sharp decrease of 75% from 2007, and would face a 
further loss of 45 billion RMB in 2009, due to the conflicts between the coal price and 
the electricity price
15
.  That‟s why Lin (2004) advocated the full lift of the price 
control over the on-grid price and the end price, so as to pass the inflation of the coal 
price to the electric power users and then secure the profit of the entire electric power 
sector.   
 
The current issue and future’s actions 
In order the deal with the conflicts between the coal industry and power industry, 
there are several options that could be considered by the state: 
 
1) The monitoring of the coal price and the regulator‟s intervene  
The regulator will intervene to the market if the coal price grows to an unacceptable 
level that will treat the survival of power companies.  On December 17
th
, 2009, the 
NDRC cancelled the 2010 coal TV conference, which was interpreted as a major step 
towards a thorough coal market.  However, in March 2010, the NDRC announced 
the new of pushing the build of the pricing indexes of the electricity coal.  It implies 
that the government attempts to strengthen, rather than to loose, the monitoring of the 
coal price, although the NDRC emphasised that coal price should be determined by 
the direct negotiation and agreement between the supply and demand parties.  
                                                             
14 http://info.electric.hc360.com/2008/04/11084363228.shtml, visited on August 15th, 2010.   
15 http://news.qq.com/a/20090313/000054.htm, visited on August 15th, 2010.   
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Actually, there was no substantial agreement has been reached between December 
2008 and June 2009, because of the conflicts of the coal price.  Thus, the NDRC 
raised the non-residential prices of electricity by around 5.4% from November 2009 
to relief the losses of the grid companies
16
.  In the early 2010, the coal supply 
shortages stroke China, and it pushed the NDRC to intervene the coal price 
negotiation again.  It‟s reported that the agreed coal price in 2010 would be 30 
Yuan/Tonne higher than the corresponding figure of last year on average (Liu and 
Zheng, 2010).  The massive closure of the small coal mines could be the reason for 
such coal supply shortage.  It also implies that the governmental intervene would be 
still essential for the coal industry and electricity industry at the current stage of 
reform.   
 
2) The integration of the power and coal producers 
The integration of the power and coal industries could be another possible option to 
deal with the conflicts of the coal price.  The so-called Huai-Hu Model is a good 
example.  The Shanghai Power Company, which is a subsidiary of China Power 
Investment Corporation (known as “CPI”), established the Huai-Hu Coal-Electricity 
Corporation, a joint venture with the Huainan Mine Group
17
.  The new joint venture 
also includes the Tianji Power Plant and the Tianji Coal Mine.  The whole group 
achieved remarkable performance, while other power producers were suffering losses 
because of the hikes of the coal price (Liu and Zheng 2010).  The China Power 
Investment Corporation was inspired from this Huai-Hu Model, and takes a series of 
projects of the vertical integration, such as the coal, electric power, the aluminium.  
The China Power Investment Corporation also extends the investment into the railway 
and freight industries to achieve greater profitability.   
 
3) The changes of the electric power structure  
The best way of lowering the price of the electricity coal should be from the demand 
                                                             
16 http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTOE5BE04K20091215?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0, visited on 
August 15th, 2010.   
17 http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/8862669.html, visited on August 15th, 2010.   
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side.  The power companies should reduce usage of the coal for the power 
generation, by shifting the future‟s investment from the conventional coal-fired plants 
to the clean energy resources, such as the hydro power, nuclear power and wind power.  
It would effectively eliminate the bargaining power of the coal producers.  
Unfortunately, the capacity share of the hydro and nuclear power declined from 24.31% 
in 1998 to 22.85% in 2008.  One of the reasons could be the construction period.   
The coal-fired plant would only take about two to three years to complete, while the 
hydro and nuclear plant would take seven to eight years.   
 
2.7.  Summary 
Through the overview of the Chinese power sector, it clearly shows that the state has 
been taking a series of reform towards a market-oriented electric power sector 
gradually.  At the moment, the Chinese electric power sector is not the same with the 
traditional plan mechanism.  In the current transitional period, the market behaviour 
and the state plan are mixed together in order to secure a stable, fast growing and 
affordable electric power supply for its fast economic development.   
 
For the past three decades, the Chinese power industry has been featured by free 
investment and the plan price.  The “welcome policy” over investment is designed to 
attract the social resources for the capacity expansion of the power generation to 
create a solid support and foundation for its industry-oriented development.  The 
plan price is designed to promote outputs of the industries at the lowest possible costs, 
and also to protect the household benefits in China.  Perhaps, these two fundamental 
phenomena in the power sector explain the concept of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”.   
 
There are several implications from the investigation into the Chinese power sector.  
First, the investments into grids facility are relative insufficient, compared to the 
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investments into the generation sector.  So, more investments into the power sector 
are needed to ease the problem of the capacity allocation, resulted from the uneven 
distribution of the energy resources.  Second, a certain degree of the vertical and 
horizontal integration could be necessary, in terms of gaining the economy-of-scale 
for the whole industry.  Third, the relief of the price cap on the on-grid and end 
electricity price could easily save the profit of the power sector from the coal price 
inflation.  However, such kind of the action would again damage the benefits of the 
end users obviously.  So, it should be carefully designed, where the governmental 
monitoring and intervene would be required during such process.   
 
So far, the Chinese power supply looks healthy, and has good performance in the 
capacity expansion, the stability of the supply, and the protection of consumer‟s 
welfare.  However, new challenges remain for the Chinese power producers, such as 
the environmental concerns, the conflicts of coal and electricity prices, the production 
efficiency, and the potential strikes by the global economic risks.  Thus, it‟s 
important to understand the industrial background of the Chinese power sector for 
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Chapter 3.  The Cost and Price Structure of the 
Chinese Power Supply  
3.1.  Introduction 
In the early 1990s, China started to restructure its plan supply of electricity in aim of 
developing a competitive electricity market.  Power generators have been separated 
from the grids and became independent power producers.  In 2002, the Big 5 power 
company groups in China were created and their subsidiaries are listed either 
domestic or overseas stock markets respectively to attract private capital investment.  
Electricity supply in China increased by 2.36 times in capacity and 2.65 times in 
output respectively, during the period from 1990 to 2005.  By the year 2004, China 
became the second largest electricity producer just behind the US in the world.  In 
2004, OECD and China together produced 70.72% of the fossil-fuel electricity and 
69.50% of the total electricity of the world (Electricity Information 2006, IEA).   
 
However, compared with the electricity market in the UK, known as British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA), the electricity sector in 
China has still been controlled by state plan at present.  Unlike many other 
liberalised industries in China, electricity prices and production have still been 
controlled directly by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of 
China in Beijing and its provincial offices throughout China.   
 
It‟s a consensus for economists that a plan economy would not be helpful for 
technology progress, leading to production inefficiency and the relatively higher costs 
of goods supplied, especially the institutional costs and expenses.  By contrast, the 
market promotes competition and thereby stimulates innovation, improve productivity 
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and cost efficiency.  However, such positive expectation may not appear if market 
fails, in particular, when market is highly concentrated and the firms abuse their 
market power.  In particular, market failure can damage total outputs and technology 
progress.     
 
It seems to be true in the natural monopolistic sector, such as electricity industry.  
The high electricity prices would damage the end-users‟ benefits and the inadequate 
liquidity would result in the even fatal problem, for example, the closure of the 
wholesale market.  By the previous studies, the negative influences of the abused 
market power have already been identified in the electricity market.  Before the 
failure of California‟s electricity market, Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) predicted 
that “large firms” in California‟s electricity market “might have an incentive to restrict 
output to raise price” with their simulation.  After the failure of California‟s 
electricity market in 2001, Chi-Keung Woo (2001) in his study concluded that “if 
electricity market reform is not done in an environment of surplus capacity, many 
sellers and easy market entry, it will not yield the desired outcome of reliable service 
at low and stable prices.”  Besides, Bimanis and his fellows (2003) studied the 
reform of Virginia‟s electricity market and declared that one of the four major 
electricity producers in Virginia “withheld a significant amount of power” and so “the 
market clearing price was extremely high”.  
 
Not only does the US electricity market suffer the problem of high electricity prices 
charged by the dominant participants in the market, but also the European countries 
have the similar problem.  Sweeting (2004) directly pointed out that “generators 
exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity 
market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration.”  
Ofgem also reported the cases of the abuse of the market power in 1997/98.  The two 
biggest power generators, i.e. National Power and PowerGen, were found that 
“significantly increased the price at which they offered their coal-fired station into the 
Pool over the period May to July 1999”.  All those show the fact that the liberalised 
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market may be lost its expected effectiveness and drive the price higher than what it 
should be. 
 
Nevertheless, most previous studies (Woo, 2001; Cocker, Lundberg, 2005; Bradley, 
Yang, 2006; Sweeting, 2007; Wang, 2007; Yao, Liu, Wu, 2007; Cai, Jiang, 2008) 
share the common belief that the effective system of the electricity sector should 
provide reliable electricity supply at the affordable prices with the high energy 
efficiency.  In order to achieve those objectives, it doesn‟t matter for the regulator of 
the electricity industry to choose a reformed plan-supply mechanism or market supply 
via competition, as long as the supply is more effective and efficient.   
 
Through the comparison of the price structure between China and the European power 
plants, this chapter attempts to address the question whether the reformed plan-supply 
mechanism or the market supply is more superior and effective in terms of the 
achievement of those objectives described above.  With the lesson learnt from the 
European electricity market, our arguments are made for advantages and 
disadvantages of market supply, when compared with Chinese reformed plan supply.   
 
This chapter includes six parts.  The first part is the introduction of this chapter.  
The second is review of previous studies and the background of both the European 
and China electricity supply.  The third is the comparison of both the household and 
the industrial electricity prices between the OECD countries and China, so as to reveal 
problems of the wholesale electricity market.  The fourth attempts to figure out the 
market problem from the point of view of the structure of the electricity sectors in 
both the UK and China.  The fifth is the comparison of the decomposed cost between 
the UK and Chinese cases.  The last part concludes and reveals the implication for 
the further reform of the Chinese electricity sector.   
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3.2.  Background, existing literature and current arguments 
The reform of the Chinese electricity sector has been carried out since the 1980s.  
Some studies draw the outline of the background and the history of Chinese electricity 
market (Li, Dorian, 1995; Andrews-Speed, Dow, 2000; Hafsi, Tian, 2005; Xu, Chen 
2006; Yao, Bin, Wu 2006; Hang, Tu, 2007; Yang, 2008).   Wu and Li (1995) also 
advocated the liberalisation of the electricity industry in China, so that the tariffs 
would be able to increase to a sufficiently high level to attract more investment and 
also improve the energy efficiency.  From the point of view of the reform history, 
Hafsi and Tian (2005) made a general conclusion that the reform of Chinese 
electricity industry “cannot be separated from the transformation of the whole 
country”, where privatisation and liberalisation should be introduced.  Wang (2007) 
also argued that the plan economy of the Chinese electricity sector, which suppressed 
the prices of electricity coal, should be removed, so that the price of the electricity 
coal can be increased freely according to the demand and supply equilibrium on the 
market.  However, in order to ascertain the further steps to build the market-oriented 
reform in Chinese electricity sector, the lessons from the European countries cannot 
be ignored. 
 
With a belief in China thatmarket can be the panacea to cure all the problems in the 
economy, the study of the California electricity market gives the belief with different 
experience that the market mechanism may also fail (Woo, 2001; Hogan, 2002; Woo, 
Lloyd, Tishler, 2003).  In the California case, the extremely high prices followed by 
the rolling blackouts stroke the whole energy system in the region.  So far, the 
deregulation of the electricity market in the UK has been the most stable reform in the 
OECD countries, although it‟s not perfect.  Some studies tried to prove that the new 
design of the wholesale market in the UK would meet the original expectation to 
remove the problems found in the previous periods.  In 2003, Ofgem declared the 
observed drop of the wholesale electricity prices by 40% after the introduction of the 
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NETA in 2001, and attributed it to the market competition promoted by the 
decentralised trading arrangement and many other various reasons, such as falling fuel 
prices, less demand and cheap investment expenditures (National Audit Office, 2003).  
The report of Ernst and Young (2006) also declared the observed instant fall of the 
generation cost and the spark spreads, which implies the decreasing electricity prices 
in the wholesale market after 2001.   
 
However, it may be too early to draw the conclusion that the UK 
full-liberalisation-oriented reform is successful, as the wholesale price in the UK 
increased again after 2002.  In other words, it means that the new design of the 
wholesale market may not be able to meet its original expectation to provide the 
reliable supply at the low price.  Green and McDaniel (1998) declared that the 
additional cost of the market reform would be transferred from the generators to the 
end users through the electricity prices.  Some other researches tried to explain the 
problem from the point of view of the market power which has prevailed in the UK 
electricity for a long time.  Wolak and Patrick‟s argued (1996) that in order to 
maximise the gains, the dominant large firms would increase the electricity pool price 
by declaring the unavailable supply in certain periods.  Sweeting (2007) measured 
the market power by the comparison between system marginal price and estimated 
bench mark marginal cost.  The evidence shows that the abuse of the market power 
would become even more serious when the market concentration varies.  Besides, 
Ofgem (1999) also reported the case of the abuse of the market power by the two 
dominant players in 1999, in which this was found by comparing the electricity prices 
with the previous period.   
 
As to the retail market, Thomas (2003) studied the UK electricity sector before and 
after the introduction of the NETA, and found that the reform of the UK electricity 
market didn‟t protect the benefit of the small consumers as expected.  Although the 
UK small consumers have the right to change their retailers, the high switch costs 
hindered those small consumers, and the small consumers were also unable to exerted 
  76 
sufficient pressure to the retailers to gain the fair price of the electricity.  Thomas 
also estimated the price for small consumers in the UK and found that it should be 30% 
lower than the actual price.  Graham (2006) also made the plausible conclusion that 
the reform of the UK electricity market didn‟t make the disadvantaged consumers 
worse than before, which implies that the reform has not significantly improved the 
small consumers‟ benefits at least.  In OXERA‟s report (2004), both the wholesale 
and the retail prices were investigated through the comprehensive comparison of the 
aggregated data between the UK and the G7 during the period from 2003 (historical 
figures) to 2009 (projected figures).  And they found that the generation cost has a 
great influence on the inflation of the wholesale price in the UK, and the introduction 
of the competition would raise the cost of the retailers.  It argues that the other G7 
countries except the UK would face the high inflation of the retail price in the future, 
because the competition in the retail market in the UK had been relatively high.   
 
A series of studies by Pollitt proved that the privatisation of the power sector without 
proper regulation would harm the outputs of other industries.  With the social 
cost-benefit analysis, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) studied the UK electricity market 
reform and declared that the power generators could “gain more than the cost 
reduction” after the introduction of the Electricity Pool, but “the consumers and 
government lose”.  Domah and Pollitt (2001) admitted that “for the first few years 
following privatisation, real prices, profits and costs in the industry rose”, and after 
the implementation of the strict regulation, “prices have now fallen sharply and there 
have been substantial reductions in costs and more recently in profits.”  By 2005, 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) carried out the comprehensive studies on aggregated data of 
the EU electricity sectors, and declared to observe the overall decline trend in the 
wholesale prices, which is consistent with the expected gains from the EU electricity 
market reform.   
 
Arguments drawn from studies above may be partial and limited since they are made 
on the basis of the UK and other OECD experience that has a common feature ― a 
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market-based approach.  It would be interesting if we can make international 
comparison of UK experience with the Chinese experience that takes a very different 
approach to manage power supply.  Through the comparison of the cost and price 
structures among different countries under different economies over a certain period, 
it will be able to draw a new view of the electricity industries through this West-East 
comparison.  And then it will provide us with something meaningful for further 
thinking about how to reform our power industry on both the Chinese and Western 
side.   
 
3.3.  Overview of the Chinese power supply with reference 
to the UK 
3.3.1.  The electricity supply in China with reference to the UK 
In 2009, the gross consumption of electricity in China reaches 3643 TWh, which has 
increased by 27.43% since 2006.  Unlike China, the UK electricity supply is much 
smaller.  The gross power consumption in the UK was only equivalent to 13.3% of 
the Chinese power consumption in 2006 and 9.8% in 2009, which means that the 
difference of the electricity supply between China and the UK would become bigger.   
 
Over the past two decades, the fluctuation of the UK power supply is much flatter 
than China.  Since 1990, China achieved remarkable economic development, where 
its average annual GDP growth is around 10%.  In 1992, the GDP growth in China 
was soaring to 14%.  During this period, Chinese power supply achieved an average 
annual growth at 9.8%, with two peaks of growth.  In 1992, the Chinese power 
supply reached its first peak of growth at around 11.3%.  After that, it started to drop 
and then reached the lowest level at 2.8% in 1998.  In 2002, the Chinese electricity 
industry entered the fourth stage of the reform, and the electricity supply growth 
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started going up again, and reached the second peak of growth at 16% in 2003.  In 
the same year, China also achieved strong GDP growth, i.e. at around 10%.   By 
contrast, the UK economic growth is around 2% over the past two decades, while the 
UK power supply growth is only 0.78% on average and never exceeded 5%.  In 
2009, the real GDP and the power supply growth of the UK dropped by 4.9% and 5.5% 
respectively.  Obviously, the growth of the power supply in China is much faster 
than the UK.  It also indicates that the reform carried out in China has been 
successful in stimulating the supply of the power to the economy.   
 
Table 3.1  The Comparison of Electricity and GDP Growth between China and the UK 
 
Gross Power Consumption Real GDP 
 





















1991 108.74 8.74% 102.47 2.47% 109.20 9.20% 98.64 -1.36% 
1992 121.05 11.32% 101.88 -0.57% 124.71 14.20% 98.83 0.20% 
1993 134.24 10.90% 102.97 1.06% 142.17 14.00% 101.13 2.33% 
1994 148.93 10.94% 104.66 1.64% 160.79 13.10% 105.59 4.41% 
1995 160.88 8.02% 108.02 3.21% 178.36 10.93% 108.61 2.86% 
1996 172.77 7.39% 112.83 4.45% 196.19 10.00% 112.18 3.28% 
1997 181.12 4.83% 112.54 -0.26% 214.44 9.30% 115.66 3.10% 
1998 186.16 2.78% 114.79 2.00% 231.16 7.80% 119.83 3.61% 
1999 197.49 6.09% 116.97 1.90% 248.73 7.60% 123.99 3.47% 
2000 216.24 9.49% 120.05 2.63% 269.63 8.40% 128.84 3.91% 
2001 236.32 9.29% 121.06 0.84% 292.03 8.31% 132.01 2.46% 
2002 264.28 11.83% 121.22 0.13% 318.61 9.10% 134.78 2.10% 
2003 305.46 15.59% 122.39 0.97% 350.48 10.00% 138.58 2.82% 
2004 352.65 15.45% 123.10 0.58% 385.90 10.10% 142.40 2.76% 
2005 400.30 13.51% 124.46 1.11% 426.05 10.40% 145.33 2.06% 
2006 458.85 14.63% 123.26 -0.96% 475.49 11.61% 149.46 2.84% 
2007 525.04 14.43% 122.58 -0.55% 537.36 13.01% 153.97 3.02% 
2008 554.40 5.59% 122.18 -0.32% 585.98 9.05% 155.06 0.71% 
2009 584.71 5.47% 115.45 -5.51% 636.96 8.70% 147.43 -4.92% 
Source: the Chinese power data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the UK power data from the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change of the UK; The real GDP from the UN data. 
Note: Year 1990 = 100; The gross power consumption equals to the power consumption of all industries plus 
the transmission losses 
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3.3.2.  The installed capacity in China with reference to the UK 
The total capacity of Chinese power plants was 442,387.3 MW in 2004, composed of 
105,242 MW hydro generators, 329,483 MW coal-fired generators and 6836 MW 
nuclear generators.  The total capacity has increased by 50,964 MW, with an annual 
growth of 13.2%, since 2003 (the hydro power capacity increased by 10,344 MW, 
13.02%, coal-fired power capacity increased by 39,700 MW, 13.7%).  In 2004, the 
capacity of hydro, coal-fired and nuclear power took up 24.6%, 73.72% and 1.55% of 
the total installed capacity respectively (Chinese Electricity Statistics 2005).  The 
coal-fired power capacity takes the major part out of the total capacity of electricity 
generation.   
 
By contrast, the capacity mix of the UK power plants was much diversified than 
Chinese power plants.  In 2004, the gas-fired, the coal-fired generators and the 
nuclear plants took up 33%, 37% and 16% of the total generation capacity in the UK, 
while the coal-fired plants took up 74% of the all installed capacity in China.  There 
is almost no gas-fired power station in Chinese power supply.   
 
Over the past 10 year‟s development, the mix of the power capacity in the UK has 
been changed a lot, but in China, the coal-fired power plants still dominated in 
electricity generation.  In the UK, the CCGT out of the total installed capacity 
increased from 18% in 1996 up to 33% in 2005, by around 2 times during the 10 years.  
And the proportion of the UK conventional generators reduced from 45% in 1996 to 
37% in 2005.  However, the proportion of the coal-fired plants against the total 
capacity in China kept unchanged around 76% over the 10 years.   
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Table 3.2  The Comparison of Generation Capacity Mix between China and the UK 
 
China UK 
Unit: MW Total Hydro Coal-fired 
Nuclear 
and others 





1996 236540 55580 178860 2100 68860 4101 31276 12052 12986 
1997 254240 59730 192410 2100 68140 4099 31243 12252 13016 
1998 277290 65070 209880 2340 68312 4115 29587 14618 13064 
1999 298770 72970 223430 2370 70245 4115 29711 16110 13073 
2000 319320 79350 237540 2430 72193 4115 29034 19349 12603 
2001 339490 83010 253010 3470 73382 4136 29034 20517 12603 
2002 356570 86070 265550 4950 70369 4092 26568 20260 12357 
2003 391400 94900 289770 6730 71465 4055 26991 22037 11969 
2004 440700 108260 324900 7540 73277 4058 27054 23783 11969 
2005 508410 116520 384130 7760 74041 4061 27235 24373 11969 
Unit: %  Total Hydro Coal-fired 
Nuclear 
and others 





1996 100% 23% 76% 1% 100% 6% 45% 18% 19% 
1997 100% 23% 76% 1% 100% 6% 46% 18% 19% 
1998 100% 23% 76% 1% 100% 6% 43% 21% 19% 
1999 100% 24% 75% 1% 100% 6% 42% 23% 19% 
2000 100% 25% 74% 1% 100% 6% 40% 27% 17% 
2001 100% 24% 75% 1% 100% 6% 40% 28% 17% 
2002 100% 24% 74% 1% 100% 6% 38% 29% 18% 
2003 100% 24% 74% 2% 100% 6% 38% 31% 17% 
2004 100% 25% 74% 2% 100% 6% 37% 32% 16% 
2005 100% 23% 76% 2% 100% 5% 37% 33% 16% 
Source: the Chinese data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the UK data from the DTI.   
 
3.3.3.  The supply structure of electricity in China with reference to 
the UK 
The total electricity generated in China increased up to 3255.9 TWh, by 13.68% for 
2007.  In 2007, the hydro plants, the coal-fired plants and the nuclear plants 
generated the electricity of 486.7 TWh, 2698 TWh and 62.6 TWh respectively, with 
the growth rate of 16.80%, 14.45% and 15.29% respectively.  There was no 
significant drop of the proportion of the electricity generated by the coal-fired plants 
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over the 10 years.  And in 2007, the coal-fired power plants still took up 82.9% of 
the electricity supplied in China.   
 
Unlike China, the significant change of structure of the power generation in the UK 
has taken place for the past 15 years.  In 1990, coal-fired power stations generated 
77% of the electricity in the UK.  Another 21% of total electricity was generated by 
nuclear power stations.  However, in 2005, coal-fired power stations only maintained 
39% of the total electricity generation and 38.6% of the electricity is supplied by gas 
power stations.  The nuclear power stations still hold 19%, which is almost the same 
with 14 years ago.   
 
The utilisation of the generators in China is slightly higher than in the UK, in which in 
2004 the average load factor in the UK and China was 54.7% and 56.6% respectively.  
For efficiency in coal-fired power stations, according to the data from Wang (2005) 
and DTI‟s website, in 2004, the coal-equivalent consumption rate of the UK and 
Chinese coal-fired power plants was 346 g/kWh and 376 g/kWh respectively, in 
which the UK had been slightly better than its Chinese counterpart.   
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Table 3.3  The Comparison of Electricity Supply Mix between China and the UK 
 
China   UK 
GWh Hydro Coal-fired 
Nuclear 
& other 




1990 126,300 495,000 0 621,300 7,082 234,101 58,664 280 300,128 
1991 124,800 552,700 0 677,500 6,071 233,325 62,761 607 302,764 
1992 131,500 622,700 0 754,200 7,046 221,265 69,135 3,358 300,804 
1993 150,700 683,100 2,600 836,400 5,673 193,969 80,979 23,195 303,816 
1994 166,800 747,000 14,100 927,900 6,451 185,021 79,962 37,553 308,987 
1995 186,800 807,300 12,800 1,006,900 6,286 183,567 80,598 49,458 319,909 
1996 186,900 878,100 14,300 1,079,300 5,340 174,665 85,820 68,962 334,787 
1997 194,600 925,200 14,400 1,134,200 6,227 147,664 89,341 90,874 334,106 
1998 204,300 938,800 14,600 1,157,700 7,540 149,001 90,590 98,162 345,293 
1999 212,900 1,004,700 15,500 1,233,100 8,958 135,262 87,672 119,553 351,445 
2000 243,100 1,107,900 17,500 1,368,500 8,609 147,394 78,334 126,428 360,764 
2001 261,100 1,204,500 18,300 1,483,900 7,339 147,192 82,985 129,875 367,392 
2002 274,600 1,352,200 27,400 1,654,200 8,584 141,013 81,090 139,433 370,120 
2003 281,300 1,579,000 44,900 1,905,200 7,141 153,213 81,911 139,190 381,454 
2004 328,000 1,807,300 51,700 2,187,000 9,410 145,289 73,682 151,331 379,713 
2005 395,200 2,018,000 61,500 2,474,700 9,621 150,519 75,173 147,920 383,232 
% Hydro Coal-fired 
Nuclear  
& other 




1990 20.33% 79.67% 0.00% 100% 2.36% 78.00% 19.55% 0.09% 100% 
1991 18.42% 81.58% 0.00% 100% 2.02% 77.06% 20.91% 0.20% 100% 
1992 17.44% 82.56% 0.00% 100% 2.35% 73.56% 23.04% 1.12% 100% 
1993 18.02% 81.67% 0.31% 100% 1.89% 63.84% 26.98% 7.73% 100% 
1994 17.98% 80.50% 1.52% 100% 2.15% 59.88% 26.64% 12.51% 100% 
1995 18.55% 80.18% 1.27% 100% 2.09% 57.38% 26.85% 16.48% 100% 
1996 17.32% 81.36% 1.32% 100% 1.78% 52.17% 28.59% 22.98% 100% 
1997 17.16% 81.57% 1.27% 100% 2.07% 44.20% 29.77% 30.28% 100% 
1998 17.65% 81.09% 1.26% 100% 2.51% 43.15% 30.18% 32.71% 100% 
1999 17.27% 81.48% 1.26% 100% 2.98% 38.49% 29.21% 39.83% 100% 
2000 17.76% 80.96% 1.28% 100% 2.87% 40.86% 26.10% 42.12% 100% 
2001 17.60% 81.17% 1.23% 100% 2.45% 40.06% 27.65% 43.27% 100% 
2002 16.60% 81.74% 1.66% 100% 2.86% 38.10% 27.02% 46.46% 100% 
2003 14.76% 82.88% 2.36% 100% 2.38% 40.17% 27.29% 46.38% 100% 
2004 15.00% 82.64% 2.36% 100% 3.14% 38.26% 24.55% 50.42% 100% 
2005 15.97% 81.55% 2.49% 100% 3.21% 39.28% 25.05% 49.29% 100% 
Source: the Chinese data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the UK data from the DTI.   
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3.3.4.  Summary 
By comparing the structure of the power supply between the UK and China, it seems 
to suggest that environmentally there are no much differences between the two 
economies.  China has 16% of its power supply from renewable sources, such as 
hydro power, and the UK has only 3.27%.  The lower part of power supply from 
renewable energy is supplemented by nuclear energy in the UK, taking a quarter of 
total UK power supply.  By contrast, China only has 2.5%, but growth of power 
supply from the nuclear energy has been higher, and we expect that it will increase 
further over time.  China does not develop gas-fired power technology, which is 
right, because China has rich coal resources that enable the nation to obtain low-cost 
energy to power its economic growth at a low cost.  Moreover, China that sticks with 
coal can reduce world reliance on gas and so be good to remain stable demand for gas, 
which can benefit the stability of price or cost of power for gas energy.  In this sense, 
we argue that the structure of power supply is very much affected by the resources of 
an economy.  In particular, the resource impact is more significant when the size of 
an economy is large.  
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3.4.  Electricity supply of price comparison: OECD versus 
China 
The market-oriented reform in the European countries was pioneered by the UK 
experiment of the Electricity Pool in 1991, where the liberalisation and privatisation 
were introduced in the electricity sector.  It‟s globally believed that the market 
competition would be the magic cure for the problems caused by the notorious 
centralised plan economy.  However, as mentioned by the previous study, the market 
may also fail in restricting the abuse of the market power asserted by the dominant 
firms in the industry.  The figures and tables blew present the household and the 
industrial prices in the OECD member countries and China, during the period from 
2000 to 2004.  By comparison, it will show a relative level of electricity prices in 
China, against other market economies.  It will also reveal the different market 
environments between the liberalised market and planned supply.   
 
In different countries, the end-use electricity prices could be classified into various 
categories by different measurements.  However, the household and industrial prices 
of the electricity are prevailing and comparable among most countries in the world.  
In OECD, the household price is referred to the retailing price of the electricity for 
small consumers, and the industrial price is referred to the wholesale price set among 
the power generators, retailers and large consumers.  In China, the household price 
and the industrial price are all referred to the catalogue prices.  The two electricity 
prices could vary from each other, because of the structure of the electricity industries.  
The two electricity prices in different countries may also be different, due to various 
reasons, such as competition, production costs and regulation.   
 
  85 
3.4.1.  Household electricity prices 
Compared with the OECD members, the electricity for household consumers in China 
is one of the cheapest out of the 30 selected countries.  During the period from 2000 
to 2004, the household price of OECD Europe on average is around 2.5 times as much 
as the price in China.  Before 2002, the electricity for household use in China was 
the second cheapest one to Norway.  In 2003 and 2004, the household price in China 
was the lowest, while the price in Denmark became the highest out of those countries.  
In 2004, the household electricity tariff in China was 0.4467 Yuan/kWh, i.e. only 19.1% 
of the price in Denmark which was 2.3423 Yuan/kWh, 39.1% of the price in the UK 
which was 1.1422 Yuan/kWh, and 44.6% of the average price of the OECD members 
which was 1.0015 Yuan/kWh. 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Household Electricity Prices (nominal) in OECD and China 
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the 
Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data of 
exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
 
Besides, the growth of the household price in China was one of the lowest out of the 
30 selected countries during that five-year‟s period.  As shown in Figure 3.1, from 
2000 to 2004, the household electricity price in China increased by 17.86%, only 
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rate of China was smaller than many other countries, such as the UK at 28.67%, 
Hungary at 110.73%, Norway at 115.58%, and Slovak at 167.95%.  It‟s also below 
the growth rate of the OECD Europe (46.2%) and OECD total (19.78%).   
 
Compared with those European countries, China had a relatively low level and also a 
low growth rate of the household electricity.  As shown in Figure 3.1, unlike China, 
some European countries, such as Denmark and Netherland, had both a high level and 
a high growth rate of the household price.  It implies that the difference of the 
household price between China and those European countries would become larger.  
 
The prices could also be expressed by using each country‟s purchase power parity 
conversion factor.  The purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor, known as 
the real exchange rate, takes into account the element of the differences in the relative 
prices of products and services in different economies, which could provide a better 
measure to compare the real value of the outputs of different countries.  The prices 
of the 30 countries are converted into the Chinese Yuan equivalents by multiplying the 
PPP conversion factors provided by the International Monetary Fund.   
 
When considering the PPP factors, the household electricity price in China becomes 
one of the highest out of the group of those countries, only next to Denmark after 
2002.  In 2004, the household price in China was the second highest at a level of 
0.45Yuan/kWh.  In 2004, the household electricity price in Denmark reached an 
equivalent level of 0.57 Yuan/kWh.  As shown in Table 3.5, in 2004, the average 
household prices of the OECD Europe and OECD total were equivalent to 0.31 
Yuan/kWh and 0.24 Yuan/kWh, i.e. 68.9% and 53.3% of the household price in China 
respectively.  In the same year, the household price in the UK ranked the 14
th
 highest 
out of the 30 countries, at a price of 0.28 Yuan/kWh, which was 37.8% lower than the 
price in China. 
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Figure 3.2  Household Electricity Prices (by Purchase Power Parity) in OECD and China 
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the 
Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data of 
exchange rate are collected from DataStream; 4) the Purchase Power Parity conversion rates are collected from 
the International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database April 2007”. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the household price in China was not cheap relative to both 
the purchasing power of consumers and their income level.  It also implies that the 
burden of power for the household users in China was much heavier than most other 
countries in the world, although the electricity price in China was low in a nominal 
term.   
3.4.2.  Industrial electricity prices 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the electricity for the industrial use in China was still one of 
the lowest out of those selected countries.  In 2004, the industrial price in China was 
round 49% of the average price of the OECD Europe and 38% of the average price of 
the OECD total.  In 2004, the industrial price in the UK (0.5545 Yuan/kWh) was 
1.21 times of China (0.4570 Yuan/kWh).  The industrial prices in Italy and Japan 
were the two highest out of those OECD members during the five-year‟s period.  In 
2004, the Italy (1.3326 Yuan/kWh) and Japan (1.0512 Yuan/kWh) industrial prices 
were 2.92 and 2.30 times of the price in China.  However, the industrial price in 
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New Zealand (0.4221 Yuan/kWh), Norway (0.3559 Yuan/kWh), United States (0.4387 
Yuan/kWh) and France (0.4138 Yuan/kWh).   
 
 
Figure 3.3  Industrial Electricity Prices (Nominal) in OECD and China 
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the 
Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data of 
exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
 
From 2000 to 2004, the industrial prices in all those countries increased except Japan, 
of which the industrial prices decreased by 11.21%.  The industrial prices in China 
and UK increased by 22.85% and 21.79% respectively during that period.  The 
growth of the industrial prices in China was also below the growth rate of the OECD 
Europe (63.97%) and the OECD total (26.64%).  This implies that the growth rate of 
the industrial price in China was still kept at a relatively low level. 
 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) in their studies upon the Electricity Market Reform in the 
European Union point out that “the overall trend of price decline … is not inconsistent 
with the anticipated benefits of the implementation of the Electricity Directives.”  
However, their view might be contradictory to the fact that the nominal industrial and 
household prices of the OECD Europe increased by 63% and 40% respectively during 
the period from 2000 to 2004.  In the UK, the pioneer of the liberalisation of the 
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during that period.  Those evidences indicate that the liberalisation of the electricity 
market in Europe actually didn‟t meet its expectation of a slow increase in the price.  
Compared with the OECD members, China had the relatively lower household and 
industrial prices in nominal term, and also the smaller inflation rate of the electricity 
prices, when compared to the UK and OECD average.  Moreover, our comparison 
shows that the industrial prices in China was much closer to the OECD members, we 
find no evidence that the Chinese manufacturing industry enjoys a lower power cost 
than their Western counterpart. 
 
3.4.3.  Comparing the household price with the industrial price 
Table 3.7 shows the ratio of the household to industrial prices.  If such ratio is larger 
than one, it implies that the domestic price is higher than the industrial price or vice 
versa.  The average ratio in China during the five years is only around 1.01, the 
lowest one among the 30 countries.  It means that the two prices in China were 
almost the same during that period.  It indicates that the social benefits of the 
household users in China are protected by the Chinese plan pricing scheme. However, 
it‟s exactly a reverse phenomenon in the Western countries, where the benefits of the 
large industrial users are protected at the expense of the small household users.   
 
In contrast, Denmark had the highest ratio in 4 years.  In 2004, its ratio reached up to 
2.95, which means that the household price was almost three times as much as the 
industrial price.  The ratio in the UK has been around 2 for the five years, which 
implies that the household consumers would pay twice as much as the industrial 
consumers for the electricity.  In 2004, the average ratios of OECD Europe and 
OECD total were 1.89 and 1.59 respectively, both higher than the ratio of China. 
 
Such ratio of the OECD Europe shrank from 2.12 to 1.89 over the five years, which 
implies that the two prices started to get close with each other.  However, in the UK, 
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the ratio enlarged from 1.95 to 2.06, which indicates that for the household as the 
group of small users, their benefits have not been well cared by the market 
liberalisation.   
 
 
Figure 3.4  Household to Industrial Electricity Prices of OECD and China 
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the 
Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data of 
exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
 
3.4.4.  Summary 
From the historical data presented in Table 3.4 and 3.6, it‟s clearly shows that 
electricity prices in China stayed at the relatively lower level when compared with the 
OECD countries in a nominal term.  It also reveals a fact that the household 
electricity price was as low as the industrial price in China.  Pun-Lee Lam (2004) 
argued that “electricity prices in China were highly subsidized and below the average 
total costs of generation and transmission.”  If it were true, it would imply that the 
grid would be subsidised by the Chinese government in order to protect the small 
users‟ benefit.  We will address this point in a few pages later.   
 
In another aspect, household prices relative to industrial prices were still high in 
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prices continued even after the introduction of NETTA (New Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements) in 2001.  A large number of the small electricity 
consumers in the UK paid much higher prices when compared with the industrial 
users.  Despite the introduction of market competition, the household users couldn‟t 
enjoy the lower price as same as the industrial users.  Such problem would indicate 
certain kind of the ineffectiveness of the electricity market in the UK.  It implies that 
the market reform in the UK didn‟t achieve the Pareto improvement, at least, not in 
the power market. 
 
However, if measured by the purchase power parity, the electricity price in China was 
higher than other countries (Table 3.5).  It means that compared with the OECD 
member countries, it could be more expensive for the users in China in terms of the 
affordability of electricity.  In order to mitigate the affordability problem for low 
income households, the government subsidises them directly by cutting price down at 
almost more than 2 times of the industrial price.   
 
The comparison of costs between China and the UK indicates that, first, the Chinese 
industries do not pay cheaper electricity than Western industries.  Secondly, the 
Chinese non-commercial users like households are charged for use of electricity at 
discriminated prices according to income or affordability.  The plan price serves 
income discrimination rather than balancing demand and supply for effective 
resources allocation.   
 
The comparison of costs between China and the UK indicates that, first, the Chinese 
industries do not pay cheaper electricity than Western industries.  Secondly, the 
Chinese non-commercial users like households are charged for use of electricity at 
discriminated prices according to income or affordability.  The plan price serves 
income distribution rather than balancing demand and supply for effective resources 
allocation.   
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Table 3.4  Electricity Prices for Household of OECD and China 
 
Household Electricity Prices in 
Yuan/kWh 
Average Rank in 
Descending Order 
 2000-2003 2004 2000-2004 
Denmark 1.77  2.34  1  
Japan 1.58  1.62  2  
Netherlands 1.29  1.83  3  
Italy 1.29  1.58  4  
Germany 1.15  1.64  5  
Portugal 1.08  1.45  6  
Austria 1.07  1.46  7  
Belgium 1.09  N/A 8  
Spain 0.99  1.26  9  
Ireland 0.93  1.43  10  
Switzerland 0.97  1.18  11  
Luxembourg 0.94  1.22  12  
France 0.89  1.17  13  
United Kingdom 0.89  1.14  14  
Turkey 0.77  0.92  15  
Finland 0.73  1.02  16  
Hungary 0.65  1.13  17  
United States 0.70  0.74  18  
Poland 0.67  0.85  19  
Greece 0.65  0.89  20  
Slovak Republic 0.59  1.11  21  
Mexico 0.67  0.74  22  
New Zealand 0.59  0.99  23  
Korea 0.62  0.65  24  
Czech Republic 0.57  0.80  25  
Australia 0.53  0.74  26  
Norway 0.44  0.57  27  
Canada 0.46  N/A 28  
China 0.40  0.45  29  
Sweden N/A N/A NA 
OECD Europe 0.96  1.28   
OECD 0.85  1.00   
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) 
the Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) 
The data of exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
Note: 1) The “e” means that the figure is estimated by linear method; 2) The “NA” means that the figure is 
not available; 3) The taxation is included in the electricity price. 
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Table 3.5  Electricity Prices for Household of OECD and China, measured by Purchase 
Power Parity 
  
Household Electricity Prices in 
Yuan/kWh  measured by PPP 
Average Rank in 
Descending Order 
 2000-2003 2004 2000-2004 
Denmark 0.42  0.57  1  
China 0.40  0.45  2  
Japan 0.37  0.40  3  
Netherlands 0.30  0.45  4  
Italy 0.30  0.39  5  
Germany 0.27  0.40  6  
Austria 0.25  0.36  7  
Portugal 0.25  0.35  8  
Belgium 0.26  N/A 9  
Spain 0.23  0.31  10  
Ireland 0.22  0.35  11  
Switzerland 0.23  0.29  12  
Luxembourg 0.22  0.30  13  
France 0.21  0.28  14  
United Kingdom 0.21  0.28  15  
Turkey 0.18  0.22  16  
Finland 0.17  0.25  17  
Hungary 0.15  0.28  18  
United States 0.17  0.18  19  
Poland 0.16  0.21  20  
Greece 0.15  0.22  21  
Slovak Republic 0.14  0.27  22  
Mexico 0.16  0.18  23  
New Zealand 0.14  0.24  24  
Korea 0.15  0.16  25  
Czech Republic 0.13  0.20  26  
Australia 0.12  0.18  27  
Norway 0.10  0.14  28  
Canada 0.11  N/A 29  
Sweden N/A N/A N/A 
OECD Europe 0.23  0.31   
OECD 0.20  0.24   
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the Chinese 
data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data of exchange rate 
are collected from DataStream; 4) the Purchase Power Parity conversion rates are collected from the International 
Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database April 2007”.   
Note: 1) The “e” means that the figure is estimated by linear method; 2) The “NA” means that the figure is not 
available; 3) The taxation is included in the electricity price. 
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Table 3.6  Industrial Prices of OECD and China (USD/KWh) 
 Industrial Electricity Prices 
Average Rank in 
Descending Order 
 2000-2003 2004 2000-2004 
Japan 1.05  1.05  1  
Italy 0.94  1.33  2  
Turkey 0.73  0.83  3  
Switzerland 0.60  0.70  4  
Portugal 0.59  0.77  5  
Denmark 0.58  0.79  6  
Ireland 0.58  0.79  7  
Austria 0.31  0.79  8  
Hungary 0.49  0.74  9  
Mexico 0.46  0.64  10  
Netherlands 0.48  N/A 11  
Slovak Republic 0.42  0.69  12  
United Kingdom 0.44  0.55  13  
Germany 0.41  0.64  14  
Czech Republic 0.40  0.55  15  
Finland 0.38  0.60  16  
Australia 0.40  0.50  17  
Korea 0.41  0.44  18  
Greece 0.39  0.52  19  
United States 0.40  0.44  20  
Poland 0.39  0.50  21  
China 0.40  0.46  22  
Spain 0.38  0.50  23  
Belgium 0.40  N/A 24  
Canada 0.36  N/A 25  
France 0.32  0.41  26  
New Zealand 0.28  0.42  27  
Norway 0.25  0.36  28  
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden N/A N/A N/A 
OECD Europe 0.49  0.68   
OECD 0.52  0.63   
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; 2) the 
Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; 3) The data 
of exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
Note: 1) The “e” means that the figure is estimated by linear method; 2) The “NA” means that the figure is not 
available; 3) The taxation is included in the electricity price. 
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Table 3.7  Household to industrial electricity prices of OECD and China 
 
Household to Industrial Electricity 
Prices 
Average Rank in 
Descending Order 
 2000-2003 2004 2000-2004 
Denmark 3.10  2.95  1  
France 2.82  2.82  2  
Germany 2.81  2.57  3  
Belgium 2.75  N/A 4  
Spain 2.57  2.53  5  
Austria 3.11  1.84  6  
Netherlands 2.38  N/A 7  
New Zealand 2.14  2.35  8  
United Kingdom 2.01  2.06  9  
Finland 1.93  1.71  10  
Portugal 1.83  1.88  11  
United States 1.74  1.70  12  
Poland 1.73  1.72  13  
Norway 1.72  1.60  14  
Ireland 1.65  1.80  15  
Greece 1.68  1.70  16  
Switzerland 1.61  1.67  17  
Japan 1.50  1.54  18  
Korea 1.51  1.49  19  
Czech Republic 1.43  1.47  20  
Slovak Republic 1.39  1.61  21  
Mexico 1.46  1.17  22  
Hungary 1.33  1.54  23  
Australia 1.33  1.48  24  
Italy 1.39  1.19  25  
Canada 1.28  N/A 26  
Turkey 1.06  1.11  27  
China 1.02  0.98  28  
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden N/A N/A N/A 
OECD Europe 1.98  1.89   
OECD 1.64  1.59   
Source: 1) The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 
2006; 2) the Chinese data are collected from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring 
Report 2005; 3) The data of exchange rate are collected from DataStream. 
Note: 1) The “e” means that the figure is estimated by linear method. 2) The “NA” means that the 
figure is not available. 3) The taxation is included in the electricity price. 
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3.5.  The market structure of China’s power supply with 
reference to the EU and the UK 
As a further measure to liberalise the electricity market in European Union, the 
Electricity Pool in the UK was introduced in 1991.  After that, the members in the 
European Union started to open their electricity markets one after another.  In 
February 1997, the EU Directive 96/92/EC came into force, which required all of EU 
members to deregulate their electricity markets and allow all the customers to choose 
their suppliers no later than the year 2007.  In 2003, according to the figures of the 
International Energy Agency, the electricity amounted 320 TWh was traded in all of 
Western European electricity markets.  By the year 2004, within the European Union, 
13 regional electricity exchange markets have been established, such as NETA in 
England and Wales, Powernext in France, EEX in Germany, GME in Italy and the 
cross-board Nord Pool in Scandinavia.  Moreover, those regional markets are still 
under the continued development to achieve the ultimate objective of building up an 
integrated pan-European market.   
 
3.5.1.  The market structures and reform in EU 
In general, each existing regional electricity market in the EU can be divided into two 
parts, i.e. the wholesale and retail market.  The two markets are opened to the 
different participants.  And the electricity in the different two markets would be 
traded at different prices.  Besides, the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
the electricity are separated to some extent, so that the competition on the market 
could be encouraged.   
 
(a) The UK electricity market structure 
The electricity market in the UK is a kind of typical example.  The UK wholesale 
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market, known as British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangement 
(BETTA), was established in April 2005.  Unlike the previous Electricity Pool, 
which was criticised for its non-transparency (Powell 1993), the centralised pricing 
mechanism has been removed from the market under BETTA.  As shown in Figure 
3.5, the commodity of the electricity could be traded within and between the power 
generators, large customers and the regional retailers directly, which would promote 
the competition in the market.  In the wholesale market, the cheap industrial price is 
prevailing.   
 
The retail market in the UK is constituted by small customers and the retailers.  The 
small customers have the right to choose their electricity suppliers (the retailer).  
However, according to the estimation by OFGEM, the costs of the businesses in the 
industry could be up to £580 million, including “adapting their operating procedures 
and IT systems to the new wholesale arrangements”, and the additional operational 
costs for the participants annually would be up to £30 million (National Audit Office 
UK, 2003).  It obviously shows that such wholesale and retail markets are not built 
up without costs, and these additional trading costs will be ultimately paid by the 
users of electricity.  For those small customers can only buy the electricity from the 7 
regional retailers, rather than the power generators directly, because they are lack of 
the access to the wholesale market.  Such kind of arrangement makes the prices in 
the retail market higher than the wholesale market, which costs more for the small 
customers.   
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Figure 3.5  Electricity Industry Structure in the UK  
Source: Based on the information from “The Digest of United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics 2006” 
 
Moreover, the additional transaction costs of “market trading” may also reduce the 
economic welfare as a whole (Green and McDaniel 1998).  The overall effect of the 
reform of the electricity industry in the UK could be unambiguous, just as the 
plausible conclusion made by Graham (2006) that “the introduction of privatisation 
and greater reliance on market mechanisms has not made the material position of 
disadvantaged consumers worse as regards these industries”. 
 
(b) The comparison between France and UK electricity market 
In contrast to the UK market, the French electricity market started to be liberalised in 
the year 2000 and adopted a similar structure in the UK.  The market is divided into 
a wholesale and retail part as well.  However, there are still some differences 
between the UK and France electricity market.  By the year 2004, 100% of the 
market in the UK has been opened to the competition, while in France only 68% of 
the market has been opened to the traders and industrial users.  In 1999, all 
customers in the UK were able to choose their electricity retailers, which enhanced 
the market competition (DUKE 2007).  As a result, since April 2002, the price 
controls upon the 12 regional retailers in the UK have been lifted.  In contrast, from 
July 2004, the traders and industrial users in France, who don‟t renegotiate their 
contracts with their suppliers, are still able to buy the electricity at the prices set by 
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the government.  At the end of the year 2004, around 50% of the customers chose to 
enjoy the state regulated prices.  The most important reason for Energy Regulation 
Commission (CRE) to delay the full market liberalisation has been the higher 
concentration of the electricity generation sectors in France.  In 2003, EDF 
(Electricite de France) took up around 80% of the electricity market in France, 
although other 20 competitors enlarged their market share up to 18.5% of the eligible 
electricity market.  When compared with France, the concentration ratio of the 
electricity production and distribution sectors in the UK is much smaller.  In the year 
2004, the top five businesses took up 55% of the total output in the UK market.  The 
total number of the major power producers also has grown up since the liberalisation, 
from 7 in 1990 to 30 in 2006.  Compared with the electricity market in the UK, the 
French market has not been opened to the full competition, due to its monopolistic 
structure.  In contrast, the concentration of the electricity generation sector in China 
is much smaller than the UK.  There are big 5 central-government-owned power 
companies taking around 40% of total electricity supply in China and the rest is 
shared by local-government-owned power firms and a few non-state owned firms.   
 
(c) The liberalisation of the wholesale market 
Does the liberalisation drive down prices in the wholesale market?  In 2003, 
OFGEM observed around 40% of the wholesale price decline during the period from 
1998 to 2001, and then declared that the reasons would be the decentralised trading 
mechanism and many other factors “such as falling fuel prices, a large margin of 
capacity over demand and increased competition in generation ownership.” (National 
Audit Office, 2003)  Moreover, according to the report issued by Ernst & Young in 
2006, the decreased generation costs and spark spreads, and the improved capacity 
utilisation and labour productivity were observed, alongside the liberalisation of the 
electricity market.  They also found the fall in the prices due to the increasing 
competition.   
 
As shown in Figure 3.3, from 2000 to 2002, the wholesale prices in the UK indeed 
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dropped 6.4%.  However, such prices decline didn‟t last for long and started to 
increase again after the year 2002.  By 2004, the wholesale price in the UK has 
increased by 28.3%.  Besides, Sweeting (2007) also declared that, despite the 
reduced market concentration, the power generators exerted considerable market 
power upon the England and Wales wholesale electricity market, in the late 1990s.  
The increase of the wholesale price also happened in other European markets.  The 
wholesale prices in France, Germany and Italy increased by 32%, 89% and 81% 
during those four years respectively (Figure 3.3).  It is clear about the viewpoint that 
the unbundling of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution could 
impair the overall industrial outputs under some circumstance (Meran 2004).  A 
huge rise in price raises a question about the introduction of fully-liberalised market 
in the power sector to protect small consumers‟ benefits in the long run.   
 
(d) The impact of the competition upon the power generators 
Although a long-term price trend remains ambiguous, the effect of competition upon 
the short-term profit margin of those generators is clear.  After the introduction of 
the NETA in the UK, some power generators encountered the financial difficulties and 
were unable to recover their capital costs.  Such decline of the profit margin of the 
market competitions would eventually become the driver for the horizontal and 
vertical market integration.  On the contrary, in the era of the Electricity Pool, the 
power generators could “gain more than the cost reduction” (Newbery and Pollitt 
1997).  As mentioned in DTI‟s report (DUKE 2007), “since the late 1990s, there 
have been commercial moves toward vertical re-integration between generators, 
electricity distribution and/or electricity supply businesses.”  Such integration was 
also observed in Germany during the process of market liberalisation and it has driven 
the electricity prices increasing dramatically (Green 2006).  Green in his paper (2006) 
concluded that “If a formerly regulated industry is liberalised, the increase in 
competition raises the rewards to size.  Mergers are generally the easiest way to 
make a company larger.”  The tactic collusion between the power producers may 
eventually lead to the growing prices and then damage the benefits of other market 
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participants.  However, Green (1996) argues that such mergers would take effect on 
the retailing market, rather than “the competition in generation itself”, because of the 
use of the long-term contracts, which are normally as long as 15 years in the UK.   
 
(e) The small customers on the retail market 
 
Table 3.8  Indicative Cost Breakdown for Household and Industrial & Commercial Customers (2002) 
 Percentage of Price (%) Costs and Prices (¥/kWh) Percentage Difference between 
Household and I&C  Household I&C Household I&C 
Generation 40 60 0.35  0.26  26% 
Transmission 3 5 0.03  0.02  18% 
Distribution 25 24 0.22  0.10  53% 
Retail (supply) 26 11 0.23  0.05  79% 
Other 6 0 0.05  0.00  100% 
Price 100 100 0.87  0.43  51% 
Sources: 1) "Gas and Electricity Price Projections", OXERA, 2004, 2) “The New Electricity Trading Arrangements in England and 
Wales”, National Audit Office, 2002-2003: 9 May 2003, Page 19-20, 3) "Electricity Information 2006", IEA and 4) the calculation 
is based upon the information above. 
 
To the retail market, there is no doubt that the small end-users have to pay much 
higher than the large consumers.  The retail price not only includes the cost of the 
power generation, transmission and distribution, but also the mark-up of the suppliers.  
As shown in Table 3.8, the costs of retailers (suppliers) take up 26% of the household 
prices on average, which will be passed on to the small users, while the retail costs 
only take up 11% of the industrial prices.  Compared by the unit cost between the 
household and industrial prices, the unit distribution and the retail costs undertaken by 
the household users are higher than the industrial users by 53% and 79% respectively.  
And even the unit generation and transmission costs of the household tariff are higher 
than the industrial one by 26% and 18% respectively.  Eventually, it results in the 
average household price higher than the industrial & commercial price by 51%.   
 
Although the small customers have the right to change the retailers, the high trading 
costs make them unable to join in the wholesale market to buy the cheap electricity.  
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Besides, the concentration of the retailing market increased during the process of the 
liberalisation.  Before the liberalisation of the retail market, 14 regional electricity 
retailers provided the services in their franchise area at controlled price.  However, 
after 2001, there are only 7 electricity retailers on the competition market.  When the 
small customers choose the retailers, they find that actually they won‟t have many 
choices.   
 
On the other hand, because of the market liberalisation, the market exchange costs 
will occur, which will be passed onto the end-users, especially the small users.  
Domah and Pollitt (2001) observed “the per-unit revenue of the distribution and 
supply business increased by an average of 22%”, compared to the 
pre-privatisation-period level, at the early stage of the reform of the regional 
electricity companies in the UK.  Unlike the large consumers, the small customers 
have limited ability to avoid the increasing prices of the retailed electricity.  Due to 
various reasons, over 60% of the customers haven‟t changed their retailers by 2002 
(National Audit Office, 2003).  In Germany, only 5% of the small users have 
changed their retailers since the liberalisation (Reisch, Micklitz 2006).  Eventually, 
those additional transaction costs will largely passed onto the small customers. 
 
Combined with the factor of the increasing fuel prices, it‟s almost impossible for the 
small users to benefit from market liberalisation in the retail sales of electricity.  
From Figure 3.1 in the previous part, it clearly shows that the household prices 
increased by 28% in the UK and was almost 2 times as much as the industrial prices.  
The retail market in the UK clearly fails to promote benefits for the group of small 
users of electricity.   
 
3.5.2.  Market structure and reform in China 
As shown in Figure 3.6, the Chinese electricity industry remains under a reformed 
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planning system.  Currently, unlike many other industries in China, the electricity 
industry is still heavily regulated by the government via plan.  The competition has 
not yet been introduced in selling power, but in capacity expansion, after decades of 
economic reform. 
 
(a) The independent power producers in China 
 
Grid Companies





















Figure 3.6  Electricity Industry Structure in China 
Source: Based on the information from “Bing Wang, An imbalanced development of coal and 
electricity industries in China, Energy Policy 35 (2007) 4959–4968” and Chinese Electricity 
Market and Tariffs Monitoring Report 2005, and author’s own observation 
 
By 2004, the majority of the power generators have been separated from the grids and 
became independent power producers, although some studies (Ring and Read 1996) 
believe that vertical integration of the generation and transmission could achieve the 
perfect coordination.  In 2004, the grids only held 2% of the total capacity in China 
(Capgemini 2005).  “The internal transfer prices” and the “on-grid prices” apply to 
the grid-owned and the independent power producers (IPPs) respectively.  At present, 
both the price and production volume for each power plant are set by the government.  
The on-grid price, paid by the grid companies to the IPPs, is calculated by various 
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rules and specific formula which is set up by the state, in order to take into account 
variable costs, fixed capital costs and the profit margin for those IPPs.  Under such 
state arrangement, the “on-grid” prices of those individual power plants, which could 
be different from each other, sell their output to the grid company at the agreed plan 
price that is what we observe so-called “on-grid price” in China. 
 
(b) The catalogue prices in China 
 
Table 3.9  Catalogue Prices in China 
¥/MWh 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Big Industrial Uses
1)
 372 380 NA 426 457 
Common & Non-Industrial Uses
 2)
 430 520 NA 583 614 
Household Uses
 3)
 379 380 NA 443 447 
Lighting Uses (non-household) 
4)
 500 590 NA 620 776 
Commercial Service Sector Uses 
5)
 670 690 NA 754 643 
Agricultural Sector Uses
 6)
 329 330 NA 359 365 
Irrigation Uses in Low-income Regions 
7)
 146 150 NA 156 166 
Sales in excess of Plan 
8)
 328 330 NA 351 374 
Average  376 396 410 435 458 
Source: Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005 
Notes: The catalogue 1) applies to the one, of which the capacitor exceeds 315 kV, 2) applies to the one, of which the 
capacitor is below 315 kV, the government departments and the public services providers, 3) applies to the residents, 
kindergartens, schools and rest homes, 4) applies to the users of the signal lamp, the street lamp, the arc lamp and the 
neon light, 5) applies to the business services providers, 6) applies to those involved in the farming activities, 7) applies 
to the low-income counties, and 8) refers to the prices of the traded electricity in excess of plan. 
 
Although the power generation has been separated, the power transmission, 
distribution and supply are still bundled together, of which those roles are taken by the 
two grid companies in the nation.  The prices of the electricity sold to the end-users 
can be classified into several catalogues, big industrial use, non-industrial use, 
commercial use, domestic use, lighting use, agricultural use, poor counties irrigation 
use, and retails.  Those catalogue prices will be different from each other.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, the prices of the industrial and domestic use in 
China are very close, compared with the situation of other countries.  From Table 3.9, 
it shows that the price of the poor counties irrigation use is the lowest all the time and 
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only around 25% of the commercial-use price.  From 2000 to 2004, the price of the 
industrial use increased by 23%, while the agriculture-used price only raised by 11%.  
It clearly shows that, under the price control, the prices of the domestic use, the 
agricultural use and the poor counties irrigation use are subsidised, in a form of 
“price-cut” rather than “cash-back”.  It‟s kind of evidence of which electricity prices 
are used to serve income distribution for the social justice.   
 
(c) The controlled coal prices for the power generation in China 
 
 
Figure 3.7  The Gap between the Average Market Coal Prices and Electricity 
Coal Price in China 
Source: Energy Data 2005 
 
Not only are the electricity prices under the control, but also the prices of the coal for 
the power generation are regulated as well.  Although the coal market has been 
liberalised since 1993, the prices of the coal for the electricity generation (so called 
electricity coal) are still set by the government.  As shown in Figure 3.7, from 1997 
to 2004, the market prices of the coal is higher than electricity coal with a similar 
trend of price movement.  During that period, the two coal prices increased by 24% 
and 18% respectively.  However, the prices of electricity coal are lower than the 
market prices by 28.95 Yuan/Tonne, i.e. around 21% on average.  In the year 2004, 
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implies that the prices of the electricity coal were suppressed heavily by the 
government, in order to relieve part of the cost pressure for the power plants. 
 
3.5.3.  Summary 
Both in the European countries and China, the reforms of the electricity industries 
have been carried out through the vertical unbundling.  The vertical separation of the 
European electricity industries has been implemented in depth, and the competition 
has also been introduced into both the wholesale and retail markets.  In contrast, 
China only has the power generators split off from the grid companies.  And so far, 
there is neither the wholesale nor the retail electricity market has been fully liberalised 
in China. 
 
In both China and the UK, the electricity prices and the fuel costs grew up in recent 
years.  However, from the comparisons above, it clearly shows that neither the 
market competition nor planned economy can absolutely drive down the growing 
prices incurred by the inflated fuel costs.  Fortunately, under such planned economy 
mechanism in China, the inflation of the electricity prices has been limited indeed and 
the benefits for the small and poor consumers are protected effectively. 
3.6.  Supply costs and price: China versus the UK 
As identified in the previous section, the liberalised UK market has a relatively higher 
retail prices for end users.  Moreover, the overall price in the UK on average is 
higher than the price level in China in absolute term.  Also, the UK electricity price 
is generally higher than other OECD member states.  In order to explain why such 
price difference between the two countries exists, we choose China Power 
International Development (CPID) Ltd, as one of largest power companies in China, 
which is listed in Hong Kong stock market and its 5 coal-fired power plants to 
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compare with the UK largest coal-fired power company, Drax Group.   
 
Both CPID and Drax engage in the coal-fired power generation and have the close 
output capacity.  CPID, which is one of the big five power generation companies in 
China, owned 10 coal-fired power plants with the total output capacity of 4860MW 
and produced 26GWh electricity, i.e. 1.04% of the total output throughout China, for 
the year 2005.  The Drax Group, the largest coal-fired power station in the UK, has 6 
generators with the total output capacity of 3960MW.  In 2005, it provided 23GWh 
electricity and met 7% of the total demand in the UK electricity market.   
 
3.6.1.  The comparison method 
In 2004, the captured average prices of CPID and Drax were 203.07 Yuan/MWh and 
391.49 Yuan/MWh respectively.  In 2005, the revenue from generation achieved by 
Drax was 1.96 times as much as the sales of CPID.  However, the net profit of Drax 
was 6 times higher than CPID, which shows that Drax would be more profitable than 
CPID. 
 
Table 3.10  Sales and Profit Comparison between CPID and Drax in 2005 
 CPID Drax 
Revenue (Yuan) 6,437,607,787.55 12,671,116,213.44 
Operational Profit (Yuan) 944,309,891.17 5,285,119,833.65 
Net Profit (Yuan) 629,659,415.86 4,210,205,475.38 
Operational Profit Margin (%) 15% 42% 
Net Profit Margin (%) 10% 33% 
Source: Annual Report 2005 of CPID and Drax  
 
The unit cost and the percentage of the cost against the price are calculated to identify 
the levels of the costs of CPID and Drax.  However, due to effects of the exchange 
rates and the Producer Price Index (PPI), such direct comparison may have a limit in 
precisely defining the operational costs of the power plants in a straight comparable 
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term.  So our comparison shall be regarded as indicative rather than decisive.   
 
For the comparison, we take a formula below to calculate the difference of unit costs 








cuD : Percentage difference of the unit cost (price or unit profit) between the Chinese 
and UK power plant 
cU : Unit cost (price or unit profit) of the Chinese power plant,  
uU : Unit cost (price or unit profit) of the UK power plant 
In this paper, the Drax will be selected as the benchmark, and the five Chinese plants 
together with the parent company of CPID will be compared to it, respectively.  If 
the price (unit cost) of the Chinese power plant is lower than the UK plant, the 
percentage difference of the price (unit cost) will be less than 0%.  If the two plants 
have the same price (unit cost), the percentage difference of the price (unit cost) 
equals to 0%.  If the percentage difference of the price of the plant is lower than the 
percentage difference of its unit cost, it implies that the unit cost of that power plant 
would be relatively higher (not as low as “it should be”), compared to its current price 
level.   
 
Form the Appendix 3.3 and Appendix 3.4, it shows that both in 2004 and 2005, the 
price percentage difference between CPID and Drax (-33.72% in 2004, -54.71% in 
2005) is lower than the percentage differences of the unit fuel costs (-33.6% in 2004, 
-49.07% in 2005), the unit labour cost (-30.69% in 2004, -33.15% in 2005), the unit 
depreciation and amortisation (14.63% in 2004, 1.75% in 2005), and the unit 
institutional & managerial costs (-22.98% in 2004, -38.56% in 2005), except the 
percentage differences of the unit administrative expenses (-95.64% in 2004, -90.27% 
in 2005) and the unit interest paid (-92.05% in 2004, -94.13% in 2005).  
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An interesting point is that the Chinese plants have every cost lower than their English 
counterpart except depreciation cost.  This may reflect (1) the Chinese firm 
manipulates by setting up higher cost that has no cash implication to business but 
helps strengthen its bargaining with the state for a high plan price, or (2) China has an 
industrial policy that encourages technology upgrading by providing the firm with tax 
favourable arrangement such as high depreciation rate before corporate tax.   
 
3.6.2.  The fuel cost and energy efficiency 
Table 3.11  Percentage of the Fuel Cost against the Total Cost of CPID and Drax 
 2004 2005 
CPID 67% 70% 
Drax 57% 65% 
Source: Annual Report 2004 and 2005 of CPID and Drax 
 
The fuel cost is the largest part of the total generation cost.  As shown in Table 3.11, 
in 2005, the fuel costs of CPID and Drax take up 70% and 65% of the total generation 
costs respectively.  Compared with Drax, the fuel costs of CPID took larger 
proportion of the total costs.  However, the unit fuel cost of CPID (150.46 
Yuan/MWh) was smaller than Drax (295.41 Yuan/MWh) by 49.1% in the same year.   
 
The unit fuel cost is determined mainly by the coal price and the thermal efficiency.  
During the period from 2000 to 2004, both the coal prices in the UK and in China 
increased by 34.38% and 34.22% respectively.  The main reason for such cheaper 
coal price in China could be attributable to the price control set by the government.  
Although the coal industry has been partially liberalised in 1993, the coal price for the 
power generation is still regulated by NDRC in the central government.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, the coal price for the electricity generation is 
normally lower than the Chinese market price by 30 to 100 Yuan per tonne.   
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Figure 3.8  The Comparison of the Coal Prices (Nominal) for Electricity Generation between the UK 
and China 
Source: China Electric Power Yearbook 2005, Energy Data 2005 and IEA Electricity Information 
2007 
 
In China, the increasing coal prices inevitably deteriorate the profit margin of the 
coal-fired power stations.  From 2000 to 2004, in China, the industrial and domestic 
electricity prices only increased by 22.85% and 17.86%, both lower than the rise in 
the coal prices that were increased by 34%.  Such situation eventually creates the 
issue of the new regulations to link the coal and electricity prices in the year 2005.   
 
 
Figure 3.9  The Comparison of Energy Efficiency between UK and Chinese Power Plants 
Source: The Chinese data are collected in from Xie, Shaoxiong (2002), “Review of Assumptions as to 
Changes in the Electricity Generation Sector in Nautilus Institute’s Clean Coal Scenarios Report”, and 
Wang, Qingyi(2005), “Energy Data 2005”.  The UK data are collected from DTI’s website. 
 
In the UK, in recent years, the coal-fired power plants couldn‟t avoid the pressures of 
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the coal price increases too.  After 2000, over 43% of the annual coal consumption 
in the UK relied upon the imports from overseas.  In 2004, the prices of the steam 
coal for electricity generation sharply increased by 30%, which made the coal costs 
higher than the gas costs in the UK.   Such price fluctuation led to the abandonment 
of the coal-fired power generation in the UK in 2004.  From 2003 to 2004, the UK 
coal-fired capacity increased by around 0.23%, but the power supplied by the 
coal-fired capacity dropped by around 5.17%, which resulted in a decrease in the 
coal-fired load factor by around 5.39% (DUKES 2006).   
 
One of the reasons for the higher overall energy efficiency in the UK could be the 
wide use of the combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology.  In 2004, the over 
41% of the electricity was supplied by CCGT, of which the thermal efficiency was up 
to 47%, i.e. higher than the coal-fired stations by over 11%.  Another reason could 
be the large number of the small coal-fired power stations in China, of which the 
thermal efficiency is low.  In 2004, the small (installed capacity below 50MW) and 
medium-sized (installed capacity between 50MW and 300MW) power producers took 
up 75.78% and 21.11% of the total power producers in China (Capgemini 2005).  In 
2005, the large coal-fired power plants (of which the installed capacity is above 1 
million kW) had the aggregate capacity of 14.625 million kW, which only took up 2.6% 
of the total capacity of the all-sized coal-fired power plants in China.  But the large 
plant in China could also achieve a high thermal efficiency.  For example, the 
thermal efficiency of Pingwei plant was 38.57% in 2005.  And the small and old 
power plants in the UK could only reach a low thermal efficiency, such as Uskmouth.  
So, the closure of the small thermal power plants and investing in large-size of new 
plants, for example CCGT, would help compare the thermal efficiency for both China 
and the OECD countries.   
 
Generally speaking, the overall energy efficiency of the UK is still higher than China, 
but the gap is closing.  In 2004, the overall thermal efficiency in the UK and China 
was 38.2% and 32.55% respectively.  In 2006, the average energy efficiency of the 
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power generation in China reached up to 33.34%, equivalent to the 1980s level in the 
UK.  However, since 1962, the gap of the energy efficiency between Chinese and 
UK power plants has been narrowed sharply, by over 50%. 
 
Table 3.12  The Energy Efficiency Comparison between UK and Chinese Power Plants 
  Unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
OECD (Power Generation) % 37.17 36.10 37.43 37.75 37.84  
Overall UK power plants
1)
 % 38.2 37.59 38.33 38.14 38.2 37.89 
Combined cycle gas turbine stations (UK) % 46.6 46.7 46.8 46.4 47.0 49.0 
Coal fired stations (UK) % 36.2 35.8 36.3 36.5 36.2 35.9 
Nuclear stations (UK) % 37.3 37.3 37.6 38.1 37.9 38.2 
Drax (UK)
2)
 %      38.0 
Uskmouth (UK)
3)
 %     28.7 29.9 
Overall China Power Plants (Supply) % 31.23 31.80 31.96 32.21 32.55 33.08 
Shanxi Shentou (Supply) %    32.2 32.5 32.5 
Liaoning Qinghe (Supply) %    31.7 31.3 30.5 
Pingdingshan Yaomeng  (Supply) %    35.8 35.7 35.8 
Jiangsu Changshu  (Supply) %    35.3 35.5 35.8 
Anhui Pingwei  (Supply) %    36.1 36.4 37.0 
CPID  (Supply) %    35.7 35.9 35.6 
Shanxi Shentou  (Generation) %    35.51 35.65 35.55 
Liaoning Qinghe  (Generation) %    35.01 34.68 33.56 
Pingdingshan Yaomeng  (Generation) %    38.76 38.60 38.73 
Jiangsu Changshu  (Generation) %    37.05 37.27 37.60 
Anhui Pingwei  (Generation) %    37.81 37.93 38.57 
CPID  (Generation) %    37.84 37.91 37.86 
Source: 1) The Chinese data are collected in from the paper “Xie Shaoxiong, Review of Assumptions as to 
Changes in the Electricity Generation Sector in Nautilus Institute’s Clean Coal Scenarios Report”, and author and 
Prof. Guy Liu’s survey of CPID’s annual report 2004 and 2005; 2) The UK data are collected from DTI's sheet 
file18945. 3) Calculation based on the data from IEA, "Electricity Information 2006", Table 13. 
Note: 1) gross calorific value basis. 2) Drax is the most efficient coal-fired power plant in the UK, which implies that 
the thermal efficiency of other UK coal-fired plants won't exceed Drax.  3) The thermal efficiency of Drax is the 
baseload efficiency, calculated by the energy out to energy in.   
 
As shown by the selected samples, in 2005, both CPID and Drax achieved the energy 
efficiency around 38%.  However, in 2005, the average price of the natural coal 
purchased by CPID (239.21 Yuan/Tonne) is lower than Drax (510.61 Yuan/Tonne) by 
42.58%.  Considering the fact that the fuel costs of CPID is lower than Drax by 
49.07%.  This explains why fuel takes more weight in total costs of the UK firm than 
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its Chinese counterpart, given that both have a similar level of the thermal efficiency.   
 
The gap of the thermal efficiency between the OECD average and China is not so 
obvious either.  In 2004, the average thermal efficiency of OECD was 37.84%, 
higher than China by around 5.2%.  However, the thermal generation efficiency of 
CPID was 37.91%, i.e. at the same level with the OECD average.   
 
The percentage difference of the price between the two is smaller than the percentage 
difference of the fuel cost.  It could be interpreted as, because of the price control in 
China, the Chinese power plant couldn‟t transfer the increase in the fuel cost into the 
price as much as the UK counterpart.  However, it would encourage those Chinese 
power producers to improve their energy efficiency, such as building large plant and 
implementing new technology, in order to suppress their overall fuel costs.   
3.6.3.  The fuel cost pass-through 
As described above, the power generators in the UK and China expose themselves to 
the risks of the operational costs growth, which is mainly due to an increase in fuel 
costs.  However, such increases may be transferred to the electricity price, and then 
paid by the end users.  In order to measure how much increases in the fuel costs have 
been passed through into the electricity price, the ratio of a change in the electricity 
price to a change in coal price is calculated by the following formula, under the 




If such ratio is below 1, it means that an increase in the fuel costs can be partly passed 
through to the electricity price.  It also indicates that the inflation of the fuel price 
would be absorbed partly by the end users and partly by the generators.  If such ratio 
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is equal to 1, it means that the increase in the fuel price is fully passed to the 
electricity price.  If such ratio is larger than 1, it means that the electricity prices 
increased more than the fuel prices.   
 















Electricity to Coal 
 China UK China UK China UK China UK China UK 
2000 0.3720 0.4595 NA NA 120.93 368.50 NA NA NA NA 
2001 0.3800 0.4210 2.15% -8.38% 123.94 384.52 2.49% 4.35% 0.86 -1.93 
2002 0.4030e 0.4302 6.04% 2.19% 137.97 368.82 11.32% -4.08% 0.53 -0.54 
2003 0.4259 0.4530 5.70% 5.29% 140.91 380.37 2.13% 3.13% 2.67 1.69 
2004 0.4570 0.5521 7.29% 21.87% 162.51 494.60 15.33% 30.03% 0.48 0.73 
2005 NA NA NA NA 212.75 538.46 30.92% 8.87% NA NA 
Source: 1) "Electricity Information 2006", IEA, 2) Energy Data 2005, 3) Electricity market and Electricity Prices Monitoring 
Report 2005 
Notes: 1) Taxation included 2) “e” means the estimated figure. 
 
In Table 3.13, the price changes of the fuel and the electricity in the UK and China, 
from 2001 and 2004, are calculated and compared.  In 2001, when the NETA was 
introduced, the ratio of UK was -1.93.  It indicates that, in 2001, the introduced 
competition in the UK wholesale electricity market indeed led to the decline of the 
electricity price by 8.38%, when the coal price increased by 4.35%.  However, such 
situation didn‟t last long.  In 2002, although the coal price dropped by 4.08%, the 
electricity price grew up by 2.19% and led to a ratio of -0.54.  Such ratio increased 
up to 1.69 in 2003 and then shrank to 0.73 in 2004.   
 
As to China, such ratio only exceeded 1 in 2003, because of the cap for the price 
increase set by the NDRC in May, 2003
18
.  In 2004, the ratio went down to 0.48, 
which means that over 50% of the increase of the fuel price didn‟t pass to the 
electricity prices.  However, in the same year in the UK, less than 30% of the fuel 
                                                             
18 “The Notice from the NDRC about Improving the Work of the Negotiation of the Contract of the Electricity 
Coal in 2003”, http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/section/claw!fetch.html?id=g000022228, visited on 20th December, 
2008. 
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price increase was absorbed by the power generators themselves, which results in the 
great jump in the electricity price by 21.87%.  It clearly shows that, in the long-term, 
the introduced competition in the UK didn‟t work as effective as expected by the 
market regulator.  The fuel price increases were passed much more to the end users 
in the UK than in China.   
 
However, an increase in the fuel price may not be equal to the increase in the unit 
costs of fuel.  In order to ascertain the influence of the unit fuel cost upon the 
electricity price, a similar ratio is calculated, by dividing the electricity price change 
by the unit fuel cost change.   
 
From Table 3.14, our firm-to-firm comparing example shows that in 2005, the ratio of 
Drax as the largest coal-fired power station in the UK is above 1, i.e. 1.14, while the 
ratios of all the five subsidiaries and the parent company of China Power International 
Development Ltd are below 1.  It indicates that the power plants in China absorbed a 
part of the fuel costs growth, while the UK peer passed all of the increase in the fuel 
costs to its electricity prices.  This example of comparison sheds some light on the 
difference between plan and market in effectively regulating the firm in passing its 
cost through to consumers. 
 
Table 3.14  The Comparison of the Electricity and Coal Prices of CPID and Drax 2004-2005 
  
Electricity Price  
(¥/MWh) 




Unit Fuel Cost 
Changes (%) 
Ratio of Electricity 
Price Change to Unit 
Fuel Cost Change   2004 2005 2004 2005 
Shanxi Shentou 134.39  162.93  68.95  92.04  21.24% 33.48% 0.63 
Liaoning Qinghe 203.84  253.01  126.84  173.41  24.12% 36.72% 0.66  
Pingdingshan Yaomeng 195.59  227.70  120.40  148.72  16.42% 23.52% 0.70  
Jiangsu Changshu 275.08  290.49  164.92  177.00  5.61% 7.32% 0.77  
Anhui Huainan 248.16  267.16  125.69  156.52  7.66% 24.52% 0.31  
CPID
1)
 241.23  247.34  137.44  150.46  2.53% 9.47% 0.27  
Drax 363.93  546.17  205.32  295.41  50.08% 43.88% 1.14  
Source: Annual Financial Reports 2004 and 2005 of China Power International Development Ltd and Drax. 
Notes: 1) CPID is referred to the parent listed company, the China Power International Development. 
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3.6.4.  The labour cost 
Unlike the fuel cost, both in China and in the UK, the labour cost only takes up a 
small proportion of the total sales and the operational costs.  According to Table 3.15, 
in China, the average percentage of the labour cost against the total sales ranged 
between 5.03% and 5.78% over the seven-year‟s period.  On average, the percentage 
of the labour cost against the operational costs for the profit-making plant will be 
smaller than the loss-making plant in China.  According to Table 3.15, in 2005, the 
labour costs of the profit and loss-making plants took up 4.95% and 6.18% of the 
operational cost respectively.  Compared with the selected UK loss-making plants, 
the percentages of the labour cost against the operational cost of the Chinese power 
plants are higher.   
 
The unit labour cost is determined by the staff number and the salary rate of the 
employee.  Since 2001, the average number of the employees per power plant in 
China has decreased by 3.3%.  However, the changes of the average employees 
working for the profit-making and loss-making plants in China are different.  The 
average employees working for the profit-making plant increased during the period 
from 2002 to 2004 and then started to decline in 2005, while as to the loss-making 
plants, the average employees declined from 2000 and then increased slightly in the 
year 2005.  In 1999, the ratio of the number of employees between profit-making 
and loss-making plants was 1.188.  In 2005, such ratio became 1.43.  It implies that 
there is a trend of the employment shift from the loss-making plants to the 
profit-making ones. 
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The Average Labour Cost per Plant (1000 RMB) 




11,590.22 12,045.95 16,426.89 18,135.74 20,207.61 26,328.43 29,788.81 
The Loss-making 
Plants 
8,056.56 11,299.85 12,889.35 12,193.25 12,396.22 12,722.95 13,495.27 
The Average Labour Cost per Employee (1000 RMB) 




16.08 15.13 22.56 22.50 25.64 30.40 40.15 
The Loss-making 
Plants 
13.27 16.69 20.36 18.99 20.26 24.90 26.00 
The Labour Cost Percentage against the Total Cost (%) 




4.60% 4.81% 4.85% 5.13% 5.04% 4.96% 4.95% 
The Loss-making 
Plants 
5.18% 4.73% 6.85% 5.66% 7.90% 7.18% 6.18% 
Unit Labour Cost (Yuan/WMh) 
All Plants 8.29 10.64 12.91 12.29 11.84 12.82 13.44 17.49 18.70 
Source: The data of Chinese power plants are collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China; The data of UK power plants are 
collected from FAME.   
Note: The financial data of Drax and Uskmouth were reported as at the year end of December 31
st
, 2004 and October 31
st
, 2006 
respectively.   
 
However, the reduction in the employment in the Chinese power plants was not aimed 
to cut labour cost, rather is to raise it by increasing a wage rate.  Under the small 
reduction of the average number of employees, the average labour cost per plant 
increased by 157.02% and 67.51% for the profit-making plants and the loss-making 
plants respectively, during the period from 1999 to 2005.  Actually, the average 
labour cost per employee for both the profit-making and loss-making plants were 
increased by 149.74% and 95.91% respectively over the seven years.  As a result, the 
unit labour cost for the Chinese power plant was increased by 62% during that period.  
This observation shows evidence in supporting our argument that the Chinese power 
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firms are not to minimise costs, at least, labour costs.   
 
The small proportion of labour costs in sales shown by our large sample of some 1000 
power generation companies is consistent with our particular-selected sample 
companies.  The unit labour costs of both CPID and Drax take up a small proportion 
of the price, i.e. only 5.05% and 3.42% respectively in 2005.  Although in 2004 the 
average salary per person of CPID (36,118 Yuan) was only 5% of Drax. (741,736 
Yuan), the higher percentage of the labour costs of CPID implies that CPID suffers 
from the burden of the excessive employees.  Actually, in 2004, the entire group of 
CPID employed over 6603 employees, while Drax only employed 540 staff.  
Considering the total outputs of the generation, it clearly shows that the labour 
productivity of the UK Drax is around 10 times higher than its counterpart CPID in 
2004.   
 
Table 3.16  The Average Number of Employees per Plant in China 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
All plants 695 757 718 748 733 658 635 
The profit-making plants 721 796 728 806 788 866 742 
The loss-making plants 607 677 633 642 612 511 519 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
For the unit labour cost of CPID, it was 12.12 Yuan/MWh and 12.50 Yuan/MWh for 
the year 2004 and 2005 respectively, still lower than the unit cost of Drax by -30.69% 
and -33.15%.  However, it was higher than the price percentage difference both for 
the 2004 and for 2005, which means that the unit cost of CPID was relatively higher.   
 
Although the average salary of the Chinese plant is only equal to 5% of the UK 
counterpart, the unit labour cost of the Chinese plant is 72% of the UK counterpart on 
average.  The reason for this would the excessive number of staff and the low labour 
productivity of these Chinese power plants.  In another aspect, the difference of the 
unit labour cost between the two was less than their price difference.  Just as the fuel 
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cost, the price control makes it difficult for the Chinese power plants to pass their 
labour costs to the electricity prices, when compared to the UK counterpart. 
 
3.6.5.  The finance costs 
Although CPID faces the pressure from the fuel and labour costs, it gains the 
advantage of the interest cost.  In 2005, the interest cost of CPID only took up 1.75% 
of the total sales revenue, while as to Drax, the percentage of the interest cost against 
the sales was 13.46%.  For the year 2004 and 2005, the financial cost of Drax took 
up 17% and 19% of the total costs, respectively.   
 
Not only does the Chinese firm enjoy a lower interest costs, but also the interest rates 
as well.  The interest rate applied to CPID was only 4.46% in 2004 and 2.4% in 2005, 
while the interest rate of Drax was 8% in 2004 and 5.55% in 2005. As we know, CPID 
is state-controlled quoted company in Hong Kong, which can gain benefit from the 
stae in financing its investment.  Drax is private-owned public quoted company in 
London, and apparently it doesn‟t have advantage of state support.   
 
Table 3.17  The Comparison of the Average Financial Cost between Chinese and UK Coal-fired 
Power Plants 
  
Chinese Coal-fired Power Plants 
Selected UK 
Power Plant 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005 
N=923 N=962 N=984 N=1001 N=1193 N=1189 Drax Drax 
Percentage of Financial Cost 
Against Total Cost (%) 
7.86% 7.66% 6.87% 6.06% 4.67% 4.25% 17% 19% 
Interest Rate (%) 4.41% 4.33% 4.28% 4.28% 3.25% 3.04% 8% 5.5% 
Unit Financial Cost (Yuan/MWh) 16.2 17.4 15.1 12.4 10.9 10.7 67.05 58.42 
Source: Numbers are calculated from the data collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Chinese Electric Power 
Yearbook 2006, FAME and Annual Report of Drax (2004, 2005) 
 
From the historical point of view, both the average financial costs and interests rates 
of the Chinese power plants have declined over the years.  As shown in Table 3.17, 
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from 2000 to 2005, the unit financial costs of the Chinese power plants fell by 34%.  
The average interest rates for all plants decreased by 38%, i.e. 1.89 percentage points.  
Due to the fact that at present most large banks in China are SOEs (state-owned 
enterprises), it‟s justified to believe that those coal-fired power plants in China enjoy 
the indirect subsidies through the favourable interest rates granted by the state-owned 
banks.   
 
3.6.6.  The overheads 
In the electricity industry, the overhead costs could be defined as the expenses and 
costs except the fuel costs and the labour costs.  Classified by function, the overhead 
costs will be attributed to different cost pools (Landeros, Reck and Griggs, 1994), 
such as the distribution costs, the administrative expenses, the financial costs and the 
generating expenses.  By definition, the overhead means all costs on the income 
statement except for the direct labour, the direct materials and the direct expenses.  
But in this study, the overhead refers to the administration only, excluding the direct 
labour and direct materials.   
 
The administrative expenses of CPID were 0.5 Yuan/MWh in 2004 and then increased 
up to 1.54 in 2005.  The administrative expenses of Drax were 11.44 Yuan/MWh in 
the year 2004 and 15.87 Yuan/MWh in the second year respectively.  As to CPID, 
the unit administrative expenses as percentage of the price were 0.21% in 2004 and 
0.62% in 2005 respectively, which were much smaller than Drax (3.14% in 2004 and 
2.91% in 2005).  In 2004 and 2005, the unit administrative expenses of CPID were 
smaller than Drax by 95.64% and 90.27% respectively.  However, such result might 
be due to the different ways of the classification of the overheads and administration 
expenses.  For example, in the UK, the overheads may include the indirect labour 
and materials.  But in China, the indirect labour and material will be included in the 
cost of sales.   
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To address the concern above, we define the unit overheads as the unit total costs 
minus the unit fuel cost (direct material) and unit labour cost (direct labour).  As 
shown in Table 4.6, the percentage difference of the overheads between CPID and 
Drax was -66.35% and -68.68% in the year 2004 and 2005 respectively.  Again, after 
eliminating the element of the interests, the unit overheads of CPID (25.69% in 2004, 
22.92% in 2005) took up larger percentage of the total costs, compared to Drax (23.86% 
in 2004, 18.18% in 2005).  This provides us with evidence that the Chinese 
state-owned firms have higher agency costs than its English counterpart.   
 
The institutional and managerial costs are those expenditures and charges to 
administrate and sustain the operation of the business, which are composed of the 
business taxation, administration expenses and depreciation.  In 2004 and 2005, the 
unit institutional and managerial costs of CPID were 25.65 Yuan/MWh and 21.99 
Yuan/MWh, lower than Drax by 22.98% and 38.56% respectively, but higher than the 
prices percentage difference between the two.  It means that the institutional and 
managerial costs of CPID were relatively higher, compared to its own price level. 
 
Table 3.18  The Overheads of CPID and Drax in 2004 and 2005 
 2004 2005 








58.35 173.38 -66.35% 53.59 171.06 -68.68% 
Overheads as Percentage 
of the Total Cost (%) 
28.00% 39.00% NA 25.00% 32.00% NA 
Unit Overhead excluding 
Interest (Yuan/MWh) 
53.02 106.34 -50.14% 49.27 97.55 -49.50% 
Overheads excluding 
Interest as Percentage of 
the Total Cost (%) 
25.69% 23.86% NA 22.92% 18.18% NA 
Source: Annual reports of CPID 2004 and 2005, Annual report of Drax 2005 
 
As a whole, it implies that despite of the low administrative expenses level, the 
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overall operational efficiency of Drax would be higher than CPID because 
proportionally Drax has a lower overhead cost than CPID in its total costs.  The low 
level of administrative expense may be changed if the state regulatory constraint on 
cost or cost-pass-through is lifted.   
 
3.6.7.  The depreciation 
The depreciation is the amount written down to attribute the historical cost of the asset 
across its life in use.  Unlike many other expenses and costs transactions, the 
depreciation never includes any item of cash outflow, but stands for the value of the 
assets that will not be recovered through the disposal process only.  It means that the 
depreciation and amortisation expenses actually are the “hidden profit” for the 
companies.   
 
Table 3.19  The Depreciation of the Chinese Power Plants 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average depreciation per plant (1000 Yuan) 
Profit-making plant 38746.85 41718.39 55620.26 60209.61 73927.15 76355.15 87256.75 
Loss-making plants 33841.63 36808.27 32568.25 30537.37 24289.39 22176.15 27014.75 
Changes of average depreciation per plant (%) 
Profit-making plant NA 7.67% 33.32% 8.25% 22.78% 3.28% 14.28% 
Loss-making plants NA 8.77% -11.52% -6.24% -20.46% -8.70% 21.82% 
Average depreciation as percentage of the total cost (%) 
Profit-making plants 15.39% 16.68% 16.42% 17.04% 18.45% 14.38% 14.49% 
Loss-making plants 21.78% 15.41% 17.30% 14.19% 15.48% 12.51% 12.38% 
Source: The National Statistics Bureau of China 
 
From Table 3.19, it shows that as to the profit-making plants in China, the 
depreciation took up 15.39% of the total costs in 1999, increased up to 18.45% in 
2003 and then dropped again to 14.49% in 2005.  The proportion of the depreciation 
of the loss-making plants decreased from 21.75% in 1999 to 12.38% in 2005.  Over 
those seven years, the average depreciation of the profit-making plant in China 
increased by 125%. 
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On the contrary to the costs and expenses described above, the unit depreciation and 
amortisation expenses of CPID (25.06 Yuan/MWh in 2004, 20.27 Yuan/MWh in 2005) 
were higher than Drax (21.86 Yuan/MWh in 2004, 19.92 Yuan/MWh in 2005) by 
14.36% in 2004 and 1.75% in 2005 respectively.  The percentage of the depreciation 
against the price of Drax was only 6.01% in 2004 and 1.75% in 2005 respectively, 
while as to CPID, it‟s 10.39% in 2004 and 9.98% in 2005.   
 
In 2005, the profit margin before taxation of CPID and Drax were 12.89% and 31.01% 
respectively.  By considering the effect of the depreciation charges, the modified 
profit margin of CPID and Drax would be 22.87% and 32.76%.  This implies that the 
profit margin before taxation of CPID would be lower than Drax by 30.2 percentage 
points, rather than 58.4 percentage points at present.  Even though, the profit margin 
of the Chinese power plants under the price control set by the government is smaller 
than the UK power plant operated in a liberalised market.  The observation of 
depreciation and its difference between Chinese firm and the UK firm shows that the 
Chinese firm set a higher cost for depreciation at expenses of their profit, in which 
this is not a case in the UK firms that lower down the depreciation cost in order to 
increase profits.  The reason is that the Chinese firms set up a higher cost that has no 
cash implication to business but helps bargain with the state for a higher plan price, or 
China has an industrial policy to encourage the technology upgrading by allowing 
higher depreciation rate before tax.   
 
3.6.8.  Subsidies 
Both the profit and the loss-making power plants in China might receive the subsidies 
income directly granted by the government.  As shown in Table 3.20, over 8% of all 
plants in 1999 reported that they received the subsidies and in the year 2005, such 
percentage increased to 23%.  During the period from 1999 to 2005, the percentage 
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of the loss-making plants with the subsidies was normally larger than the 
profit-making ones.  However, the percentage of the profit plants with the subsidies 
increased dramatically.  In the year 2005, the percentages of the profit and 
loss-making plants with the subsidies were 22% and 23% respectively.   
 
Table 3.20  Percentage of the Power Plants receiving the Subsidies 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
N=916 N=923 N=962 N=984 N=1001 N=1193 N=1189 
All Plants 8% 8% 9% 11% 15% 17% 23% 
Profit-making Plants 5% 5% 7% 9% 12% 19% 22% 
Loss-making Plants 13% 15% 11% 15% 19% 14% 23% 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Over the seven years, not only the percentage of the direct subsidised plants increased, 
but also the average amount of the subsidies grew up.  Table 3.21 shows that the 
average subsidies income for the coal-fired power plants in China increased by 3.2 
times over the seven years, up to 1.96 million Yuan in the year 2005. On average, as 
expected, the loss-making plants receive much greater subsidies than the 
profit-making plants.  In the year 2005, 128 loss-making plants received over 
320,565,118 Yuan from the government in China.   
 
Table 3.21  The Average Subsidy per Power Plant in China 
1000 Yuan 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ALL Plants 466.52 476.69 1031.77 1116.98 1186.28 972.76 1963.27 
Profit-making Plants 255.95 121.96 543.80 1001.58 807.91 595.04 1502.19 
Loss-making Plants 858.73 1231.83 1912.40 1316.14 1998.96 1343.58 2504.41 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
However, from Figure 3.10, it clearly shows that both the profit-making and 
loss-making plants received the subsidies.  Only 108 plants over the 7 years have the 
subsidies above 500 thousands RMB.  88.93% of the plants, which include both the 
profit-making and loss-making ones only received a limited subsidies below 500 
thousands RMB.  It means that the subsidiaries are not granted for the loss-making 
plants to cover part of their heavy operational expenses and costs.  Actually, the 
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plants receiving the subsidies over the 7 years are almost subject to a kind of normal 
distribution, which indicates that there is no linear relationship between the amount of 
the subsidies and the profit of the plant.  The wide-reported explanation for such 
phenomenon is that the government granted the subsidies to the power plants for the 
main purpose of technology upgrading via new equipment investment to improve 
productive and environment efficiency
19
.  For example, in Jiangsu province, the 
subsidies for the use of the energy efficient equipment are equal to 30% of the book 
value of the machine.   
 
 
Figure 3.10  The Chinese Power Plants with Subsidies  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Notes: The unit is one thousand RMB. 
 
3.6.9.  Discussion 
Without a doubt, the overall low cost level is the precondition for the Chinese power 
plants to keep their prices low.  However, in 2005, the total unit cost of the CPID 
was only lower than Drax by 42.82%, while its price was lower by 54.71% (Table 
3.22).  This suggests that the total unit costs of the sample plants in China were not 
lower “enough” to generate a profit margin in their price as similar as their English 
counterpart.  This explains why Chinese power sector has a lower profitability, 
                                                             
























0 10000 0 10000 0 10000 0 10000
1999 2000 2001 2002









  126 
which is a result partly of state plan control, partly of the cost behaviour of the 
state-owned power firms and partly of institutional impact.   
 
Our discussion shows that, under the price control set by the government, the Chinese 
power plants couldn‟t transfer their variable costs into the electricity prices as much 
as their UK peers do.  When both the Chinese and the UK power plants are facing 
the increasing fuel costs, China is more effective in restricting cost-pass-through to 
the electricity price and so lowering profit margin of the power producers.  In 
contrast, the UK plants can relatively straight pass through 100% of the cost to the 
price, because the UK firm has no regulatory control on the cost behaviour.  The cost 
control may explain why China firms have higher incentive to invest on new 
technology because the firm can seek higher profit margin by cutting cost of 
production through investment on new technology.   
 












CPID Drax CPID Drax CPID Drax CPID Drax 
2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Unit Fuel Cost 56.98 56.42 137.45 205.33 60.83 54.09 150.46 295.42 
Unit Labour Cost 4.4 4.81 10.61 17.51 4.41 3.42 10.91 18.68 
Unit Financial Cost 2.21 18.42 5.33 67.04 1.75 13.46 4.33 73.51 
Unit Depreciation 10.39 6.01 25.06 21.87 8.19 3.65 20.26 19.94 
Unit Overhead  
excluding Financial Cost and 
Depreciation 
10.2 21.91 24.61 79.74 11.93 25.35 29.51 138.45 
Unit Other Exceptional Items 0 0 0 0 0 30.98 0 169.2 
Unit Profit before Taxation 15.82 -7.57 38.16 -27.55 12.89 31.01 31.88 169.37 
Unit Taxation (1.08) 6.39 (2.61) 23.26 (1.00) 2.21 (2.47) 12.07 
Electricity Price 100 100 241.23 363.93 100 100 247.34 546.17 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
Notes: 1) In 2005, Drax received £310.9m administration income from TXU, and also recognised £19m income by the 
revaluation of the tangible fixed assets; 2) Excluding the exceptional income, Drax would have made losses of £66.3m 
through the generation activities, i.e.¥988m, in 2005; 3) the positive tax means the tax refund. 
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As can be seen from Table 4.9, the Chinese firms could enjoy the low interest rates 
granted by the state-owned banks as an indirect subsidy.  It would encourage the 
Chinese power companies to invest more on larger plants and upgrading technology.  
In the UK, the higher bank interests discourage the UK power plants to invest, which 
could lead to the insufficient capital expenditures, and slow down technology 
upgrading that decides energy efficiency.  However, the high profit margin would 
offset such effects of the high finance costs to some extent on the UK power 
investments.   
 
Besides the magnified generation costs and the low interest rates, the Chinese plants 
could also earn extra returns, rather than their reported figures, through the 
depreciation charges.  In the year 2004, the unit cost of the depreciation of CPID is 
higher than Drax both by 14.7%, while the price of CPID is lower than Drax by 
33.72%.  On taking into the “hidden profit”, the earnings of CPID would increase by 
around 10%.  Such estimation would also be applicable to other power plants in 
China. 
 
The impact of the liberalisation of Chinese electricity market would be ambiguous.  
The market competition may not be powerful enough to discipline the firm‟s 
cost-pass-through behaviour, which has been evident by the UK firms.  In addition, 
the collusion among the major generators may combine with the abuse of the market 
power and then reduce the benefits of the end-users at last.  In 2006, the electricity 
price bidding experiment in northern China provinces failed and suspended, which 
confirmed such expectation.   
 
In order to retain the sustainability of the state plan price in selling electricity, China 
extends its regulatory power to the coal market.  All of coal supplied to the power 
sector has been subject to the control of the state plan.  This regulatory extension to 
the up-stream energy market is aimed to ensure the power firm to get a low-cost 
supply of fuel for sustaining the low plan price that can benefit the whole 
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down-stream industry and so the economy.  But a challenge for this system is that 
once the price regulation to coal market is lifted, which is currently happening to 
China, how the current plan-based price control system in electricity sales can be 
sustainable will become an immediate problem for the Chinese policy maker.   
 
3.7.  Conclusions 
Through this comparative analysis of power supply in China and in the UK, we 
identify some merits for the Chinese reforms plan-based regulatory system in 
managing the power industry.  In contrast to the UK where it is the most liberalised 
market in the world, China‟s plan system promotes growth of power supply, capacity 
expansion, and technology upgrading.  The reform plan system also promotes 
benefits for the whole society and the economy rather than a sectorial interest via 
imposing low plan prices in purchasing and selling electricity.  The electricity price 
for the small users is well restricted to the same level with the large industrial users in 
China.  The power prices for industrial users remain at a relatively lower level than 
many OECD economies that have liberalised power market.  As to the UK electricity 
market, it clearly shows that the Pareto improvement was not achieved after the 
introduction of the decentralised wholesale arrangement, as the situation of the small 
users became even worse, compared to the industrial users.  Furthermore, the 
reformed plan system is more effective than the fully-liberalised market in 
disciplining cost-pass-through behaviour of the firms.  To stimulate technology 
upgrading, the state ownership provides the power firms with advantages in accessing 
low cost finance.   
 
As a result of this promotion of investment, the energy efficiency of Chinese power 
plants improved continuously and significantly over the years, which has caught up 
the leading plants in the West.  Especially, the actually gap of the thermal efficiency 
between the UK and Chinese coal-fired plants diminished very significantly in recent 
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years.  The reason for such improvement of the Chinese power plants should be due 
to the favourable industrial policies and the low interest rates granted by the 
state-owned banks, which both encouraged the investments with the implement of the 
new technology in the electricity sector.  In contrast to China, the market-based 
private-owned UK electricity corporations experienced relatively slow investment on 
technology upgrading.  The two paces of investment explain the technology gap 
closing between the regions.   
 
Unlike the failure of the California electricity market that damaged the security of 
electricity supply, the reformed plan system has not brought any concern on the 
security issue of power supply in China.  This is because the government sets the 
price and the volume of the electricity generation for each individual plant.  There is 
no evidence to show that the reformed plan system is unable to promote energy 
supply to meet the growing demand of the economy.   
 
On one hand, the plan-based regulatory system should be more suitable for the 
naturally monopoly industry, such as the electricity sector, because the market is 
unlikely to be able to function in protecting the industry from the price collusion.    
In future, China should be more carefully thinking about its reform in the power 
sector.    A fault in the design of the reform may offset the benefits gained from 
reform.  China‟s reformed plan system is certainly not perfect, and needs to change 
for the better.  The behaviour of the power firm in setting higher costs needs to be 
changed when the price of coal supply is liberalised, how to ensure the power firms to 
be sustainable in business becomes a priority challenge for the Chinese policy 
maker ― can the firm survive the impact of the fuel cost rise due to the liberalisation 
of the coal market?  To address this question, good understanding of electricity 
pricing becomes priority of demand for further research.  
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Chapter 4.  Pricing Behaviour of Chinese Power 
Firms 
4.1.  Introduction 
The electricity sector plays a more and more important role in the state‟s economy, 
especially in the developing countries.  Since 1990, the real GDP in China has 
increased by 5.8 times, up to 11,337 billion Yuan by 2008 (from the UN Data).  
During the same period, the total electricity produced in China increased from 0.62 
billion MWh in 1990 to 3.4 billion MWh in 2008.  Since 2000, the average ratio of 
the power consumption growth to the GDP growth was around 1.17, which indicates 
that the power becomes more and more important in stimulating the economic growth 
in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009).   
 
By 2007, China has been the second largest electricity producer to the US in the world.  
In 2008, the Chinese power firms produced the electricity of 3.4 billion MWh all 
together, around 8.8 times as much as the electricity supplied in the UK, and equals to 
the 1994‟s level of the US (Electric Power Annual 2005, and DUKES 2006).  In 
2008, total power installed capacity in China increased up to 804 thousand MW, 
almost 10 times of the total net capacity of the power generation in the UK.  As a 
result, China‟s electricity sector has been growing bigger and bigger to attract 
attention from both policy makers and academic research.   
 
For existing studies, researchers have taken different approaches to study the pricing 
behaviour of a manufacturing firm.  McFetridge (1973) showed the positive 
relationship between the industry concentration and the price-cost margin with the 
evidence obtained from the studies on the Canadian manufacturing sector.  Odagiri 
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(1986) also found a similar view about the industry concentration and the mark-ups of 
the firm with the sample of the Japanese manufacturers.  Shinkai (1974) studied the 
business pricing policies in Japanese manufacturing industries and found the input 
price could explain almost half of the output price of those firms.  Before the 
liberalisation of the electricity market in the UK, the studies of electricity prices were 
mainly focused on the cost behaviour of the plant, which attempted to explain how 
various cost and external environment can affect total cost and so prices.  Stewart 
(1979) developed the cost function of the UK power plants and found “the plant size 
has relatively little effect on the average cost, while the plant utilisation factor is the 
major element leading to reductions in average cost as cumulative output expands”.  
However, with the construction of the cost function of the US power plants, 
Betancourt and Edwards (1987) argued that “the plant size has a statistically 
significant role in the determination of the costs when the load factor is included in 
the analysis”.  Moreover, Green and McDaniel (1989) in their study of UK power 
market, found that “there are likely to be large transfers of input cost rises, from 
electricity companies (and the coal industry) to consumers”, which indicating the 
importance of the fuel cost in affecting electricity prices.   
 
As the UK electricity industry has been liberalised after privatisation and vertical 
unbundling in the middle of the 1990s, some recent studies have attempted to explain 
the pricing behaviour of the generators from the point of view of market competition 
and market power.  Green and Newbery (1992) applied the Cournot model to 
simulate competition on prices among the UK generators and concluded that National 
Power and PowerGen could exercise considerable market power “without collusion 
by offering a supply schedule that is considerably above marginal operating cost”.  
Wolak and Patrick (1996) argued that the major generator in the UK could unilaterally 
restrict the amount of generation capacity it makes available to the market so as to 
increase their profit.  Such argument is also supported by the study on the California 
electricity market (Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999).  Furthermore, the market power 
abuse by the generators is proved by Woo, Lloyd and Tishler (2003) on their studies 
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of the electricity market in the UK, Norway, Alberta and California.  Sweeting (2007) 
in the study on the UK electricity sector found that “generators exercised considerable 
market power in the late 1990s despite falling market concentration”.   
 
In contrast to the UK power market, after December 2002, the reform of the 
electricity sector in China entered the stage of the vertical unbundling.  However, the 
oligopoly model may not be suitable to explain the situation in China, because the 
electricity sector in China has not been fully liberalised in one hand, and it has more 
than thousands of power firms on another.  Unlike many other industries in China, 
the capacity expansion rather than the price competition is encouraged in the Chinese 
electricity sector at present.  As mentioned in the previous section, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (known as NDRC) set the production volume 
and the prices for each individual power plant in China.  And, the process of the 
vertical unbundling of the electricity industry has not been completed yet.  Although 
the independent power producers have been separated from the grids, the grid 
companies in China still undertake the integrated function, including the transmission, 
the distribution and the supply.  The numerous papers focused on the description of 
the history, the status and the future of the Chinese electricity market, but a few 
studies investigated the determinants of electricity prices.  Wang (2007) compared 
the electricity and the coal industries in China together and found that the low coal 
price protected the electricity industry, which implies that the coal prices should have 
positive relationship with the electricity prices.  Liu, Wang and Song (2007) also 
stated that “at the wholesale level, power plants are paid not according to short-run 
marginal costs but according to the dates of production, guaranteed rates of return and 
total costs of the plant.”  Lam‟s study (2004) is a unique study that provides the 
empirical estimates of the pricing behaviour of the Chinese power firms.  With the 
cross-sectional data for the year 1998, he argued that the “electricity prices in China 
are highly subsidised and below the average total costs.”   
 
This chapter attempts to test and explain the on-grid pricing behaviour of the power 
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firm in China electricity sector, with the description of the recent pricing policies and 
the evidence of both the external and internal factors from Chinese coal-fired power 
plants.  Compared with previous studies, our research will focused on investigating 
how electricity is priced in China.  This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 
outlines the previous studies of the pricing behaviour of both the UK and Chinese 
power plants.  Section 3 is the theory of plan price and specifies the empirical 
models.  Section 4 and 5 describe the variables and the data to be tested in the 
estimation.  Section 6 shows the results of the empirical estimates and discussion.  
Then Section 7 draws the conclusion.   
 
4.2.  Towards understanding of the electricity pricing in 
China 
As the reform of the UK electricity industry has been carried out with the 
liberalisation and privatisation, the recent researches and literature investigated the 
electricity pricing mechanism in the UK from the point of view of the market 
competition.  It‟s a common view that the UK electricity industry reform result in 
oligopoly behaviour rather than the expected result of perfect market competition.  
However, the specific pricing behaviour of market participants is still in controversy.  
Some studies provided evidence that the market leaders maximise their profit margin 
by declaring the unavailability of the electricity supply in certain periods (Ofgem‟s 
report, 1998; Wolak and Patrick, 1996).  But others argued that the market leaders 
increased output at a relatively higher price to achieve a high profit margin (Stewart, 
1979; Lopez, 2004; Sweeting, 2007).   
 
A recent study about the Pool pricing behaviour was carried out by Sweeting (2007), 
which looks at the pricing behaviour in every half-hour period under the UK 
Electricity Pool over the period from 1995 to 2000.  First, the marginal cost function 
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was constructed with the information of unit capacity, thermal efficiencies, input fuel 
prices and variable non-fuel costs, and then adjusted according to the outage of the 
generators.  After that, the highest cost unit across 25 simulations of unit availability 
was calculated and identified as the estimated benchmark marginal cost.  He 
compared the estimated benchmark prices with the real prices and found “lower 
competitive benchmark prices, reflecting falling fuel prices and the replacement of old 
coal and oil capacity with more efficient CCGT capacity, as well as higher average 
electricity prices”, which stands for the market power exercised by the dominant 
generators.  He also found the difference between the real and the estimated prices 
became even greater after 1997, though the market concentration was declining.  In 
other word, the declining market concentration and the fuel cost didn‟t result in the 
expected decline in the wholesale prices.  The evidence from his study seems to 
suggest that the UK market-oriented reform has not achieved its aim that promotes the 
full competition to bring the power prices down to the perfect competition level.   
 
However, a further study on the NETA and BETTA still needs.  Besides, Sweeting‟s 
study focused on the evaluation of the UK electricity reform only, and didn‟t extend 
the implication of his finding from the UK market to other markets or economies, 
such as China. 
 
Regarding the Chinese electricity sector, a number of previous studies have been 
made in attempt to introduce its history, status and prospect (Li and Dorian 1995, 
Andrews-Speed and Dow 2000, Hafsi and Tian 2005, Xu and Chen 2006, Hang and 
Tu 2007 and Yang 2008).  A common view of these studies is that the electricity 
industry in China is still under a plan economy.  Unfortunately, most of them didn‟t 
take any further investigation into how the firm would behave in the plan system, 
such as in setting costs and pricing.  Lam‟s paper (2004) is the only one to describe 
the pricing behaviour of Chinese power plants with the cross-sectional data of State 
Power Corporation for the year 1998.  In the paper, the 2SLS model was employed 
to construct the price function as well as the cost function.   
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With the cost function, it indicates that the internal cost factors, i.e. the fuel costs and 
the investment expenditure, were more important in the role of the price 
determination, rather than the capital costs, wages and the production of the quantities.  
With the pricing function, the catalogue prices didn‟t cover the full average unit cost 
of the electricity, because “the capital costs of the generation and transmission assets 
owned by the State Power Corporation of China were ignored in the process.”  Lam 
(2004) also argued that the catalogue electricity price in China might be subsidised 
because of the positive relationship between the electricity price and the regional 
income level.  In other words, it‟s observed that the electricity price is relatively 
higher in the area with higher regional income and lower in the poor areas. 
 
However, the average electricity prices of the power producers employed by that 
paper exclude the taxation, but include the transmission and distribution costs, other 
operation and maintenance costs, depreciation charges and the profit margins of the 
State Power Corporation.  It means that the electricity prices are not “on-grid prices”, 
but the average “catalogue prices” between the grid networks and the end-users.  It 
also ignored the impact of external factors upon the prices, such as the average unit 
cost from the rival plants and the market share of the individual plant.  The most 
recent situation of the electricity pricing after 2002 was not examined in that paper.  
Besides, Lam didn‟t derive the quantitative model from the theory of the plan 
economy, although it‟s agreed that the Chinese electricity sector was under the plan 
economy.   
 
Unlike many other liberalised industries in China, electricity prices have still been 
under state plan control, which is set by NDRC.  The price regulation has been 
changed several times since 1998 (Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and 2006).  
Generally speaking, the “on-grid price” before 2003 was based on the unit cost, the 
interest rate, the taxation rate and the estimated return on capital employed.  In 2003, 
the “ex post pricing” method was introduced to set an on-grid prices.  In order to be 
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sustainable, a certain mark-up will be added up on the top of the internal rate of return 
or the operational costs of the power plants at the end of year (Wang 2006).  Under 
such arrangement, it encourages the power firms to boost their capital expenditures on 
capacity investment.   
 
During the period from 2001 to 2003, the coal price in China increased by around 
13.7%, and thus the on-grid prices grew by 9.8% (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1  Chinese Average On-grid Electricity Price (including Tax) 
Source: CPNN, Electricity Market and Electricity Price Supervision Report 2005. 
 
In December 2004 NDRC issued the Decree 2909 (China Electricity Year Book 2005, 
page 464-465) to adjust the electricity price with the change in the coal price.  The 
adjustment of the on-grid price was stipulated as the formula below.   
 
ititit PEPEPE 1  






where itPE is the ex-factory price of the individual power plant i at time t; itPE is the 
adjustment of the on-grid electricity price of the individual plant i at time t; itPC is 
the changes of the coal price; it is the conversion of the coefficient, which is related 
to the coal equivalent consumption rate of the electricity supply, the heating value of 
the fuel and the offsetting ratio; itr is the offsetting ratio, i.e. the percentage of the 
coal price inflation that the power plant will be undertaken; s is the coal equivalent 
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consumption rate of the electricity supply and H is the heating value of the natural 
coal.   
 
Once the power firm‟s sales price is set up, the state adds the further margin on the top 














Where tPS  stands for the end price of the grid company at time t; itPR is the 
adjustment of the catalogue price of the individual plant at time t; and itL  is the 
transmission loss ratio of the individual plant at time t.  The end price of between the 
grid company and the users at time t were acquired by adding up the sum of the 
allocated on-grid price adjustments on the last period of end price.   
 
Such arrangement relieved the pressure of the power producers by transferring the 
coal price growth to the grid companies, and then saved the grid companies by 
passing such inflation to the end-users again.  In another aspect, the “ex post pricing” 
also was changed into the “ex ante pricing”, in order to encourage the improvement of 
thermal efficiency (Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2005, page 464-465).   
 
In 2005, in order to mitigate the impact of a huge rise in fuel costs, the “on-grid price” 
was re-defined.   It was split into “capacity tariff” and “volume tariff” (Chinese 
Electric Power Yearbook 2006, page 553), which can be expressed as the following 
function: 
ititit VPCPPE  
Where itPE is the on-grid price of an individual plant i at time t; itCP is the capacity 
tariff of a plant i at time t; itVP is the volume tariff of a plant i at time t. 
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where tK is the parameter determined by the demand and supply in the market at 
time t; itDEP is the depreciation; itFE is the financial expenses; and itCIU is the 
capacity in use.   
 
The “capacity tariff” guarantees some excessive revenues to be received by the firms 
to cover the fixed costs occurred by the investment and finance activities of the power 
plant, which encourages further expansion on capacity.  The “volume tariff” includes 
both the variable costs incurred in the operation and also a state planned profit margin.    
To some extent, such arrangement lowers the operation risks for those power stations, 
because the fixed costs of the power stations are secured, and then the fuel cost 
growth are transferred to the grid companies.  However, such arrangement got 
suspended later on, because the power stations soon colluded together and then bid a 
high a price that the grids companies cannot afford (Wang 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.2  The Provincial On-grid Electricity Price of Coal-fired Power Plants and 
Regional GDP per Capita across China (2005) 
Source: the regional GDP from National Bureau of Statistics of China; the price data from “Risk 
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In China, the government issues a general guidance price first and then the on-grid 
price for each individual plant according to its cost and the average regional society 
cost, and the adjustment would be made according to development conditions in each 
region (Wang 2006).  Figure 4.2 shows the average on-grid electricity prices of the 
coal-fired power plants in 27 regions across China in the year 2005.  In the 4 regions, 
where the electricity price is above 0.37 Yuan/kWh, the GDP per capita exceeds 
25,000 Yuan.  And in the 5 regions, where the price is below 0.32 Yuan/kWh, the 
GDP per capita is below 11000 Yuan.  It implies that the on-grid electricity prices are 
relatively higher in the regions with the high GDP per capita, although most of the 
regional prices fall within the range between 0.32 Yuan/kWh and 0.37 Yuan/kWh.  It 
also implies that the on-grid price of each power plant is actually affected by regional 
incomes to some extent in China.   
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Table 4.1  The Provincial On-grid Electricity Price of Coal-fired Power Plants and Regional GDP per Capita in 
China (2005) 
Region 
GDP per Capita On-Grid Electricity Price 
(Yuan) (Yuan/kWh) 
Guangdong  24,435 0.424 
Zhejiang  27,703 0.401 
Shanghai  51,474 0.396 
Jiangsu  24,560 0.376 
Hunan  10,426 0.369 
Fujian  18,646 0.364 
Hainan  10,871 0.362 
Jiangxi  9,440 0.357 
Anhui  8,675 0.353 
Hubei  11,431 0.351 
Guangxi 8,788 0.339 
Liaoning  18,983 0.332 
Beijing  40,613 0.329 
Shandong  20,096 0.329 
Hebei  14,782 0.327 
Heilongjiang  14,434 0.322 
Inner Mongolia 16,331 0.315 
Henan  11,346 0.316 
Sichuan  9,060 0.313 
Chongqing  10,982 0.308 
Jilin  13,348 0.304 
Shaanxi  9,899 0.271 
Yunnan  7,835 0.256 
Guizhou  5,052 0.252 
Qinghai  10,045 0.24 
Gansu  7,477 0.235 
Ningxia 10,239 0.233 
Minimum 5,052 0.233 
Mean 15,814 0.325 
Maximum 51,474 0.424 
Source: the regional GDP from National Bureau of Statistics of China; the price data from “Risk Analysis of the 
Coal-fired Power Generation in China 2006”. 
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4.3.  Theory of the plan price and its testable model for 
empirical estimation 
According to the previous studies that identified the plan supply of electricity in 
China, we propose that a state planner plans a price in order to maximise the total 
output of the whole industry ( )
20
 for given resources available at time t.  In 
response to the planned aggregate output , the planner also sets an aggregate plan 
price as tp ( ).  The aggregate plan price is set not only for production to meet 
demand by both household consumers and the productions in powering other 
industries.  Due to the mixed system of the economy, with state planning in the 
electricity sector on one hand, and free market in other industrial sectors on another, it 
is expected that a lower plan price of electricity will be responded by more market 
demand from other industries in using more electricity as its essential input for their 
production.  In this sense, it is expected that tp (Q) should have a property of an 





.   
 
In a symmetric scenario, every power plant or firm should have an identical cost. If 
this is a case, then the planner can set a plan price of each individual firm to equal the 
aggregate social plan price at tit pp . 
 
In fact, firms are different and so are costs.  Thus the aggregate plan price will be 
adjusted by the planner to account individual firm‟s production condition and cost, 
making one firm with one plan price to reflect different cost conditions of firms.  
This means that there will be some adjustment in setting an individual plan price for 
                                                             
20 The working assumption is “plan electricity” is same to actual level for theory development.  We are aware of 
the difference between the actual and planned one in empirical estimation.  In empirical estimation, we expect 
that the plan is made on the basis of the actual electricity output in the past period t-1.  As a result, we use the 
actual output of electricity as the expectation of the plan output at period t. 
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firm‟s cost at cit, in which this cost adjustment can be described as follows: 
 











Or                            
1)( itttit CQpp                    …………………. (1) 
 
Where, λ is the cost adjustment coefficient for a plan price of an individual firm at a 
range between 0 and 1.  If λ=0, it means that the social plan price is fully adjusted to 
equal the cost of an individual firm.  If λ=1, it means that the social plan price is not 
adjusted at all and it remains the same as the aggregate level.  So λ indicates how far 
the social plan price is adjusted to account the cost of the firm.  In other words, the 
more adjustment the higher price of the firm will be since the more cost impacts are 
taken into account in setting up a plan price for the firm.   
 
Furthermore, in equation (1), the aggregate plan price )( tt Qp can be transformed to 
be more specific by specifying the total output of the industry  as a sum of 
planned electricity output, q, and other industrial output, , produced by other 
industry in the free market, which is  
 
                          …………………………………. (2) 
 
Since the state will attempt to set the aggregate plan supply of electricity ( ) as much 
as possible to meet the output growth of other industry that demands for electricity as 
one essential input for its production, it links  with  as  =  that has 
the property of .  Apart from the aggregate demand that affects plan 
supply for given power generation capacity in the short run, a planned price can also 
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serve as an incentive to influence power firms‟ decision in choosing their capacity of 
supply in the long run.  Due to the freedom of the firm in setting its investment in 
capacity of electricity generation, the higher planned price can stimulate the firm to 
invest more capacity that will enable the state to have more capacity to plan more 
output q in the long run, so that it gives  with the property of
0/ tt pq .  states that the other industry is operated in free market and 
so its output is a function of market price p.  On this basis, we write (2) as  
 
                                                  
)(),( tjtttjtt pQppQqQ            ………………….(3) 
If we consider an argument that the aggregate plan supply of electricity can also serve 
as „a strategic constraint‟ on the output of the other industries, in which this has been a 
particular case where the shortage of power is common in an economy, then the (3) 
can have its augment form: 
                    
)(,),( tttjtttjtt pqpQppQqQ   ……………………….. (4) 
To maximize the total output of both electricity and other industries, Q, which is the 
objective of the state planner in choosing a plan price for q, gives the following: 

































          







































Then the aggregate plan price becomes:   
tt qp                                       ………..(5.1) 
                    
 







































Where ε is the price-incentive elasticity of output to reflect how the firm will respond 
to plan prices in choosing its capacity. The state plans output for a firm according to 
its capacity, so that the elasticity is expected to be positive since the higher plan price 
will induce more capacity expansion and so output. This suggests ε>0 due to 
. 
 
For σ, it is expected to be negative. This is, first, 0 , or at least, in the short run. A 
change in electricity prices ( tp ) will not be immediately responded by a change in the 
product price of other industries ( ) due to (1) product competition that can enforce 
the firm to internally absorb a cost rise as much as possible and (2) the price 
adjustment made by the firm in response to costs will be lagged. This shows  
 in (5.2). If a change in electricity prices ( tp ) will not be responded by 
the product price ( ), then , since a rise in the electricity price will be 
expected to stimulate more supply of electricity due to a price incentive to the power 
producer. In a growing market with holding , then the more supply of 
electricity can power other industries either to produce more, , or to 
have output unchanged. The latter implies . As a result, in equation (5.2), 
we expect 0 .   
 
Secondly, the marginal output of other industries with respect to supply of electricity 
  145 









, so that with 0  it shows 
σ<0 in (5.2).   
 
The discussion above shows the negative relationship between the electricity price 
and the aggregate power quantity supplied. The negative relationship of the supply in 
relation to the plan price implies that economic growth will be very much affected or 
constrained by power supply. This creates a strategic incentive for the state to plan not 
only more quantity needed to be supplied but also at a lower cost to stimulate demand 
for power in order to produce more. This explains that the electricity price and 
quantity supplied is regulated for promoting growth.   
 
To substitute (5.2) for )(Qpt in (1) gets  
 
                                          
1
ittit Cqp                  …………….. (6.1) 
 
Or in a non-linear form the above can be presented as  
 
                                          
1),(
ittit Cqp                  ……………… (6.2) 
 
Where, γ is a coefficient affected by ε and σ, and its sign indicates a technology 
impact of the other industry in using electricity on the state planner to set up its plan 
price in relation to supply:  γ<0 means the technology of high electricity intensity as 
dominant, and γ>0 means the low electricity-intensity technology dominated over the 
other industry.   
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To turn to the cost impact on the plan price in (6.2), it is expected that the effect of 
individual firm‟s costs on setting a plan price will lead to one firm with one plan price. 
In response to this institutional arrangement, the firm will be motivated to play a high 
cost strategy.  The high-cost strategy will allow the firm to gain a cost advantage in 
bargaining with the state planner to set up a higher price for offsetting its higher costs 
of the firm.  Therefore, costs will be expected to be a central factor to affect the plan 
price of a firm in the Chinese power sector. 
 
To test this expectation, we can further break down the cost factor, C, in (6.2) into 
different cost elements that the firm could use to bargain with or affect the state 
planner for a higher price. 
  




)1()1()1(),( ……… (7) 
 
Where, first, r is the cost of capital for an argument that the firm can strategically raise 
the cost of finance or capital, such as take more bank loans to finance its projects, set 
up a higher depreciation rate, etc in bargain for a higher price to offset part of the 
finance cost.  The second is a fuel price or raw material price denoted by m in (7), 
which shows that the firm could ask the planner to past their costs through due to a 
higher input costs.  The third is the overall average unit costs in the previous period, 
denoted by cit-1 in (7), in which the past cost could be used as a starting point for the 
price bargain between the state and the firm.  We also consider the profitability state 
of the firm that can affect its bargain with the state. It is also possible that the firm 
could use the cost of rival firms (cj) as an indication of the cost environment for 
bargaining for a higher price.  If the price serves partly as an income distribution 
among power firms, then a soft-budget constraint will be expected to help the 
loss-making firm to get a higher plan price than the profit-making firm.  In (7), it 
uses D to denote the profitability state of 1 for profit and 0 for losses. 
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We take logarithm for (7) with further inclusion of market share variable (s), the 
average rival cost (cj) and other two dummy variables of location (D
L
 ) and affiliation 
(D
A
)  in our econometric model of the plan price bargaining theory: 






ˆlnˆlnˆlnˆlnlnˆln     
                                                                     
                      …………………….. (8) 
 
Where, μ is a disturbance term with a normal distribution. )1(ˆ,ˆ , and
)1(ˆ),1(ˆ),1(ˆ .     
 
To pursue the robustness test, we break the cost of capital (r) according to interest rate 
(i_r) and depreciation rate (d_r):    




ttititititjtititit dddcmrdricsqp 121 ln
ˆlnˆ_lnˆ_lnˆlnˆlnlnˆln
                                                                     
                         …………………… (9) 
 
Moreover, we also test the price-cost margin (p
M










                                                                     










               ……………………. (11) 
 
  148 
Where, we add the load factor (LF) in (10) and (11), which is actual output over the 
expected maximal output in the full capacity, to further test if there is a soft-budget 
constraint effect on the profit margin in the plan price, since the state planner could 
set up a high profit-margin price for a firm with a lower load factor in order to provide 
the firm with favourable price-setting support to subsidies or compensate the firm that 
has a lower capacity utilisation .   
 
4.4.  Data and variables 
The data employed to test the model of (8), (9), (10) and (11) are collected from two 
sources.  One is the financial reports of individual power firms on their balance sheet 
and income statement during the period from 1999 to 2005, prepared by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China.  Another set of data includes the basic production 
information about the power firms in five provinces in the southern China during the 
period from 2003 to 2005, such as a plant type, installed capacity and the generated 
volume.  Those data are published in the Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and 
2006.  The combination of the two sources provides a set of 3-year‟s panel data of 
some 100 coal-fired power firms in the five southern provinces in the southern China.  
Based on this panel data, the construction of variables employed in our estimation is 
described as follows. 
 
As shown in Table 4.3, there are 64, 100 and 98 observations in 2003, 2004 and 2005 
respectively, i.e. 262 observations in total by 108 individual plants.  The number of 
the profitable plants is 53 in 2003, 66 in 2004 and 55 in 2005 respectively, which 
means that the percentage of the profitable plants in the sample drops during the three 
years, i.e. from the 82.8% to 66% in 2004, and then to 56% in 2005.  In the sample, 
there are 20 plants are owned by the state.  The number of the profitable state-owned 
plants is 9 in 2003, 10 in 2004 and 12 in 2005 respectively, which take up 75% of the 
state-owned plants in 2003, 55% in 2004 and 70% in 2005.   
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The price 
As the component of the dependent variable in model (8) and (9), the prices of the 
electricity in China per kWh are the average tariffs including the taxation, which are 
settled between the individual power plants and the grid companies.  It‟s calculated 
by the annual sales revenue divided by the volume of electricity generated.  Those 
prices are known as the “on-grid prices” for independent power producers, which are 
determined by the office of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and also be different with individual power plants.  Such prices exclude 
both the observed transmission and distribution costs and profit margin of the grid 
companies.   
 
In this paper, the “on-grid price” of an individual power plant from 2003 to 2005 will 
be employed in estimation, instead of the average “catalogue prices” in 1998, used by 
Lam (2004).  Furthermore, we test the profit margin in the price and see how it will 
be affected.  The price-cost margin is calculated by sales revenue divided by the total 
cost of an individual firm.  We define our profit margin as sales revenue divided by 
the total cost of an individual firm.   
 
Since, the dependent variables are the electricity price and the price-cost margin.  
The average on-grid price is 0.34 Yuan/kWh in 2003, 0.39 Yuan/kWh in 2004 and 
then increases to 0.44 Yuan/kWh in 2005 respectively, with a growth rate of 10% per 
year.  However, the sample shows a steady decreasing trend of the price-cost margin 
during the three years.  The price-cost margin of the sample drops from 1.165 in 
2003 to 1.081 in 2004, and then 1.024 in 2005, which is consistent with decreasing 
profits shown by the panel.  In order to eliminate the disturbance caused by the 
abnormal observations, the extreme value of the price above 1 Yuan/kWh has been 
dropped from the panel for estimation. 
 
The total electricity output in the region 
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The total electricity output is the total production of all power plants in a province 
where an individual plant is located.  The total output of electricity in five provinces 
respectively was 401 billion kWh in 2005 and 459 billion kWh in 2006 shown in 
Table 4.2.   
 














% in the total power 
supply of China 
2003 178 34 6 62 45 325 17.66% 
2004 157 27 5 58 42 289 17.62% 
2005 216 41 8 78 58 401 16.74% 
2006 237 47 9 97 68 459 16.70% 
2007 252 62 11 116 84 525 16.50% 
2008 261 81 12 119 92 565 16.66% 
2009 233 83 20 126 102 565 16.95% 
Source: The Development Research Centre of the State Council. 
 
The average unit cost of the rival plants and the cost of the rivals over the plant 
The average unit cost of the rival plants of the individual plant i in the region can be 











, where n is the total number of the observation in time t, cit is the unit cost of the 
individual plant i in time t.  The rival plants are those located as the same province as 
the individual i.   
 
The similarity of the costs in the industry could be one of the reasons affecting the 
price of an individual firm (Grant 1982).  In Allen and Hellwig‟s study (1986), it‟s 
argued that “a small firm cannot afford to charge a high price unless all of the other 
firms charge prices very near competitive price”.  In Neufeld‟s paper (1987), it‟s 
argued that the demand-charge rate structure in US electricity sector “based prices not 
on the factors determining the utility‟s production costs but on the factors which 
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would determine the cost of alternative supply”.   
 
As mentioned above, the average cost of the other plants could form the cost 
environment for the individual plant to bargain with the government in China.  It‟s 
assumed that the higher cost of other plants could make the individual one easier to 
ask the government for higher price.  In another word, it can be expected that the 
average unit cost of the rival plants could be positively correlated with the price.   
 
In order to test the dependent variable of the price-cost margin, in the model (10), the 
unit cost of the rivals over the individual plant is used instead of the average unit cost 
of the rival plants.  Such independent variable is calculated by cjt divided by cit-1.  It 
measures how much is the average unit cost of the rival plants relative to the cost of 
the individual firm i.  If such figure is larger than 1, it means that the unit cost of the 
individual plant is below the average unit cost of the rival plants, and vice versa.  We 
expect that the higher average cost of rivals over the plant could lead to the higher 
profit margin of that particular plant, because of this will be in favour of the 
bargaining with the state.  In another word, such variable is expected to be positively 
related with the price-cost margin.   
 
The overall mean value of the total unit cost of the plant is 0.38 Yuan/kWh, and its 
mean value of each cross-section is 0.297 Yuan/kWh for 2003, 0.37 Yuan/kWh for 
2004, and 0.445 Yuan/kWh for 2005 respectively.   
 
The average cost of the rival plant has an overall mean value of 0.39 Yuan/kWh, of 
which the mean value for each year increases from 0.28 Yuan/kWh for 2003 to 0.388 
Yuan/kWh for 2004, and 0.47 Yuan/kWh for 2005.   
 
The regional market share 
The regional market share of each power plant is calculated by dividing the output of 
each plant by the total aggregate output in the five provinces in southern China. 
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As a kind of homogenous product, the market share of the electricity supply is 
expected to be positively related with its price in the market economy.  In the market 
economy, the individual firms will adjust their prices in response to the perceived 
changes in their market shares.  According to the theory of Nash-Cournot, the 
non-collusive firms in a concentrated market will be more profitable than the 
un-concentrated market.  And in the oligopolistic industries, it‟s more likely for the 
firms to generate the collusion and then achieve higher profits.  In both cases, “the 
increased concentration is likely to lead to higher profitability” (Hay and Morris, 
1991).   
 
Some previous empirical studies also find evidence to support such claim.  
McFetridge (1973) studied the cross-sectional data of 43 Canadian manufacturing 
industries during the period from 1965 to 1969.  In that study, the evidence shows 
that, “given the rate of growth of demand and the level of capital intensity”, the 
price-cost margin is positively correlated with the Herfindahl index, i.e. the proxy of 
the industrial market concentration.  With the study of 79 US industries, Qualls 
(1979) found “a statistically significant positive relationship between the cyclical 
variability of price-cost margins and concentration.”  Moreover, Domberger studies 
71 industries in the UK and then found the value of partial price adjustment 
coefficients were positively correlated with concentration (Domberger, 1979).  In the 
paper of Dixon (1983), with the study of 43 manufacturing sectors over the period 
1948/49-1973/74 in Australia, it‟s concluded that “the extent of price cutting is 
positively related to the number of firms in an industry.” 
 
However, the theory of the market economy may not be applicable to explain the 
situation in China.  If a firm gains a large market share, it could either raise its sale 
price by exercising its market power or lobby more intensively the state planner to set 
a plan price in the firm‟s favour, if the firm is under a plan control.  In order to test 
the effect of the market concentration in the price and price-cost function, the variable 
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of the regional market share is incorporated into the regression models.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that the changes in the regional market share are expected to 
be positively correlated with the changes in the price and the price-cost margin.   
 
The total unit cost 
The total unit cost is the total costs divided by total output produced by the firm over 
a year, and the costs include the cost of sales, overheads and financial costs.  Lam 
(2004) found that the catalogue price of electricity in China didn‟t fully track the 
average total cost.  As described above, under the plan economy, the price of the 
electricity of the Chinese power plant is set to cover the total costs and also the profit 
margin to ensure a certain return on capital employed.  The government sets a price 
according to cost information in the past, so that a lagged unit cost is employed in 
estimation, in order to capture the cost-driven expectation.  As a result, the 
relationship between changes of the lagged cost and the on-grid price is expected to 
be positive, indicating the price effect of the costs.   
 
The cost of capital  
The cost of capital is the sum of the imputed interest rate and the depreciation rate.  
The imputed interest rate is calculated by the interest costs divided by the interest 
bearing debt, where the interest bearing debt is the result of the total debt minus trade 
payables.  The depreciation rate is calculated by the depreciation charges divided by 
the historical cost of the fixed assets.   
 
The cost of capital could be one important impact on price setting, since the firm can 
set the cost higher to strengthen its bargaining with the state in obtaining a favourable 
price.  The price impact of the financial cost is also evident by Yochi Shinkai (1974) 
that 19 manufacturing industries over the period from 1967 to 1971. 
 
Lam (2004) tested the capital cost of the power companies in China, which consists of 
“equity cost, debt cost and depreciation charge”, and then found that it insignificantly 
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affected the catalogue prices.  However, such result contravenes the evidence found 
in previous chapter, where the depreciation charge is recognised as an important tool 
to manipulate the profit margin of the plant in China.  Because of its role in 
bargaining with the state and then reduce taxation, it‟s high likely for those Chinese 
power plants to boost their depreciation charges.  In another word, it‟s expected to 
find out the positive relationship between the price and the depreciation rate.   
 
The fuel price 
By the accounting definition, the cost of sales consists mainly of three elements, i.e. 
material input, capital consumption, and labour.  Since coal is used as “material input” 
for generating power, we could calculate a fuel cost from the costs of sales minus 
wage costs and depreciation charges.  As a result, fuel inflation can be identified as 
change in the unit cost of fuel in the current time against the previous time.  The 
overall average fuel price inflation in the panel is above 1, i.e. 1.255, which indicates 
that the coal price keeps growing over the three years.  And for 2004 and 2005, the 
average inflation of the fuel price in the sample is 1.341 and 1.291 respectively, which 
shows a slowdown of the price growth of the coal for electricity generation. 
 
The cost of the capital 
The cost of the capital of the plant consists of the interest rate and the depreciation 
rate.  Its mean value is 0.087 for the overall panel, 0.077 for 2003, 0.081 for 2004 
and 0.102, which increases by 32.5% over the three years in the sample.  The 
average interest rate of the plant is 0.028 for the overall panel, 0.023 for 2003, 0.024 
for 2004 and 0.037 for 2005.  The number of the interest rate above 0.5 and below 
-0.05 has been regarded as “extremes” and then dropped.  The average depreciation 
rate of the plant is 0.059 for the overall sample, 0.0547 for 2003, 0.0575 for 2004 and 
0.064 for 2005.  The abnormal number of the depreciation rate above 1 has been 
dropped.   
 
The load factor 
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The load factor, measuring the utilisation of the capacity, is the ratio of the actual 
output of the power generated by a power plant over the output that the plant would 
have produced at its full installed capacity during a year.  It indicates the capacity 
utilisation of the power plant
21
.  Since the higher load factor can bring the better 
financial performance of a firm, it‟s expected that for the firms with a given lower 
load factor the state could compensate their low finance through allowing the firms to 
charge a high profit margin in its planned price.  As a result, the plan price is 
expected to play a role of “the soft-budget constraint” in helping the firm with a poor 
or lower income-generating capability.  If this expectation is established, then we can 
observe a negative relationship between the load factor as indication of income 
making ability and the profit margin in the planned price of a firm.   
 
The average load factor of the sample plants decreases from 64.13% in 2003 to 62.9% 
in 2004, and then to 59.1% in 2005.  The overall load factor of the panel is 61.78%. 
  
                                                             
21 An average load factor can be calculated by the formula as follows: 
%100
days 365 day per  hours 24 Capacity  Installed
Output Annual Total 
Factor  Load Average
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Table 4.3  Data Description 
 Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Electricity price 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Overall 262 0.3946037 0.1798012 0.102647 0.972294 
2003 64 0.3354982 0.1512081 0.102647 0.685363 
2004 100 0.391491 0.1720102 0.120246 0.729399 
2005 98 0.4363794 0.1945802 0.117872 0.972294 
Price-cost 
margin 
Overall 262 1.08028 0.1917842 0.5587857 1.686237 
2003 64 1.165098 0.2122232 0.7560277 1.686237 
2004 100 1.081005 0.1854567 0.5587857 1.641228 






Overall 262 2123.641 188.3312 1802.9 2280.32 
2003 64 1802.9 0 1802.9 1802.9 
2004 100 2175.37 0 2175.37 2175.37 
2005 98 2280.32 0 2280.32 2280.32 
Total unit cost 
of the plant 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Overall 262 0.3801886 0.196389 0.100136 0.998197 
2003 64 0.2969346 0.1514268 0.115294 0.690444 
2004 100 0.3704158 0.1694601 0.100136 0.68515 
2005 98 0.4445307 0.2252147 0.102551 0.998197 
Average cost 
of the rival 
plant 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Overall 262 0.3920749 0.070343 0.278376 0.470011 
2003 64 0.2842493 0.0022601 0.278376 0.28696 
2004 100 0.3880239 0.0016614 0.384938 0.390674 
2005 98 0.4666252 0.0022299 0.461143 0.470011 
Cost of capital Overall 262 0.0874434 0.0749743 -0.036843 0.761336 
2003 63 0.0766327 0.0476915 -0.014872 0.205381 
2004 94 0.0806707 0.0842336 -0.036843 0.761336 
2005 90 0.1020846 0.0786797 -0.014856 0.520234 
Interest rate Overall 262 0.0279858 0.0424845 -0.047072 0.409509 
2003 63 0.0224563 0.0295012 -0.046147 0.116973 
2004 94 0.0235798 0.028321 -0.047072 0.091768 
2005 90 0.0364582 0.0585642 -0.038649 0.409509 
Depreciation 
rate 
Overall 262 0.0592745 0.0559033 0 0.711871 
2003 64 0.054737 0.0383316 0 0.2 
2004 100 0.0575429 0.0744113 0 0.711871 
2005 98 0.0640047 0.0420025 0.000243 0.230403 
Inflation of the 
fuel price 
Overall 196 1.3164 0.8754626 0.124965 7.925491 
2003      
2004 99 1.341224 0.9355543 0.124965 5.390256 
2005 97 1.291065 0.8136584 0.367261 7.925491 
Load factor Overall 262 0.6177588 0.2149172 0.059551 0.994292 
2003 64 0.6412697 0.2147314 0.059551 0.994102 
2004 100 0.6291852 0.2010357 0.108793 0.946537 
2005 98 0.5907452 0.2277062 0.060122 0.994292 
N = 262 (Number of observations) 
n = 108 (Number of plants) 
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All of the dependent and independent variables above will be incorporated into the 
estimation model in the form of logarithm.  To ensure the exdogeneity in our 
estimation, we have lagged variables that are likely to generate potential endogenous 
impact.  These variables are the total regional output, the market share, the total unit 
cost of the firm, and the load factor.  The average cost of the rival plants, the interest 
rate, the depreciation rate and the inflation rate of the fuel price remain at time t in 
estimation.   
 
Moreover, three dummy variables are employed in the model, i.e. the state of the 
profit, the location of the plants and the affiliation of the plant.  The state of the 
profit will be 1 if a plant makes profit, and it will be 0 if a plant makes losses.  If a 
plant is located in Guangdong province, the dummy variable of the location will be 1, 
otherwise it will be 0.  If a plant is owned by the state, the dummy variable of 
affiliation will be 1, otherwise it will be 0.  As shown in Table 4.3, there are 89 
profitable plants, 79 Guangdong plants, and 20 state-owned plants in the panel.  And 
there are also 174 observations of the profit-making plants, 191 observations of the 
Guangdong plants and 47 observations of the state-owned plants.   
 
Table 4.4  Dummy Variables 





Profitability of plants (Profitable plant = 1) 53 66 55 174 89 
Location of the plant (Guangdong =1) 44 74 73 191 79 
Affiliation of the plant (State-owned plant = 1) 12 18 17 47 20 
 
4.5.  Empirical results and discussion 
The STATA is employed to run the regression for the model estimation.  The 
estimated results of the price and price-cost margin model of the Chinese power 
plants are shown in Table 2.4 below, respectively.   
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Table 4.5  Estimation of the Price and Price-cost Margin Function of the Chinese Power Plants 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 Log price Log price Log price-cost margin Log price-cost margin 
Independent variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Constant 2.427 1.8 1.989 1.4 2.820*** 3.7 2.837** 3.2 
Total regional output (Log Qt-1) -0.321 -1.9 -0.059 -1.3 -0.335*** -3.4 -0.335** -3.0 
Average cost of the rival plants 
(Log cjt) 
0.628*** 4.4 0.415* 2.4     
Average cost of the rivals over 
the plant [Log (cjt/cit-1)] 
    0.100 1.9 0.106 1.6 
Regional market share of the 
plant (Log sit-1) 
0.026 0.8 -0.007 -0.3 0.032 1.9 0.038 1.9 
Lagged cost of the plant ( Log 
cit-1) 
0.222*** 3.6 0.155* 2.1     
Cost of capital (Log rit) 0.049** 3.0   -0.016 -1.3   
Interest rate (Log i_rit)   0.033** 2.7   -0.002 -0.2 
Depreciation rate (Log d_rit)   0.024 1.1   -0.010 -0.5 
Inflation of the fuel price (Log mit) 0.277*** 6.7 0.192*** 4.0 -0.100** -2.7 -0.110** -2.4 
Load factor (Log Lfit-1)     -0.124** -3.2 -0.133** -2.9 
State of profit of the plant  
(1 for profit, 0 for loss) 
-0.127*** -4.0 -0.073* -2.1 -0.065* -2.2 -0.059 -1.8 
Location of the plant 
(1 in Guangdong, 0 in others) 
  0.229* 2.5 -0.152 -1.9 -0.147 -1.7 
Affiliation of the plant 
(1 with central, 0 with local) 
-0.309** -2.6 -0.178 -1.5 -0.190 -1.9 -0.181 -1.6 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.98 . 0.95 . 0.662 . 0.612 . 
Standard error of estimation 0.118  0.110  0.098  0.105  
Number of observations 191  180  191  180  





12.59  32.59  34.42  33.73  
Dependent variable: Log price in Model 8 and Model 9; log price-cost margin in Model 10 and Model 11 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: 1) H0: difference in coefficients not systematic. 
 
In order to determine the use of the fixed or random effect estimation model, the 
Hausman test is carried out.  It test whether the estimates of the random effect model 
is consistent with the fixed effect model.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, it means 
that the random effect model is biased, and the fixed effect model is preferable.  It 
  159 
also means that the efficient regression model, i.e. the random model, cannot be used 
instead of the fixed effect model.  The results of our estimation for the four models 
are discussed as follows.   
 
In Model 8 and 9, the chi-square of the Hausman test is 12.59 and 32.59 respectively, 
which are both more than the critical value 5.99.   In the Model 10 and Model 11, 
the Hausman test gives the chi-square statistics of 34.42 and 33.72, both of which are 
larger than the critical value of 5.99.  It means that the fixed effect model is 
legitimate for estimation.   
 
The Table 4.5 shows that the average cost of rival plants, the lagged cost, the cost of 
capital and the fuel price inflation have a significant impact on electricity prices 
changes.  According to the results of Model 10 and Model 11, around 66% and 61% 
of the variation of the price-cost margin can be explained by the explanatory variables 
respectively.  These results show that total regional output, the average cost of rival 
plants, the regional market share, the inflation of the fuel price and the load factor 
have a significant impact on the price-cost margin.   
 
The total regional output 
As expected, the total regional output has a negative relationship with the price of 
electricity, with a significance of t-statistic at 1.9 in Model 8 and 1.3 in Model 9.  
Despite of the less significance, it‟s an indication that the state intends to lower prices 
in order to supply more & cheaper electricity that will help increase the total output 
and protect the total industrial outputs.  In both Model 10 and Model 11, this 
indicator is more obvious.  The total regional output is negatively correlated with the 
price-cost margin at a significance level, where 1% of the increase in demand for the 
total regional output will result in 0.335% fall in the profit margin in the price.  This 
means that not only the prices but also the profit margin of the electricity has been 
limited to a certain level to favour other industries to benefit from low cost electricity 
in the long run.  In other words, it conforms to our argument that the state intends to 
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supply sufficient electricity at a lower cost to meet the demand of other industries that 
relies on power intensively for their production.  With this pricing policy, the state 
promotes the growth of the whole industry and so the economy but at expenses of the 
power sector profitability.   
 
The average cost of the rival plants 
According to the results of the estimation in Table 4.5, the average cost of the rival 
plants is positively correlated with the electricity prices, and the average cost of rivals 
relative to the cost of the firm itself is also positively correlated with the profit margin 
of the plant.  As shown by the Model 10, 1% increase in the average cost of rivals 
will induce 0.1% increase in the profit margin of the individual plant.  If the 
argument of Grant (1982), Hellwig (1986), and Neufeld (1987) that the price of the 
production may also depend on the cost of the alternative supply can be applied to the 
Chinese context, then it seems to suggest that the state has taken account a 
market-influence element in pricing electricity.  This is possible since the cost 
environment element could be transmitted to the planner through the bargaining 
process in price setting between the state and the firm that uses the cost environment 
to increase its influence for a high price.   
 
The regional market share of the plant 
According to the result of Model 8 and Model 9, the relationship between the regional 
market share and the price changes is insignificant and ambiguous.  The absolute 
value of the t-statistics of the regional market share of the plant is 0.8 and 0.3 in 
Model 8 and Model 9, both smaller than 1.96, so the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.  This suggests that the changes in the regional market share of the plant 
have no impact on the price.  However, according to the results of Model 10 and 
Model 11, the increase in the regional market share of the plant will lead to some 
increase in the profits of the plant, which is consistent with the theory of the industrial 
organisation, and empirical findings reported by McFetridge (1973), Qualls (1979), 
Domberger (1979) and Dixon (1983).   
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In the plan supply, the positive link between market share and the profit margin of 
price can be interpreted as “a lobby power” to influence the planner to set a price in 
its favour on one hand, and also as “efficient gain” of the large firm that benefit from 
cost efficiency and so profitability on the other hand.  Due to the fact that the energy 
efficiency of the large-sized power plant is higher than the small-sized one, the NDRC 
will allocate production to the large-sized plants with a high priority.  Figure 4.3 
presents the relationship among the load factor, market shares of the installed capacity 
of the coal-fired power plants in the 5 provinces in southern China.  The size of the 
circle in Figure 4.3 is calculated on the basis of the size of the installed capacity.  It 
clearly shows that the large plant normally takes up a large percentage of the market 
share, and also has a high load factor.  But some small plants have low load factors.   
 
 
Figure 4.3  Capacity, Load Factor and Market Share of Chinese Power Plants (2003-2005) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and 2006. 
Note: The areas of the circle indicates the size of the installed capacity of the power plant 
 
The lagged total unit cost of the plant 
The changes in the lagged cost of a plant have a strong positive relationship with the 
price changes of the electricity.  The t-statistic of the lagged cost in Model 8 is 3.6 
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Figure 6.3. Capacity, Load Factor and Market Share of China Pow er Plants 2003-2005
 
Source: National Bureau of Statisitcs of  China, China Electric Pow er Yearbook 2005 and 2006
Note: The area of the dot is based on the size of  the intalled capacity of  the pow er plant.
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The significant of the lagged cost impact on price supports our argument that plan 
prices are adjusted by the costs in the past.  Such results are consistent with the 
pricing regulations issued by the NDRC in 2004 to reflect changes in costs such as 
fixed cost and the variable cost of the power plant.  The estimated result in particular 
shows the impact of long-run costs on the price.  This finding extends the argument 
made by Lam (2004) that electricity prices are mainly determined by “short-run costs”.  
The close link between the price and the cost found by this study is also evident by 
other studies.  Wang (2006) found that the prices of the Chinese power plants are set 
by adding a certain mark-up on the top of the internal rate of return or the annual 
operational costs.  Besides, Liu, Wang and Song (2007) also made the expectation 
that “at the wholesale level, power plants are paid not according to short-run marginal 
costs but according to the dates of production, guaranteed rates of return and total 
costs of the plant.”  This similar relationship was also found in the centralised 
wholesale arrangement, i.e. Electricity Pool at UK, where Green (1999) claimed that 
the spot price of the UK electricity wholesale market has the positive relationship 
with the linear marginal cost.   
 
The cost adjustment effect on price is not very large, only between 0.22% and 0.15%.  
As the coefficient of the lagged cost is below 1, it implies that a part of the change in 
the past costs is transferred into the present electricity price.  This is perhaps that 
there are other present cost adjustment effects as well, i.e. short-run cost input, such as 
fuel inflation, which offset the long-run adjustment effect on the price.   
 
The cost of the capital 
As the combination of the interest and the depreciation, the changes in the cost of 
capital also have the positive relationship with the price changes at the significant 
level.  According to Model 8, the 1% increase in the cost of capital will lead to 0.049% 
of the price increase.  In Model 9, the cost of capital is replaced by the interest rate 
and the depreciation rate.  1% increase in the interest rate will result in 0.033% 
increase in electricity price.   
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The positive relationship between the cost of capital and the price indicates that the 
state takes into account the costs of finance in the price setting.  This finding implies 
that, at least, a part of the cost of capital is covered in the plan price.  With the link of 
the price and financial costs, it‟s expected that the firm is indeed to invest more since 
the part of financial costs can be covered by a rise in the price, through bargaining 
with the state for a higher price.  Furthermore, the interest and depreciation are those 
items before taxation.  It‟s believed that the cost of capital could be also employed as 
the tax shield to reduce the taxation.   
 
According to the robust test, the positive relationship between the interest rate and the 
price is significant.  It means that the borrowings for the capacity expansion would 
be also the important items to bargain for the higher prices.  The plant borrows more 
loans to enlarge the capacity, and then in return it will be able to get a higher price and 
also spare more cash flow.  In other words, the plan price set by the government 
covers the debt expense, so that the investment in the electricity sector will be 
encouraged by a reward of a higher price.   
 
According to Model 10 and the robust test, the negative relationship between the cost 
of capital and the price-cost margin is insignificant, and so is the interest rate as well 
as the depreciation rate. This implies that a rise in financing cost will help increase a 
price but not lower the profit margin of a price.  So this explains why a high-cost 
strategy is accountable for the firm to pursue in the plan supply.  Although the 
depreciation rate is irrelevant to the reported price-cost margin according to Model 11, 
it doesn‟t mean that the depreciation has no impact on the profitability of the Chinese 
power plant.  With the comparison between Drax in the UK and CPID in China, it 
clearly shows that the percentage of the depreciation against the price of Drax was 
only 6.01% in 2004 and 1.75% in 2005 respectively, while as to CPID, it‟s 10.39% in 
2004 and 9.98% in 2005.  In the context of the much higher operational cost of the 
UK plant, it means that the Chinese power plant would hide part of the profit, through 
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the high depreciation charges.   
 
The inflation of the fuel price 
There is the strong positive correlation between the changes in the fuel price inflation 
and the price.  In both Model 8 and Model 9, the t-statistics of the inflation of the 
fuel price is above 1.96.  And in Model 8, 1% increase in the fuel price will result in 
0.277% of the increase in the electricity price.  In Model 9, the coefficient of the fuel 
price inflation is 0.192.  However, the inflation of the fuel price shows the negative 
relationship with the price-cost margin of the plant.  The increase in the fuel price by 
1% will result in the fall in the price-cost margin by 0.1%.  It means that the fuel 
price is a killer to firm‟s profitability.   
 
As described above, under the pressure of the growth of the coal price, the regulator 
in China modified the rules in order to relief the heavy burden on those power 
generators by allowing the power firm to transfer part of the fuel cost rise to the grid 
companies and then the end-users.  It‟s quite reasonable to expect the positive 
relationship between the changes in the price and the changes in the fuel price.  The 
previous studies provided evidence to show the significant relationship between the 
input and the output prices.  Hall and Hitch (1939) investigated 33 manufacturers, 3 
retailers and 2 builders, and then conclude that the prices “will be changed if there is a 
significant change in wage or raw material costs”.  Ripley and Segal (1973) studied 
the annual data of 412 industries from 1954 to 1969 and then argued that 
“approximately 60 per cent of the variation of price changes can be explained by 
changes in three primary variables-unit labour costs, materials costs, and real output”.  
With the evidence of Japanese manufacturing, Yochi Shinkai (1974) also found that 
“in the case of output prices, the single most important element of costs is the input 
price whose variations explain nearly half of the variations in the output price.”  
However, in the case of electricity generators, the salary only takes up around 5% of 
the electricity price, so its impact on the overall tariffs is limited and can be ignored.  
As the fuel cost takes up around 90% of the variable cost, 70% of the generation cost 
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and over 50% of the ex-factory price in China, it‟s reasonable to expect the fuel price 
has the significant impact on the electricity prices.   
 
Lam (2004) studied the cross-sectional data of 26 regional and provincial power 
companies for the year 1998 and found that the fuel price is a significant variable in 
estimating the electricity prices, while the wage is insignificant.  According to the 
results of the estimation above, the inflation of the fuel price has a strong positive 
relationship with the price and also a strong negative relationship with the price-cost 
margin.  It means that the increasing fuel cost will be passed to the electricity price, 
but it will deteriorate the profit margin of the plant nevertheless.  Such evidence 
supports the findings by Lam (2004) that around 40% of the fuel prices can be passed 
into the electricity prices in China.  This is also consistent with the regulations about 
the adjustments of the ex-factory electricity price issued by the NDRC in recent years.   
 
The load factor 
According to the results of Model 10, 1% increase in the lagged load factor of the 
Chinese power plants will lead to around 0.124% drop in the price-cost margin in 
current period.  It‟s not surprising that the load factor is negative related to the price.  
As mentioned above, the high load factor can bring the better financial performance 
of a power firm, the plan price plays a role of “soft budget constraint” in helping the 
firm with a poor or lower income-generating capability by allowing it to charge a high 
profit margin in its plan price.   
 
As the costs will be spread over the products, high load factor will lead to low unit 
cost and then low price.  The low load factor implies that the more costs will be 
allocated to the limited products, which will lead to high unit cost and also high price.   
 
The similar phenomenon also happens in the UK energy sector.  Some evidence 
from the previous study links the costs with the capacity utilisation of the power 
plants.  , Lopez (February 2006) studied the UK power plants and found that “the 
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greater the plant capacity the higher that is the load factor” from “a sample of 
half-hour data on load factor for coal-fired power plants in England and Wales”, 
which is the evidence “in favour of increasing returns to scale in power plants”.  In 
Table 4.5, the operational indicators of two coal-fired power stations at UK provide 
the supplemental evidence to support the view of the observed return to scale in 
Lopez‟s study.  Drax power station is the biggest coal-fired power stations in the UK, 
of which the capacity is 9.8 times as much as the capacity of Uskmouth.  The load 
factor of Drax and Uskmouth is 69.1% in 2004 and 5.28% in 2006 respectively.  Not 
surprisingly, the cost per unit of Drax in 2004 is only 16.7% of the unit cost of 
Uskmouth in 2006.   
 
Table 4.6  The Return to Scale of the selected UK Power Plants 
 
Drax Uskmouth 
as at Dec 31, 2004 as at Oct 31 2006 
Capacity (10 MW) 387.00 39.30 
Output (10
5
 MWh) 234.26 1.69 
Age (Year) 30 45 
Load Factor (%) 69.10% 5.28% 
Price (Yuan/KWh) 0.364 1.129 
Unit Cost (Yuan/KWh) 0.453 2.631 
Operational Profit (Yuan/KWh) (0.089) (1.502) 
Total Assets (1000 Yuan) 19,483,982.03 4,611,102.01 
Source: FAME and the annual reports of Uskmouth and Drax power station 
 
Moreover, in the recent study of the UK power exchange system, i.e. NETA, Sweeting 
(2007) performed the algorithm of the static oligopoly model and found that the 
dominant generators could have increased their profits “by lowering their bids and 
significantly increasing their output.”  In other word, the price-cost margin of the 
dominant UK power plants would be positively related to their output and the load 
factors.  However, Sweeting‟s conclusion contradicted with the findings in Ofgem‟s 
report (1999) that National Power and PowerGen exercised the market power by 
significantly increasing the price “at which they offered their coal-fired station into 
the Pool over the period May to July 1999”, which was consistent with Wolak and 
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Patrick‟s argument (1996) that the dominant generators would raise the electricity 
pool price by declaring the unavailable supply in certain periods, in order to maximise 
their profit. 
 
However, because of a plan institution in China, such negative relationship in Model 
10 can be interpreted as the soft-budget constraint effect on the profit margin in the 
plan price rather than the consequences of the oligopoly behaviour in the UK.  
Clearly speaking, in order to encourage the electricity supply, the Chinese government 
would provide the subsidies in the form of the so-called “soft price constraint on cost”.  
As the notorious “constructive destruction”, the soft price constraint is believed to 
lead to the low efficient production, to impede the progress of the technology change 
and to encourage the excessive production expansion.  However, it doesn‟t mean that 
the Chinese government is going to protect the small inefficient plants with the 
favourite plan prices or to support them with the subsidies for the high generation cost.  
As shown in the previous section, the 10 smallest power plants in China with lower 
capacity utilisation made losses in recent years, but the 10 largest power plants with 
higher load factor also made the profit in the same period.  Besides, the Chinese 
government has the plan and also takes the action to shut down the small plants 
gradually.  
 
Comparing the 10 smallest coal-fired power plants and 10 largest ones in the five 
Southern provinces in China, it shows that the average unit total cost of the largest 
plants is substantially lower than the average unit total cost of the smallest ones.  The 
former one is 54% and 49% of the latter on in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Table 4.6).  
The average load factor of the 10 largest plants is higher than the 10 smallest plants 
both in 2004 and 2005.  Although the large plants may have higher fixed costs, the 
average unit fixed costs (including the depreciation, overhead costs and finance costs) 
of the 10 largest firms are still lower than the 10 smallest firms, due to the higher 
output quotation of allocated to the large firms by the state.  Under the same level of 
the variable costs, it will lead to the fixed cost, and hence the total cost, to be spread 
  168 
over the larger amount of the electricity generated.   
 











Average Capacity (10 MW) 6.09 120.45 4.63 132.49 
Average Output (10
5
 MWh) 2.56 77.05 2.09 80.08 
Average Load Factor (%) 56.9% 72.3% 56.9% 68.0% 
Average Price (Yuan/KWh) 0.459 0.331 0.539 0.340 
Average Unit Cost (Yuan/KWh) 0.471 0.256 0.563 0.274 
Average Unit Depreciation (Yuan/KWh) 0.056 0.027 0.091 0.052 
Average Unit Overhead Cost (Yuan/KWh) 0.041 0.021 0.048 0.020 
Average Unit Operational Profit (Yuan/KWh) (0.012) 0.075 (0.024) 0.066 
Source: Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2006 and 2005 
Notes: 1) the average overhead cost including the finance costs, 2) the large firms refer to those with the 
capacity ≥ 120 MW, 3) the small plants refer to those with the capacity ≤ 5 MW. 
 
Stewart (1979) studied the cross-sectional data of 58 newly constructed fossil-fuel 
plants in 1970 and 1971 and then concluded that “the cause of declining average cost 
is primarily a result of the ability of plants with higher utilisation rates to spread 
capital expenses over a greater volume of output”.  Bateson and Swan (1989) 
examined “the average costs of electricity generated” in New South Wales during the 
period from 1970 to 1984, and also argued that “costs…are highly sensitive to the 
degree of capacity utilisation but less so to unit size (scale)”.  However, both at UK 
and in China, it‟s likely for the larger plants to achieve the higher production, through 
the higher capital utilisation.  The evidence above also shows that the government 
would set the higher price for the small plants, of which the load factors are also low.  
However, due to the high fixed cost, the 10 smallest plants still make the losses.   
 
The reasonable explanation for such negative relationship between the two variables 
is that the Chinese government encourages the medium and large power plants to 
fully utilise their installed capacity to meet the growing demand for the electricity.  
As the larger plant will have the higher thermal efficiency, such arrangement also 
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reduces the wastes of the society, promotes the industrial technology advance, 
improves the energy efficiency, and hence maximise the total outputs of the whole 
industry in China.  So, it‟s reasonable to believe that the state uses the load factor as 
an instrument of “soft budget constraint” to control the unit cost of the electricity, and 
hence the electricity price.   
 
The dummy variables 
Not surprisingly, the dummy variable of the state of the profit in both Model 8 and 
Model 9 shows a negative relationship with the price changes.  Such negative 
relationship shows that soft-budget constraints provide the upward adjustment of the 
ex-factory prices and the profit margin for the loss-making plants than the 
profit-making plants.  It confirms expectation in the previous section that the 
profitability of the plant would affect the bargain power of the firm with the 
government.  It implies that the power plant is encouraged to report higher cost and 
lower profit to the government, and then will receive higher price and profit margin in 
next period, although the transfer of the cost inflation has been suppressed and 
controlled by the government to some extent.  In Model 10 and Model 11, the state 
of the profit is also negatively correlated with the dependent variable, i.e. the 
price-cost margin, which is consistent with prices estimation.  It implies that the state 
uses “the price” as an instrument to help a weak or low efficient firm to get higher 
financial support through selling at a high price with the high margin of profit in price.  
The state sets the plan price on the basis of the cost.  The high cost of a firm will 
lead to a high plan price to be given.  However, the state also needs to restrict the 
financial budget of the power firms and to provide the cheap electricity for other 
industries.  So, not all of the increase in the generation cost of the power firms can 
be passed to the grids.  The power firms need to internalize some of the generation 
cost to make the profit.  It means that the increase in the cost can erode the 
profitability of the power firms.  Thus, there is a risk that cost-inefficient power 
firms may suffer the losses, if the plan price is insufficient to cover its increasing cost.   
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The positive coefficient of the plant‟s location in Model 9 shows that it‟s more likely 
for the plant in Guangdong province to enjoy the higher price.  It‟s consistent with 
the conclusion drawn by Lam (2004) that electricity price in China would be higher in 
the region with higher per capita income.  However, it‟s more likely for the plant out 
of Guangdong to receive higher profit margin, according to the negative relationship 
between the price-cost margin and the dummy variable of the location. 
 
The negative coefficient of the affiliation implies that it‟s more difficult for centrally 
state-owned plants to ask for higher prices and the profit margin.  The reason for 
such results could be that centrally state-owned plants have larger installed capacity 
so that they have higher energy efficiency and will report lower generation costs to 
the price maker.  As shown in Table 4.8, according to the sample, the overall average 
price and price-cost margin of the centrally state-owned plants are lower than the 
locally state-owned plants by 103.9%.   
 
Table 4.8  Average Total Unit Cost of the Local and State-owned Plants in China 
 2003 2004 2005 Overall 




















Percentage difference of the average total unit cost 69.47% 110.82% 115.86% 103.9% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Chinese Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and 2006 
Note: the figure in the brackets is the number of the observations. 
 
4.6.  Conclusions 
The empirical result of this chapter shows that the power firms in China are 
institutionally motivated to bargain with the government for a high price by means of 
raising their costs.  The electricity price in China is determined on the basis of mixed 
consideration of the production cost of the power firm and the total outputs of other 
industries.  And the competition in price doesn‟t exist in the Chinese power 
  171 
generation industry. 
 
As the power firms bargain with the state to set the price, it‟s unlikely for the 
dominant power plant to manipulate the market, which can be seen in the liberalized 
market in the Western countries.  However, it doesn‟t mean that there is no intention 
of the collusion among those Chinese power plants under the plan economy.  
According to the test, a kind of collusion among those firms may also exist, where the 
higher average cost of the rival firms will help a particular firm to bargain with the 
state for a higher price and then a higher profit margin.   
 
The Chinese government also faces the dilemma of the plan pricing.  On one hand, 
instead of price competition, the plan price is employed by the government to cover 
both the operational cost and the investment expenditures of those power plants, with 
the purpose of securing the sustainability of the electricity supply against the inflation 
of the coal price in the short run, and also attracting more investment to increase 
capacity in the long run.  On another hand, in order to maximise the total output of 
the whole society, the state has to offer cheap power for the households and other 
industries with a low electricity price.   
 
In order to balance the two requirements, the Chinese government implements the soft 
price constraint on those high-cost power plants.  The inflation of the fuel price will 
be partly covered by a rise in the price, but it will inevitably deteriorate the 
profitability of the power plants since a rise in fuel costs is partially compensated by 
the plan price.  The appetite of plants, which charge a higher price in the high 
income area, is also suppressed, as no evidence shows that those firms can obtain a 
higher profit margin than the firms in other areas.   
 
Unlike the European market, where the price is set by market directly via market 
competition, the electricity price setting in China is in the hand of the government 
mainly on the basis of the cost of the production.  At present, the fundamental aim of 
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the electricity pricing in China is to maximise the total social output rather than 
maximising the profits of the power industry.  However, in order to promote the 
efficiency and the productivity of the Chinese power plants, the state has introduced 
market competition in capacity investment and free entry to the business.  The UK 
experience shows that market liberalisation leads to developing imperfect competition.  
The dominant market players can abuse their market power to exploit an extra return 
from the consumers, in particular, in the long run.  In contrast, China takes a 
reformed plan system to supply power.  Although the plan supply results in the high 
cost behaviour of power firms, it has a merit in removal of market power and 
improvement of household benefits as well as stimulation of capacity expansion.  
How has capacity been expanded and what determines capacity investment is a 
question that we will further study next chapter.   
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Chapter 5.  The Determinants of the Chinese 
Power Supply Capacity 
5.1.  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to look at what determines capacity expansion of power 
supply in China.  China has experienced a tremendous increase in electricity supply 
over last three decades.  In 2008, China‟s total installed capacity is 803 MW, which 
is around 10 times of the UK and around 70% of the US (online database of the 
International Energy Agency).  When compared with 30 years ago, it had only 
around 72,350 MW, which was about today‟s capacity in the UK.  As can be seen, 
China‟s installed capacity has increased by more than 12 times over the past 30 years.   
 
This huge capacity growth has enabled China to serve its growing demand for power 
without a serious problem of supply shortage of supply.  Interestingly, the 
institutional environment of the Chinese power sector has still been in the plan system 
as discussed in the previous chapters.  One common phenomenon of a plan system is 
“shortage”, but the Chinese plan economy in the power sector doesn‟t suffer this 
problem.  The contrast of the conventional wisdom to the Chinese experience 
motivates us to understand the issue about what drives the growth of supply of power 
with respect to capacity in a situation where the sector has been under the reformed 
plan control.  Normally, supply always responds to demand at least in the long-run 
regardless of a plan or market economy.  In a market economy, the pace of supply 
response to demand is much quick and fast.  In contrast, in a plan economy, the pace 
of supply response to demand is slow.  But over that three decades, in particular, 
since 1992, we have been able to observe a fast pace of response of supply to demand 
in China‟s power sector.  The growth of GDP as an indication of demand for power 
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has been always responded by the growth of electricity available for end users.  This 
response can be illustrated by the link between the growth index of the GDP and the 
growth index of the power consumption shown in Figure 5.1.  In contrast, the link is 
not shown strongly in the UK (see Figure 5.1).  This comparison provides us with an 
idea that power supply has a stronger relationship with GDP growth in China than in 
the UK.   
 
If capacity investment is a long-run commitment for power supply, and power supply 
is more responsive to GDP, then we expect that GDP can play a role of demand in 
driving up power supply in the long-run.  This view provide us with expectation that 
GDP drives power supply for both the long run and the short run given other factors, 
such as prices and an economic structure.  The close link between GDP and power in 
China can alternatively be interpreted as “power drives GDP” since without electricity, 
China will lose its power to grow the economy.  This may be particular true when the 
structure of the Chinese economy is dominated by manufacturing industry.  Against 
these two opposite arguments, the chapter will start with testing the causality between 
GDP and power supply for given the electricity price and an economic structure.  
The latter two elements in relation to power supply will also be investigated with 
reference to OECD power sectors.   
 
Most previous studies attempt to estimate the power shortage and surplus of a 
particular country through identifying the relationship between the power 
consumption and the development of the economy.  Some academics tried to explain 
the intensity of the energy uses with various factors, such as the structure of the 
economy (Zhang & Nie, 2005; Crompton & Wu, 2005; Zhang & Sun, 2008), the 
industry production (Yang & Zhang, 2007), the GDP growth (Shiu & Lam, 2004; Liao, 
Fan & Wei, 2007), and even the technical change (Garbaccio, Ho & Jorgenson, 1999).  
In some studies, evidence shows that the high energy demand of a particular country 
could be resulted from its high GDP growth (Li & Dorian, 1995; Wu & Li, 1995; 
Crompton & Wu, 2005; Rosen and Houser, 2007).  In order to quantify the energy 
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supply risks, Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (known as APERC) in their 
research report (2007) listed four factors which would influence the energy security of 
an economy, i.e. “availability, accessibility, acceptability and affordability”.   
 
Because of the special technique property of electricity, the availability of the power 
supply will largely depend on the capacity adequacy of the power generation.  As 
power generation is believed to be the bottleneck that affects down-stream 
production
22
, an economic growth can be constrained by the capacity of power 
generation.  At the end of 2008, the total installed capacity in China reached up to 
802.6 GW, i.e. 5.23 times of the 1991‟s level.  However, the capacity is still 
inadequate for China‟s fast growing economy.  In 2005, China experienced the most 
serious blackouts since the 1990s
23
 which hit 26 provinces.  A number of previous 
studies tried to identify the relationship of the net capacity with a group of factors, 
such as demand, prices and even the return of the investment.  Ma, Oxley and 
Gibson (2009) in their paper compared the growth of the capacity with the aggregate 
demand in the Chinese energy sector, and argued that the energy demand in China can 
be affected by “the rapid income growth”, “the expanding transportation”, “the lagged 
electricity price reform” and etc., while the energy supply can be affected by “the 
increasing investment”, “the improved energy efficiency”, “the energy reforms” and 
etc..  Wen, Wu and Ni (2004) argued that “the prices of electricity to reflect 
short-term supply and demand status will create market signal for a proper capacity 
expansion”.  Tishler, Milstein, Woo (2008) in their study investigated “the 
interdependence among equilibrium capacity, market price level, market price 
volatility, and supply shortage due to the price capping” with the Israel data, and 
argued that price capping would lead to power shortages, “because the tightening of 
the price cap induces an increase in the quantity demanded which is higher than the 
increase in the optimal capacity”.  Some other studies even employed the real option 
                                                             
22 Wu Yin, 2004, “Electricity Sector Development Strategy in China”, 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/work/2004/coal/WuYinText.pdf, visited on 8th November, 2006. 
23 Liu Wei, 27th August, 2006, “How to get rid of the strange cycle of the excess and the shortage of the electricity 
supply?”, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/4745157.html, visited on 1st June 10, 2009. 
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theory to explain the optimal investment strategy of different types of power plants 
(Shinichiro Takizawa, Atsuyuki Suzuki, 2004; Gollier, Proult, Thais, Walgenwitz, 
2005; Botterud & Korpas, 2007; Fleten, Maribu, and Wangensteen, 2007).   
 
However, those studies have a limit on identifying which effects are general 
internationally and which effects are country-specific.  In contrast to the studies 
above, our approach to examine the determinants of power supply will be on the basis 
of using a comparative analysis of China with OECD experience to look at elements 
discussed by previous studies in terms of international general effects or China 
specific phenomenon respectively.  Furthermore, we also intend to identify the 
elements in terms of direct and indirect impacts respectively on supply.  The impact 
on power supply will be assessed first by looking at the explanatory power of our 
proposed elements to electricity consumption, and then the elements directly related 
to consumption will be further investigated for their possible impact on power supply 
in the long run ― capacity.  If the elements have a significant impact on both 
demand and the supply, we then call it a direct effect on supply.  Otherwise, if the 
impact is not identified on supply but on demand, then we call it an indirect effect on 
supply because the impact is made via effect on demand.  In this sense, our strategy 
to investigate determinants of power supply is a two-stage approach, which estimates 
the determinants of power consumption in stage one, and then verifies these 
demand-related determinants for their possible impact on capacity in stage two.  Any 
elements that explain directly power consumption but may have no direct impact on 
power supply are called “indirect determinants” of power supply since these indirect 
determinants affect power supply through their impact on power consumption.  With 
this two stage investigation strategy, we will illustrate the link between power supply 
and the determinants, respectively, with reference to OECD countries in the next 
section.  Then in the third section, these respective links will be modelled more 
rigorously by using econometrics in terms of time series data estimation.  Having 
statistically verified relationship between power supply and our proposed 
determinants, we will conclude our analysis and discussion in the last section.    
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Table 5.1  The Growth of the Installed Capacity 
Unit:% China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
1981 4.85% 11.27% 2.52% 1.93% 4.41% -6.25% 2.39% 
1991 9.85% 0.91% 20.91% 2.34% 2.69% -3.97% 1.08% 
1992 9.94% 0.87% -2.22% 6.50% 2.77% -3.99% 1.39% 
1993 9.84% 2.28% -0.80% 3.04% 3.80% 1.53% 1.18% 
1994 9.29% -0.39% 0.16% 1.03% 3.77% 0.65% 1.37% 
1995 8.66% 0.36% 1.22% 2.73% 2.78% 1.66% 0.68% 
1996 8.89% 1.94% -1.10% 3.59% 3.04% 4.79% 0.87% 
1997 7.48% 4.05% -0.80% 3.13% 3.79% -0.73% 0.35% 
1998 9.07% -1.36% -0.30% 2.98% 3.24% 0.60% -0.16% 
1999 7.75% 1.92% 0.95% 1.84% 1.36% 2.81% 1.98% 
2000 6.88% -0.06% 3.15% 2.23% 2.31% 3.91% 1.56% 
2001 6.32% 1.07% 1.47% 0.77% 1.21% 1.79% 12.49% 
2002 5.03% 0.82% 5.11% 0.54% 1.70% -3.72% 6.68% 
2003 9.77% -0.08% -0.95% 2.36% 0.92% 1.98% 6.01% 
2004 12.60% 0.18% -0.39% 3.86% 1.73% 2.38% 1.63% 
2005 15.36% -0.65% 0.37% 5.12% 0.75% 1.60% 1.71% 
2006 22.34% -0.04% 5.24% 4.66% 0.52% 2.02% 0.85% 
2007 14.68% 0.32% 0.77% 4.60% 0.13% 1.62% 1.10% 
2008 12.69%       
Average 10.36% 0.71% 1.93% 3.02% 2.15% 0.88% 2.40% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) 
 
5.2.  Major elements in relation to power consumption and 
supply: an illustration of China with reference to OECD 
countries 
5.2.1.  Economic development and power consumption 
China‟s economy is characterised by its high GDP growth.  For the past 30 years, 
China‟s real GDP increased by around 15 times, with an average growth rate of 10%.  
In contrast, other six OECD countries only achieved relatively moderate economic 
growth over the past two decades, where the average annual growth of the real GDP 
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of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US is 1.88%, 1.73%, 1.34%, 1.39%, 
2.51% and 2.93% respectively.  So far in 2007, the real GDP in China reached up to 
11 trillion Yuan (online database of UNData), ranked as the third largest in the world.   
 
As an emerging economic giant, China becomes a huge power consumer in the world 
quickly.  Today, China is the second largest power consumer next to the US.  In 
2007, the total observed net power consumption in China is up to 2,814,663 GWh, i.e. 
almost equal to the aggregated usage in France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, or 
72% of the power consumption in the US.  Even back to 1990, China was the third 
largest power consumer in the world, next to the US and Japan, where its annual net 
consumption was only 534,890 GWh, i.e. around 70% of Japan and 20% of the US.  
Obviously, the power demand in China has increased dramatically for the last two 
decades.   
 
China The UK 
  
Figure 5.1  The Real GDP Index and the Power Consumption Index of China and the UK (1990 – 2006) 
Source: UNdata, International Energy Agency, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
From 1990 to 2007, the average annual growth rate of the net power consumption in 
China was around at 10%.  In recent years, the average annual growth even reached 
up to 14.55% from 2002 to 2007.  By contrast, the power consumption of the six 
OECD countries only increased by no more than 10% during the same period, with an 
average annual growth of less than 1.9 %.   
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China The UK 
  
Figure 5.2  The Growth of the Real GDP and Power Consumption in China and the UK(1991 – 2007) 
Source: UNdata, International Energy Agency, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
As shown in the Figure 5.1 above, we can easily find that both the power consumption 
and the real GDP have increased dramatically during the past two decades.  From 
1991 to 2007, the growth rates of both the power consumption and the real GDP are at 
some 10% in China.  In contrast, the relationship between power consumption and 
GDP in the UK has become weaker and weaker since 1997, where the increase in the 
power consumption growth tends to be less linking with GDP growth.   
 
According to Figure 5.2, it clearly shows that the power consumption fluctuated with 
the real GDP in the similar pattern.  During in the early 1990s, the growth of the real 
GDP is around 12% and the power consumption growth is around 15% in China.  
From 1996 to 2001, the average growth of the real GDP and the power consumption 
in China dropped to around 8.6% and 7.2%, respectively.  After that, the China 
recovered its economic growth and the power consumption growth again.  However, 
according to Figure 5.2, it shows a different situation in the UK, where the power 
consumption growth is unlinked with economic growth.   
 
Thus, it‟s expected that the real GDP has a positive relationship with the power 
consumption in both the long run and the short run in China, while this relationship 
appear weak or insignificant in some OECD countries.  This suggests that this 
relationship is China-specific, and it cannot be generalised without analysis to other 
economies in the world.   
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Table 5.2  Power Intensity of Electricity Consumption per GDP (kWh/USD): China vs. OECD Countries 
 China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
1990 1.3224 0.2598 0.2806 0.1930 0.2514 0.2856 0.4712 
1991 1.3158 0.2759 0.2670 0.1944 0.2508 0.2961 0.4967 
1992 1.2786 0.2793 0.2583 0.1967 0.2504 0.2961 0.4826 
1993 1.2444 0.2821 0.2556 0.1992 0.2519 0.2938 0.4860 
1994 1.2267 0.2815 0.2479 0.2015 0.2657 0.2778 0.4803 
1995 1.1763 0.2791 0.2472 0.2016 0.2673 0.2810 0.4820 
1996 1.1547 0.2883 0.2485 0.2023 0.2664 0.2878 0.4772 
1997 1.0985 0.2801 0.2457 0.2047 0.2681 0.2802 0.4635 
1998 1.0552 0.2789 0.2431 0.2075 0.2754 0.2748 0.4587 
1999 1.0375 0.2753 0.2399 0.2087 0.2817 0.2721 0.4502 
2000 1.0481 0.2710 0.2375 0.2105 0.2798 0.2687 0.4505 
2001 1.0554 0.2733 0.2399 0.2114 0.2744 0.2642 0.4427 
2002 1.0761 0.2694 0.2459 0.2147 0.2782 0.2601 0.4451 
2003 1.1342 0.2775 0.2484 0.2211 0.2723 0.2549 0.4378 
2004 1.1927 0.2781 0.2490 0.2219 0.2725 0.2476 0.4286 
2005 1.2365 0.2748 0.2477 0.2256 0.2716 0.2474 0.4265 
2006 1.2800 0.2666 0.2427 0.2270 0.2662 0.2389 0.4152 
2007 1.3226 0.2629 0.2372 0.2247 0.2685 0.2312 0.4174 
Changes1990-2001 -20.19% 5.21% -14.51% 9.50% 9.14% -7.50% -6.05% 
Changes2002-2007 22.91% -2.43% -3.52% 4.67% -3.49% -11.10% -6.23% 
Changes1990-2007 0.02% 1.19% -15.44% 16.42% 6.78% -19.05% -11.41% 
Source: Based on the information from the Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) and the UN data. 
 
In 2007, China consumed 35.73% of the global electricity generated, but it only 
contributes 5.9% of the total GDP in the world.  This implies that China‟s ability in 
using the power to generate the economic wealth is very low.  This may reflect a 
problem in Chinese economic structure or institution in promoting the efficiency of 
power usage for production.  In Table 5.2, the electricity intensity is calculated by 
dividing the electricity consumption by the real GDP.  The lower electricity intensity 
indicates a low power consumption required to produce one dollar of GDP.   
 
Not surprisingly, China‟s electricity intensity is the highest among the seven countries.  
In 2007, China‟s electricity intensity equals to 3.17 times of the US, 4.93 times of 
Japan, 5.72 times of the UK and 5.89 times of Italy.  It obviously shows that China 
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has a lot to improve its usage of electricity to generate national output, compared with 
developed countries.  It also implies that China has massive energy-intensive 
industries to produce little but consume more of power.  Moreover, such problem 
became even worsen in recent years.  From 1990 to 2001, the electricity intensity in 
China was decreased by 20.19%, which was the sign of improvement of the energy 
efficiency.  But, from 2002 to 2007, China‟s electricity intensity increased by 
22.91%.  It made the overall electric power intensity of China almost unchanged 
over the past 20 years.   
 
In contrast, the overall electricity intensity of France, Italy and Japan also increased 
by 1.19%, 16.42%, and 6.78% respectively in the period from 1990 to 2007, although 
France and Japan dropped the intensity by 2.43% and 3.49% respectively after 2002.  
The best performing economies in lowering the intensity have been Germany, the UK 
and the US, which have experienced continuous improvement of the electricity 
intensity since 1990, where the intensity of the three countries dropped by 15.44%, 
19.05% and 11.41% respectively.  This implies that most OECD countries have 
reached a stage of development with a low-energy-intensity structure of the economy 
in the recent years.   
 
 
  182 
Table 5.3  The Growth of the GDP and the Power Consumption of the OECD Countries and China 
 China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
Year Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C Δ GDP Δ C 
1991 9.20% 15.11% 1.02% 0.47% 5.11% 0.16% 1.53% 0.44% 3.35% 2.98% -1.37% -0.22% -0.19% 2.73% 
1992 14.20% 15.01% 1.37% -1.06% 2.23% 0.80% 0.77% 2.49% 0.97% 0.36% 0.21% -0.69% 3.34% 0.15% 
1993 14.00% 14.25% -0.91% 0.53% -0.80% 0.28% -0.89% 1.76% 0.25% 1.62% 2.27% 1.76% 2.69% 2.56% 
1994 13.10% 15.78% 2.22% 2.68% 2.66% 1.28% 2.15% 1.57% 1.10% 2.82% 4.32% 0.32% 4.06% 1.47% 
1995 10.90% 15.94% 2.12% 4.11% 1.89% 0.82% 2.83% 3.03% 1.96% -0.74% 2.94% 0.73% 2.54% 0.84% 
1996 10.00% 11.24% 1.11% -0.41% 0.99% 2.51% 0.72% 1.92% 2.75% 1.64% 2.78% 0.47% 3.75% 2.18% 
1997 9.30% 9.05% 2.24% 2.72% 1.80% 2.24% 1.89% 2.21% 1.57% -1.75% 3.10% 0.65% 4.55% -0.99% 
1998 7.80% 9.51% 3.50% 2.28% 2.03% 2.19% 1.44% 4.50% -2.05% 2.15% 3.35% 2.48% 4.22% 3.76% 
1999 7.60% 5.79% 3.30% 1.97% 2.01% 0.65% 1.93% 2.48% -0.14% 2.15% 3.04% 2.06% 4.49% 2.54% 
2000 8.40% 3.55% 3.91% 3.06% 3.21% 0.95% 3.58% 2.81% 2.86% 0.63% 3.80% 1.33% 3.69% 3.16% 
2001 8.30% 3.98% 1.85% -0.67% 1.24% 0.67% 1.80% 3.14% 0.18% 2.21% 2.37% 0.40% 0.76% 1.53% 
2002 9.10% 7.98% 1.03% 4.43% 0.00% 1.50% 0.34% 1.02% 0.26% 2.40% 2.05% 5.26% 1.61% 2.73% 
2003 10.00% 6.35% 1.09% 1.28% -0.22% 1.61% 0.04% 2.92% 1.41% 2.57% 2.77% 4.12% 2.52% 2.90% 
2004 10.10% 11.48% 2.47% 1.98% 1.06% -0.45% 1.20% 3.32% 2.74% 6.66% 3.26% -1.34% 3.65% 2.84% 
2005 10.20% 10.95% 1.71% 0.09% 0.78% -1.83% 0.09% 0.39% 1.93% 0.82% 1.84% 1.47% 3.08% 3.41% 
2006 11.10% 10.97% 1.99% 2.62% 2.87% -1.08% 1.87% 1.96% 2.40% 0.80% 2.85% 0.21% 2.87% 0.40% 
2007 11.40% 8.66% 1.90% 7.28% 2.48% 0.01% 1.46% 2.24% 2.12% 3.11% 3.12% 2.26% 2.19% 5.22% 
1991-2001 167.34% 114.43% 22.64% 21.49% 18.60% 6.57% 17.37% 27.63% 9.75% 20.06% 31.99% 17.76% 39.73% 24.52% 
2002-2007 65.18% 103.0% 9.50% 6.84% 7.14% 3.38% 4.73% 9.62% 11.07% 7.19% 14.61% 1.89% 15.14% 7.97% 
Source: Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) and UN data. 
Notes: Δ GDP: the changes of the GDP; Δ C: the changes of the power consumption. 
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5.2.2.  Industry structure and power consumption 
 
China The UK 
  
Figure 5.3  The Power Consumption Index and the Percentage of the Industrial Value-added out of the GDP of 
China and the UK (1981-2006) 
Source: UNdata, International Energy Agency, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
An economic structure in relation to power consumption is illustrated in Figure 5.3 for 
China and the UK, respectively.  China shows a close link but the UK does not.  
From 1971 to 2006, the output of China‟s industrial sector increased by around 23 
times, making its percentage in the GDP enlarged from 42.15% in 1971 to 48.50% in 
2007.  Therefore, in Figure 5.2 of this increase of industrial output in the GDP, it has 
been mainly driven by a rapid growth of China‟s heavy industry, for instance, on 
heavy industry increased its output in total industry sector form 58% in 1999 to 70% 
in 2007(Table 5.6).  We plot the heavy industry against power consumption in China, 
which shows the percentage of the heavy industrial value-added and the power 
consumption has increased in the same pace over the past three decades.   
 
In contrast, the six OECD countries have experienced the process of 
“de-industrialisation” of the manufacturing sector over the past three decades, where 
the industrial outputs increased slowly, and the industrial sector lost its share in the 
economy.  For example, the UK‟s industrial sector only increased by 1.26 times from 
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1971 to 2006, and it lost almost by 20% share in the GDP from 1971 to 2007.  By 
the end of 2007, the industrial sector of all the six OECD countries falls to the level 
below 31% of the total GDP.  For example, in the UK, the industrial sector 
contributes only 23.08% of the value-added output to its total GDP in 2007.  
According to Figure 5.3, it clearly shows that the percentage of the industrial output 
relative to the GDP decreased despite of the increase in the power consumption over 
the past three decades.  This suggests that, unlike China, power consumption is no 
longer related to the manufacturing industry but related to consumption of households 
and the service sector in the UK (Table 5.4).  The impact of the service sector growth 
on electricity consumption is also seen for China, Italy, Japan, the US and France 
(Table 5.4).  From the comparative observation presented in Table 5.4, we argue that 
the economic structure of the service sector matters for power consumption, but not 
the structure of the manufacturing industry except China where the heavy industry 
plays a more and more importance in the manufacturing and the economy.   
 
Table 5.4  Composition of the GDP and the Power Consumption by Type of Users 
Industry 
% of the Industrial Sector out of 
the GDP 
% of Industrial Usage out of the 
Total Power Consumption 
 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 
China (Overall Industry) 













France  27% 23% 21% 35% 33% 30% 
Germany  37% 30% 30% 45% 42% 45% 
Italy  32% 28% 27% 51% 51% 46% 
Japan  40% 32% 30% 44% 38% 33% 
UK  35% 28% 24% 35% 34% 34% 
US 28% 24% 22% 32% 32% 24% 
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Service & Commerce 
% of the Service Sector 
out of the GDP 
% of Service Usage out of the 
Total Power Consumption 
 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 
China  32% 39% 40% 4% 8% 9% 
France  70% 74% 77% 25% 25% 29% 
Germany  61% 68% 69% 17% 24% 22% 
Italy  64% 69% 71% 18% 20% 25% 
Japan  58% 66% 68% 28% 32% 35% 
UK  63% 71% 75% 25% 27% 28% 
US 70% 75% 77% 31% 32% 34% 
Household 
% of the Household 
Consumption out of the GDP 
% of the Household Usage out of 
Total Power Consumption 
 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 
China  49% 42% 37% 8% 12% 11% 
France  57% 56% 58% 30% 31% 33% 
Germany  58% 58% 55% 28% 26% 26% 
Italy  57% 58% 57% 24% 22% 21% 
Japan  53% 54% 52% 24% 27% 28% 
UK  62% 64% 65% 33% 33% 34% 
US 67% 68% 71% 34% 33% 36% 
Agriculture 
% of the Agriculture out of the 
GDP 
% of the Agricultural Usage out of 
Total Power Consumption 
 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 
China  27.00% 15.00% 11.00% 6.85% 5.00% 3.00% 
France  3.77% 2.84% 2.20% 0.65% 0.66% 0.71% 
Germany  1.49% 1.26% 0.92% 1.50% 1.50% 1.55% 
Italy  3.49% 2.80% 2.04% 1.93% 1.76% 1.77% 
Japan  2.59% 1.77% 1.47% 0.22% 0.17% 0.09% 
UK  1.89% 1.04% 0.94% 1.35% 1.28% 1.09% 
US 2.06% 1.23% 1.08% N/A N/A N/A 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics of China, Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) and UN data. 
 
In 2007, China‟s industrial usage accounts for over 75% of the overall power supplied, 
much higher than any other six OECD countries.  By contrast, industrial users in the 
US only consumed 24% of the total electricity generated in 2007.  Before 2000, 
China has a decreasing percentage of the industrial usage in the total power 
consumption.  From 1990 to 2000, China‟s industrial power consumption dropped 
from 78% to 72%.  But after 2000, this trend reversed.  This phenomenon was also 
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noticed by existing studies.  Kahrl and Roland-Holst (2009) argued that “the growth 
in energy use was paralleled by an abrupt upswing in the energy intensity of China‟s 
GDP beginning in 2002, which, although peaking in 2004 and falling slowly since, 
reversed a two decades trend of steady declines in energy intensity”.   
 
Table 5.5  The Changes in the Power Intensity by Sector: China vs. OECD Countries 
  1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2006 1971-2006 
China  Overall 18.18% -12.13% -20.34% 21.29% -1.95% 
Industry 11.22% -15.32% -33.63% 27.01% -21.13% 
Agriculture 43.60% -35.83% -7.67% -4.33% -4.90% 
Service NA NA 5.78% 8.10% NA 
France  Overall 23.82% 6.85% -1.77% -2.45% 39.86% 
Industry 1.78% 17.65% 11.54% 3.20% 37.59% 
Agriculture 96.80% 30.10% 18.86% 50.82% 487.14% 
Service 36.50% 28.13% -5.17% 5.72% 88.21% 
Germany  Overall 11.72% -8.69% -11.03% 1.21% -11.89% 
Industry 16.24% -5.99% 1.93% 1.12% 13.84% 
Agriculture 47.08% 28.26% -24.62% 64.14% 195.96% 
Service -0.29% -0.92% -3.06% 4.49% 10.22% 
Italy  Overall 4.37% 6.83% 8.30% 7.39% 29.35% 
Industry -1.03% 12.37% 21.36% 4.09% 40.57% 
Agriculture 118.08% 93.93% 28.61% 30.24% 741.21% 
Service 10.17% 29.54% 9.64% 23.92% 110.50% 
Japan  Overall 1.79% 1.53% 11.54% -2.98% 6.80% 
Industry 0.51% -23.49% 17.23% -11.91% -25.97% 
Agriculture 40.11% 22.33% 35.35% -43.47% 43.27% 
Service 43.73% 145.51% 11.60% 6.35% 331.42% 
UK  Overall -6.10% -9.51% -9.25% -9.56% -29.26% 
Industry -9.83% 8.87% 4.30% 3.49% 10.30% 
Agriculture 21.14% -13.45% 47.73% -6.31% 57.80% 
Service 12.89% -12.58% -12.87% -11.52% -21.28% 
US Overall 5.94% -5.85% -9.31% -6.21% -12.34% 
Industry 0.77% 4.83% -5.19% -21.76% -15.69% 
Agriculture NA NA NA NA NA 
Service 16.18% -6.06% -6.34% -6.12% 2.23% 
Source: Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) and UN data. 
 
China‟s industrial output increased from 42% in 1990 to 49% in 2007 relative to the 
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GDP, but the power consumption of the industry in the total remains almost 
unchanged over the same time period (see Table 5.4).  This dis-link between output 
growth and power intensity of the industry: a decline of the power intensity by some 6% 
(i.e. 33% between 1991 and 2000, and 27% between 2001 and 2006, see Table 5.5).  
The power intensity improvement is evident by the Chinese steel sector and cement & 
glass manufacturing sector.  The production of one tonne of steel fell from using 847 
kWh of electricity in 2000 to 719 kWh in 2006.  The same was true for cement & 
glass that experienced a fall in power usage by some 20% between 2000 and 2006, 
see Figure 5.4.  Those observations show that the positive relationship between 
China‟s industrial output and power consumption cannot be explained by production 
technology employed but arise in output volume.  The rapid growth of the volume 
drives up power consumption and also offsets or marginalises the effect of industrial 
technology progress on power consumption.  In particular, the volume is accountable 
for increasing power consumption in the heavy industry when it experienced a rapid 
increase from 58% in the total industrial output to 70% over the period of 7 years for 
1999 to 2007 (see table 5.6).  This indicates the industry structure that has switched 
from low-energy-intensity to high-energy-intensity as a result of the world heavy 
industry restructuring of shifting production from the West to the East.  The 
discussion above suggests that the positive impact of China‟s industrial structure on 
power consumption can be explained by the volume change and the industrial 
restructuring to a more heavy-industry dominant character.   
 
The rapid development of the heavy industry in China also impacts the power 
intensity of the total industry.  From 1981 to 2000, the overall electricity intensity in 
China improved by around 32%, at the same time, the electricity intensity of its 
industrial sector also lowered down by 49%.  However, after 2000, such trend of the 
electricity intensity reversed in China.  By 2006, the overall and the industrial 
electricity intensity increased again by about 21% and 27% respectively.  The reason 
for this kind of changes would be attributable to the development of the heavy 
industries in recent years.  The heavy industry takes up over 70% of the total gross 
  188 
industrial output in 2007, while it‟s only 58% in 1999.   
 
Table 5.6  Percentage of the Gross Industrial Output by Light and Heavy Industries in China 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Light Industry 41.97% 39.80% 39.43% 39.14% 35.49% 33.47% 32.44% 29.96% 29.53% 
Heavy Industry 58.03% 60.20% 60.57% 60.86% 64.51% 66.53% 67.56% 70.04% 70.47% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: National Statistics Bureau of China 
 
Because of the concentration of the development on heavy industry, the heavy 
industrial output of China increased dramatically along with its power consumed.  
For example, in 2006, China produced over one third of iron & steel in this world, by 
consuming around 31% of the global power supplied for the iron & steel production.  
In the same year, China also produced 48% of the cement & glass in this world, by 
using 41% of the global power used for the cement & glass production.   
 
Compared to China, those six OECD countries takes up limited and declined shares in 
the global heavy industrial outputs.  For example, the UK produced 1.79% of the 
global iron & steel output in 2000, and its global share dropped to 1.11% in 2006.  
During the meantime, the power consumed for the iron & steel production dropped by 
around 7.9%, and its global share dropped to 0.59%.   
 
However, the dramatic increase in power consumption for the heavy industry doesn‟t 
necessarily mean that the power intensity in China has worsened during the period.  
Take the iron & steel sector as example.  Although the Chinese power efficiency of 
iron & steel production is not the highest among the seven countries, it still improved 
by 15% during the period from 2000 to 2006, and became even higher than the US by 
around 11% in 2006.   
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Figure 5.4  Power Consumption per Unit of Industrial Outputs (kWh/Metric Tonne) 
Source: The World Steel Association, the US Geological Survey Minerals Information Team, the National Statistics 
Bureau of China and the Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) 
 
Generally speaking, the power efficiency of the heavy industrial production in China 
has been improved to some extent over the years.  The reason why the electricity 
intensity rebounded in recent years is that the Chinese economy became reliant upon 
the heavy industry more and more since 2000.  As the industrial sector is so critical 
to China‟s economy, China needs much more power than any other developed 
countries to support its industry restructuring to the heavy-industry-dominant 
manufacturing.  Again, the high concentration in the energy-intensive sector raised 
overall electricity intensity in China.   
 
In contrast, the service and commercial usages and the residential usages of electricity 
only take up very limited percentage in the total power consumption in China.  In 
2007, the commercial and the household consumption only took up around 9% and 11% 
of the total power consumption in China.  In terms of the OECD countries, the 
commercial and the household users consumed much more power than China.  For 
example, in 2007, the commercial users and the household users consumed 28% and 
34% of the total power supply in the UK.  Besides, the percentage of the industrial 
power consumption keeps on decreasing while the percentage of the commercial and 
household consumption increase in the OECD countries.  For example, in Japan, the 
percentage of the industrial usage dropped from 44.45% in 1990 to 32.26% in 2006, 
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3.86%, respectively.   
 
From the discussion and analysis above, we argue that the economy structure in China 
has a positive relationship with the power consumption, which is unique to some 
extent, since this relationship is not observed in some “de-industrialised” OECD 
countries.   
 
5.2.3.  Electricity prices, power consumption and capacity 
Having discussed economic growth and industrial structure in the relation to power 
consumption, this section will look at how price can impact on the power.  In China, 
as previous chapters have identified, there are two prices that can be expected to 
influence power supply and consumption.  One is called the on-grid price, which is 
the price taken by Chinese power firms to sell their output to grids.  Another is the 
catalogue price that is used by end-users to pay distributors for their electricity bills.   
 






% of On-grid Price 
out of End Price 
Growth of End 
Price (%) 
Growth of On-grid 
Price (%) 
2000 405.0 282.0 69.63%   
2001 407.5 281.0 68.96% 0.62% -0.35% 
2002 410.0 290.0 70.73% 0.61% 3.20% 
2003 434.7 308.5 70.96% 6.02% 6.37% 
2004 458.2 303.7 66.27% 5.41% -1.55% 
2005 485.0 317.9 65.56% 5.84% 4.70% 
2006 499.0 331.0 66.33% 2.90% 4.12% 
2007 514.1 336.8 65.51% 3.01% 1.74% 
2008 523.5 347.3 66.35% 1.83% 3.14% 
2009 534.3 367.6 68.80% 2.07% 5.84% 
Average 467.1  316.6 67.77% 31.11% 30.82% 
Source: the annual report of the power industry monitoring 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and the electricity 
market and electricity price monitoring report 2005.   
 
From Table 5.7, we could find that although both the catalogue price and the end price 
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increased by around 30% from 2000 to 2009, the two prices could fluctuate in 
different way in each year.  For example, in 2004, the catalogue price increased by 
around 5.41%, while the on-grid prices dropped by -1.55%.  As both the two prices 
are planned by the government, there is no direct link between the changes in two 
prices annually.   
 
 
Figure 5.5  The Lagged Real End Price of the 
Electricity and the Power Consumption in China 
(1990-2006) 
 
Figure 5.6  The Plot of the Growth of the Catalogue 
Price (End Price) and Power Consumption of China 
(1980 to 2006) 
Source: International Energy Agency and the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China.  
Source: the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
In Figure 5.5, it clearly shows that the changes in catalogue electricity price against 
changes in power consumption in China.  It indicates that the end users have been in 
general responsive negatively to the fluctuation of the electricity price.  This 
observation that the interaction between plan on price setting and market for free 
choice is working since at an aggregate level, power consumption can be influence by 
changes in the catalogue price.   
 
Table 5.8  The Changes in the End Electricity Price: China vs. the OECD Countries 
 
China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
From 2000 to 2004 -5.42% -0.90% 35.44% 26.14% -5.30% -3.01% 6.98% 
From 1986 to 2006 55.37% -28.39% -19.27% 74.09% -27.67% 9.69% -21.14% 
Source: National Statistics Bureau of China and Electricity Information 2009 (IEA)  
Notes: The real electricity price index in 1990 is 100.   
 
Since the reform in the 1980s, the electricity price in China has increased significantly, 
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although its growth became flat in recent years.  According to Table 5.7, from 1986 
to 2006, the electricity price in China increased by around 55%.  During the period 
from 1986 to 2006, the electricity price in France, Germany, Japan and the US 
decreased by -28.39%, -19.27%, -27.67% and -21.14% respectively.  In Italy and the 
UK, the electricity prices increased by 74% and 9.69%, respectively.  This is an 
increasing comparison.  Over the two decades from 1986 to 2006, as significant rise 
in the price in China is not alone since Italy has experienced even more price rise.   
But China‟s power price is under the plan control and Italy price is left to market to 
decide.  This suggests that plan and market can be indifferent in terms of discipline 
of prices in moving up, in particular, when market fails in promoting competition.  
The UK is another example to show this point.   
 
 
Figure 5.7 The Plot of the Growth of the Catalogue Price (End Price) 
and Power Supply Capacity in China (1980 to 2006) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
The impact of the electricity price on the capacity would be complex in China.   
Definitely, the increase in the electricity price would be welcomed by the power firms.  
Kroeber (2008) argued that “the simply raising end-user electricity prices … would 
merely spur the construction of more unneeded generating capacity.”  However, the 
decrease in the electricity price has not been evidenced by the decrease in the growth 
of the power capacity.  From 2000 to 2006, the net capacity of the power supply 
increased by around 95%, although the real price dropped slightly by around 6% in 
China.  It implies that the electricity price may not be the reason for the power firms 
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to expand their capacity.   
 
In contrast, in the West, Wolak and Patrick (1996) found that the major generator at 
UK could increase their profits by unilaterally restricting the amount of generation 
capacity available for the market.  Such argument is also supported by the study on 
the California electricity market by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).  Their 
observation shows that the monopolist firm can manipulate the prices through the 
capacity of the power supply.  If this can be established, then what we can observe is 
a negative relationship between capacity and the price.  However, the counter force 
to offset this negative relationship is free entry to the market since the higher price 
can affect new entrants and more investment on capacity.  Therefore, the price can 
be positively related to capacity if market is competitive.   
 
5.2.4.  The power consumption and the power supply capacity 
In the past two decades, China achieved a dramatic and steady expansion of the power 
generation capacity, compared with other six OECD countries.  From 1991 to 2008, 
the average annual growth of the power capacity in China is as high as 10.36%.  In 
1990, the total capacity in China was only equal to 18.8% of the US.  After fast 
expansion for over two decades, the generation capacity in China increased by 5.8 
times during the period from 1990 to 2008.  In 2007, China‟s installed capacity is 
equal to 65.5% of the US, and almost equal to the sum of the total capacity of France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK.   
 
In contrast, the six OECD countries have only achieved a relatively flat growth of the 
net capacity.  The average annual growth in Italy, the US, Japan, Germany, the UK 
and France is 3.02%, 2.40%, 2.15%, 1.93%, 0.88% and 0.71% respectively.   
  




Figure 5.8  The Net Capacity Index and the Power Consumption Index of China and France (1990 -2006) 
Source: International Energy Agency and the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
According to Figure 5.9, both the net capacity and power consumption in China have 
increased around 4.5 times over the past two decades.  In France, the net capacity 
have increased by around 12%, but the domestic power consumption increased by 
around 38%.   
 
According to Appendix 5.4, in 2007, the average load factor in China is around 52%, 
which is higher than Italy (38%), Japan (47.2%) and the US (45%), but lower than 
France (55.8%), Germany (54.8%) and the UK (53.7%).  It shows that the load 
factor in Italy, where more than 16% of the total power supply is imported from other 
countries, is the lowest among those OECD countries.  Besides, its load factor has 
declined significantly, i.e. from 43% to 38%, over the past two decades.  It implies 
that the Italian power firm couldn‟t compete with the international power producers 
with competitive electricity price, and Italy relies on the power imports to replace its 
expensive domestic power generation
24
.  In another aspect, France exports around 16% 
of its total power output to other countries, and this encourages higher utilisation of its 
existing power supply capacity.   
 
In contrast, the load factor in China has been almost unchanged over the past two 
decades.  It suggests that China chooses to build up more power supply capacity to 
satisfy its domestic power demand, rather than increase the utilisation of the existing 
                                                             
24 The end prices for household and industrial users of OECD countries are compared and discussed in Chapter 3.   
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capacity or the power imports.  One of the reasons why the overall load factor of the 
Chinese power supply keeps almost unchanged could be due to the poor transmission 
facilities.  Kroeber (2008) argued that raised an example that Jiangsu was busy 
building more power plants, although there was adequate generation capacity in the 
whole province.  The reason was that most of the plants were built in “the coal-rich 
north of the province”, while most of the power demand came from “the industrial 
south”.  The insufficient grid facilities limit amount of electricity that can be 
transmitted from the north to the south of the province, so that excessive generation 
capacity “had to be built in the south”.  Thus, it suggests that the relationship 
between the power consumption and the power supply capacity would be particularly 
strong.   
 
The power generation in China heavily relies on the thermal plants, which take up 
over 77% of the total capacity and produce over 83% of the electricity in 2007.  
Although the hydro and nuclear capacity in China increased by 5.09 times from 1990 
to 2007, the percentage of the thermal plants out of the total capacity even increased 
from 73.86% in 1990 to 77.73% in 2007. As over 97% Chinese thermal plants are 
using coal and coal products as the fuel, it implies that China heavily relies on the 
coal-fired plants to provide the electricity supply, and such reliance becomes more 
and more serious.  Besides China, the OECD countries, except France, also heavily 
rely on the thermal plants to produce electricity.  In 2007, the thermal plants in 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US take up 58.63%, 73.74%, 22.56%, 63.91%, 
and 79.00% of the total capacity respectively, and produce 62.06%, 81.83%, 67.52%, 
77.37% and 72.04% of the total power supply.  France is an exception, where 55% 
of the total capacity and over 75% of the total supply can be attributed to the nuclear 
plants.  However, the structure of thermal capacity in those OECD countries is much 
more diversified than China.  In Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, coal-fired plants 
only take up 0.08%, 19.34%, 35.83% and 39.22% of the total thermal capacity 
respectively, which means that other types of fuels, such as natural gas and oil, play 
an important role in power generating in those OECD countries.   
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5.3.  Data and Empirical Estimation 
5.3.1.  Estimation Models 
Having discussed how power consumption can be related to GDP, economic structure 
and prices from a descriptive aspect, we in this section move further to verify 
statistically our expectation of the relationship derived from the last section.  We 
take a two-stage estimation approach to identify and quantify both the direct and 
indirect factors which could have a significant impact upon the aggregate capacity 
expansion of power plants in China and other six OECD countries.  In the first stage, 
estimation is pursued for identifying the factors that can affect the power consumption 
in terms of both the long term and the short term, respectively.  An increase in power 
consumption is expected to be responded by power generators in committing more 
investment to increase supply in the long run, which is capacity investment.  To test 
this expectation, in the second stage, our estimation then focuses on examining the 
demand-driving variables for their impact on capacity expansion at an aggregate level 
of a nation.  The variables in our estimation that explains the capacity derived from 
our supply capacity function that may include demand for the power consumption and 
the load factor.  We also estimate the supply function by replacing the power 
consumption with its determinants identified in the stage 1 of demand estimation, in 
which it has real GDP, electricity prices for end users, and the power exported.  This 
extension enables us to identify which determinants of demand can also impact on 
supply directly.  In order to make an international comparison, our econometric 
models are estimated with reference to some OECD countries respectively.   
 
Stage 1 
Rosen and Houser (2007) classified the driver of the total energy demand in China 
into “the industry-led demand” and “the consumption-driven demand” elements.  
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They argued that as China is making high energy-intensive industrial products rather 
than importing, it would raise its energy consumption.  This argument is consistent 
with our expectation discussed in the last section of this chapter that GDP as an 
aggregate output of a nation, together with the price of power and economic structure, 
are expected to affect demand of power, in which this can be written as: 
ypGDPfC ,,  
Where C is the aggregated level of power consumption, p is the electricity price for 
end users, and y represents economic structure.  This is a demand function with the 
expectation that both GDP and the structure of the industry will plan a positive role in 
stimulating demand but price will be reverse.  The power demand function will be 
estimated in stage 1 in aim of identifying the factors that affect the power 
consumption in both the long term and the short term, respectively.  So, two separate 
demand functions are specified as follows.   
 
Model 1a ― Long-run relationship 
Model 1a is our long-run demand function: 
ttttt DDypGDPC 221131211  ………..………. (1a) 
, where C  is the index of the power consumption; GDP  is the index of the real 
GDP; p is the index of the real price of the electricity for end users; y is the 
percentage of the industrial value added out of GDP, or the share of heavy industry in 
the GDP, i.e. the proxy for the economic structure; D is the dummy variable of time 
for different periods; is the constant and is the random noise with normal 
distribution .   
 
According to Model 1a, power consumption in the current period is explained by the 
lagged real GDP, the lagged real electricity price, and the economic structure.  In 
order to control the endogeneity in estimation, we use the lag of those variables 
except the economic structure, which is considered to be a predetermined variable that 
is relevant to policy or the context of an economy.  The dummy variables are also 
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added in the function in order to control the time heterogeneity of the estimation.  As 
the Chinese power sector reform started in 1980s, the model (1) to capture the 
long-run relationship covers the periods from 1980 to 2006.  In order to make a 
reasonable international comparison, the all of other six OECD countries are 
measured in the same periods with China.  Thus, there are two the dummy variables 
of time incorporated in the model, which control the time effect of 1990s and 2000s 
respectively.  All those explanatory variables except y  and dummy variables of 
time are converted into the logarithm form.   
 
Model 1b ― Short-run relationship 
Model 1b attempts to examine the short-run relationship between the power 
consumption and its explanatory variables.  The regression model is specified as 
follows: 
ttttt DypGDPC 2131211  ……………….... (1b) 
Model 1b uses the first differences of the variables to investigate the short-term 
relationship.  China has liberalised its prices for most of industrial and consumer 
goods since 1992.  As a result, we choose the periods from 1992 to 2006 to estimate 
the model.  In order to control the change in China‟s market environment that was 
very different between the 1990s and the 2000s, we employ a dummy of time to 
capture the change in estimation.  Again, all variables except ty  and 2D  are in 
the form of logarithm.   
 
Stage 2 
The second stage is aimed to find out what factors can directly influence the supply 
capacity in the long-term.  According to our derived function of power supply 
capacity, it specifies two basic elements that can affect the supply in the long run: one 
is demand shocks and another is capacity utilisation indicated by the load factor.  
Empirically, we augment this function by replacing the demand shocks captured by 
the variable of power consumption with its pre-determinants or predictors identified 
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in stage 1, such as the GDP, the price of electricity and exports.   
Box 1.  Derivation of the Function of Power Supply Capacity 
At an aggregate level, suppose we observe an actual capacity K that equals to the 
equilibrium capacity K* at time t.  The current K at t is grown from the previous 
level of K at t-1.  Therefore, K can be grown from the past to the equilibrium level of 
K* at t, or K can be grown to a new level that diverts from the equilibrium. This 
growing process can be described by the adjustment function as follows:  
                              …………… (a) 
where λ is the growing-adjustment coefficient.  λ=0, K is grown to a level where 
. λ=1, K is given as same as the past, . When 0< λ<1, then K is 
grown from the past to a new level that diverts from the equilibrium.  At the K*, the 
equilibrium means that supply of power outputs Q
s
 equals to demand for power Q
d
.  
When the utilisation of the capacity is taken into account, we can write Q
s
 as ρK*, 
where ρ is a load factor that measures how much production capacity has been 
utilized to produce Q
s
.  This gives: 
                        ……….(b) 
Since the load factor can be defined as  , where  is the maximal capacity 
utilisation or the maximum load factor feasibly allowed by technique.   is less than 
100% since a power firm must retain some capacity reserves from the management 
perspective of the technique safety and the supply security of power. We call  as 
the technically feasible load factor.  The manipulation of  and  
provides us with:  
                                   ………….….……….(c) 
Substituting (c) to (a) gets:         ….………..……….(d) 
This means:                     ………….…..……(e) 
By manipulating (e) gives:       ……………...……(f) 
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Or gives:                      …………….……(g) 
Apparently, the capacity  at time t is expected to be grown from the previous  
through the growth adjustment for a change in the technically feasible load factor and 
the demand shocks to the supply that is indicated by .  If the demand shock 
 is greater than what supply  can server, then , which promotes 
capacity to grow more; if the demand shock can be served by part of , then 
, which discourages capacity to grow.  For the same analogy, any 
increase in the load factor will be expected to be responded by capacity positively.   
 
 
Piao and Zhong (2008) argued that the growing shortage of the electricity supply 
encourages investment into the power generation sector.  Kroeber (2008) also 
admitted the fact that new power plants are built in the industrial areas where the 
energy demand is high.  Their view suggests that the power consumption should play 
a direct role in affecting power generation capacity in China.  Lam (2004) in his 
paper argued that investment in power generation in China had the positive 
relationship with electricity prices.  With these expectations, we therefore extend our 
theoretical function of the capacity:   
                                           …..……….. (g) 
to an empirical model with taking into account a sequence of investment and capacity 
formation, which usually takes two or three years to build up a new power plant after 
start of the investment (Lin, 2004): 
                  ………… (2a) 
where ΔK is the growth of capacity formed at time t,  ΔQ is the growth of power 
consumption that captures the demand shocks occurred on the capacity investment 
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decision made at t-2.  t-2 is the load factor reported two years before new capacity is 
formed.  Empirically, we employ the average load factor of the year in estimation. To 
replace the power consumption variable with its predictors identified in stage 1 of 
estimation, such as the GDP, the power price and power exports, the equation (2a) 
becomes: 
tttttt DDExpGDPK 22112232211 …………. (2b) 
where the one-year lagged GDP is applied instead of the lagged two years, because 
this is to mitigate multi-collinearity between the GDP and other variables specified in 
equation 2b.  Ex  is the index of the power exports, and p is the index of the real 
electricity price for end users.   
 
In Model 2a and 2b, it represents a long-run relationship in the model.  We then 
employ a long time-series data to pursue our estimation from 1980 to 2006.  For the 
same reason discussed previously, we control the time effect in the 1990s and the 
2000s by defining the two time dummy variables in the model.  All those variables 
are in natural logarithm, except the dummy variables.   
5.3.2.  Data 
Data Source 
The variables for regressions include the supply capacity of the power generation 
(GW), the observed power consumption (GWh), the power exports (GWh), the real 
electricity price index for the end users, the real GDP (billion USD), and the industrial 
value added (billion USD) at a national level.  The aggregated annual data on China, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US over period from 1980 to 2007 are 
collected from: Statistics Yearbook of China published by the State Bureau of 
Statistics of China, International Energy Agency, UN Data, and World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank, which gives 27 observations for each country in the 
dataset.   
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Table 5.9  Data Description of Variables (1980-2006) 
 China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
Capacity (GW) 
Mean 222.37  101.81  107.91  64.82  214.85  72.71  787.37  
Minimum 65.87  63.66  82.55  46.82  143.70  66.43  625.92  
Maximum 622.00  116.98  131.58  89.49  278.78  83.14  1,077.69  
Power Consumption (GWh) 
Mean 864,582.85  349,444.33  480,915.04  232,994.85  784,358.52  296,304.78  2,954,104.56  
Minimum 256,780.00  231,657.00  418,918.00  162,798.00  520,245.00  233,332.00  2,075,684.00  
Maximum 2,445,233.00  450,946.00  542,394.00  317,566.00  993,882.00  353,816.00  3,816,845.00  
Real Electricity Price Index (1980=100) 
Mean 116.09  90.56  100.32  89.69  79.86  102.22  96.11  
Minimum 79.71  85.84  86.85  78.21  75.59  94.67  90.00  
Maximum 152.13  100.00  108.83  102.48  100.00  126.57  103.10  
Real GDP (Billion USD)       
Mean 730.84  1,296.77  1,798.53  1,157.31  2,992.34  1,067.65  6,395.41  
Minimum 166.44  981.46  1,361.97  893.53  2,050.53  756.10  4,184.68  
Maximum 1,910.30  1,673.53  2,234.38  1,399.07  3,733.30  1,470.65  9,192.91  
Percentage of Industrial Value Added (%)      
Mean  45.17% 27.82% 36.65% 33.03% 37.77% 35.04% 28.74% 
Minimum 41.34% 20.65% 28.86% 26.83% 30.13% 23.08% 22.03% 
Maximum 48.68% 35.58% 46.73% 40.24% 45.70% 43.03% 34.51% 
Load Factor (%) 
Mean 52.19% 49.63% 58.57% 41.61% 46.44% 52.20% 48.37% 
Minimum 47.63% 43.15% 52.12% 38.12% 42.90% 44.23% 41.74% 
Maximum 56.73% 56.59% 65.07% 45.98% 49.76% 58.02% 56.93% 
Power Exports (GWh) 
Mean 4,107.93  53,373.00  33,721.11  1,164.00  0.00  510.11  11,026.56  
Minimum 0.00  12,394.00  16,224.00  372.00  0.00  0.00  2,558.00  
Maximum 12,271.00  80,739.00  65,441.00  3,018.00  0.00  2,959.00  24,271.00  
No. of 
Observation 
27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Electricity Information 2009 (IEA), UN Data, and World Bank. 
 
The real GDP of all the seven countries are collected from the online database of the 
UNData.  A group of previous studies tried to investigate and explain the 
relationship between the energy consumption and the economic growth.  With the 
study of the Chinese data during the period from 1971 to 2000, Lam (2004) argued 
that “real GDP and electricity consumption for China are co-integrated and there is 
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unidirectional Granger causality running from electricity consumption to real GDP 
but not vice versa”.  Yuan, Kang, Zhao and Hu (2008) again confirmed the 
co-integration between output and energy use in China.  Mahadevan and 
Asafu-Adjaye (2007) employed the panel error correction model to investigate 20 
countries from 1971 to 2002, and then proved that, “among the energy exporters, 
there was bidirectional causality between economic growth and energy consumption 
in the developed countries in both the short and long run.”  From the illustration in 
the previous section, it‟s expected that there is a positive relationship between the real 
GDP and the power consumption in those seven countries, but this relationship may 
be country-specific.   
 
The percentage of industrial value added in GDP is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators in the World Bank online database.  For China, we use the 
percentage of heavy industrial value-added instead.  As shown by the discussion in 
section of 5.2, the growth of the heavy industrial outputs is highly related to power 
consumption.  Thus, we believe that our estimation will be consistent with the 
expectation of the positive relationship between the two variables we discussed in 
section 5.2.   
 
The real electricity price index of the OECD countries and China are obtained from 
Electricity Information 2009 and National Bureau of Statistics of China respectively.   
 
The data of the power consumption of all of sample countries including China are 
collected from the online database of Electricity Information 2009 prepared by the 
International Energy Agency.   
 
The data of the power supply capacity are collected from the online database of 
Electricity Information 2009 prepared by the International Energy Agency.  Before 
the regression, all data, except the percentage of the industrial value added, are 
converted into the index and then the logarithm form.  And the dummy variables of 
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time are generated on the basis of the three periods, i.e. the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 
2000s.  In other words, the value of the time dummy variables will be 1, when the 
corresponding observation falls in that particular period.  Otherwise, it will be 0.   
 
The load factor is calculated by the following formula: .  
The total power output and the capacity are collected from the online database of the 
Electricity Information 2009 issued by the International Energy Agency.   
 
Concerning and problems in the data 
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression needs the time-series variables being 
stationary themselves or jointly stationary at least.  If the series is non-stationary, the 
OLS would produce biased estimates, known as “spurious regression”.  The unit root 
of those time-series variables of each country must be investigated before the 
regression.  The Augmented Dickey and Fuller test has been employed to test the 
unit root of those variables for each country.  The null hypothesis 0H assumes that 
the series is non-stationary, and it could be rejected if the unit root or non-stationarity 
doesn‟t exist.  The element of the time trend would also be added in the test for the 
particular country as appropriate.  If all of the independent variables in the same 
model have the same number of unit root with the dependent variable, it means that 
the model is qualified for the OLS regression.  Otherwise, the variables with 
different number of unit root may not be suitable for the OLS regression in the same 
model.  If a stationary variable has been found correlated to a non-stationary variable, 
it means that such relationship is just a “spurious correlation”.   
 
However, the non-stationary variables can also constitute a co-integration.  We will 
perform the ADF test on the residual of the model to prove the validity of the long-run 
model.  
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Table 5.10  T-statistics of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Stationarity 
 US Germany Italy UK France Japan China 
 Level δ Level δ Level δ Level δ Level δ Level δ Level δ 
Power Consumption -1.602 -5.520*** -0.665 -3.426** -0.040 -4.527*** -0.056 -4.076*** -3.796*** -3.334** -1.804 -4.971*** 1.607 -2.635* 
Real GDP -0.117 -3.037** -0.472 -3.475** -1.443 -3.485** 0.957 -2.896* -3.544* -4.471*** -1.976 -4.138*** 0.954 -3.275** 
Electricity Price -2.106 -3.357** -2.537 -2.845* -3.485** -3.818** 0.330 -5.817*** -2.843** 2.640* -4.981*** -4.049*** -1.524 -2.801* 
Percentage of 
Industrial Value Added 
out of GDP 
-0.550 -2.977* -1.049 -3.612** -1.387 -4.711*** 0.676 -2.946* -4.273** -3.825*** 0.023 -2.813* -0.082 -3.950*** 
Net Capacity -0.012 -3.086** -0.887 -6.148*** -0.045 -3.128** -0.688 -4.135*** -3.830*** -2.305** -1.877 -3.337** 1.555 -2.115** 
Load Factor -1.624*  -1.546*  -3.602**  -1.649*  -4.283**  -2.972*  -4.300***  
Notes: The δ stands for the first difference.  *, **, and *** represent the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level.  The lag in the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion test.     
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The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test has been applied in order to test the stationarity of 
both the long-term and short-term time-series variables of the seven countries.  As 
shown in the table above (5.10), for China, the levels of the power consumption, the 
real GDP, the electricity price and the net capacity are found to be non-stationary.  
Such findings are consistent with the results of the ADF tests in Lam‟s paper (2004), 
where the time series of the power consumption and the GDP for China are found to 
be non-stationary.  As a result, the legitimate using OLS to estimate the long run 
mode of power consumption with the listed explanatory variables will be dependent 
on the stationary of the residuals. This will be tested further in estimation.  The test 
also shows that the percentage of the industrial value added of China intends to be 
relative to the dependent variable, as it turns non-stationary.  In terms of the first 
differences, the results of the ADF test reject the null hypothesis of the unit root for 
the power consumption, the real GDP and the electricity price of China.  So, this 
justifies OLS as a suitable approach to estimate the short-run relationship of the 
changes in the power consumption with the real GDP and the electricity prices.   
 
As to the UK and Germany, the levels of the first five variables are all non-stationary.  
As those variables have the same unit root, they are justified for the OLS regression in 
the same model.  In terms of the first order of the first difference of the first five 
variables of the two countries, the results of the ADF test reject the null hypothesis of 
the non-stationarity.   
 
In the case of the US, the levels of the power consumption, the real GDP and the 
percentage of the industrial value added all have the same integration of order one.  
It means that those variables are qualified for the OLS regression to give an unbiased 
estimation.   
 
In the case of Italy, the result of the test shows that the electricity price is stationary, 
which is different from other four variables.  The ADF statistics of the first 
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difference of the variables are all below the critical value, so that the null hypothesis 
of unit root shall be rejected.   
 
In terms of France the variables are all found to be stationary under the levels as well 
as the first differences.  In terms of Japan, the electricity price is found to be 
stationary, which is different from other four variables, which implies that any 
significant relationship between the electricity price and the power consumption 
would be spurious correlation.   
 
According to the results of ADF tests, the load factors of all those seven countries are 
found to be stationary, which is eligible for the OLS regression of Model 2a and 2b.   
 
5.3.3.  Empirical Results 
Causality Tests 
We start our estimation by performing the Granger Causality test first to check the 
causality relationship between GDP, power consumption and supply capacity.  The 
null hypothesis of the Granger Causality test is that the variable X does not Granger 
cause the variable Y.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can say that the changes 
in X could cause the changes in Y.  Then it‟s justified to use the variable X to explain 
the variable Y in the model.   
 
According to Table 5.11, it suggests that the relationship between the power 
consumption and the GDP in China should be bidirectional.  Moreover, it also 
suggests that the changes in the power supply capacity are resulted by the changes in 
the GDP, the power consumption and the load factor respectively in the case of China.   
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Table 5.11  The Granger Causality Tests 
China F-Statistic Prob>F 
Null 
Hypothesis 
 F-Statistic Prob>F 
Null 
Hypothesis 
GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 6.0142 0.0069 Rejected Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 4.1850 0.0244 Rejected 
Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 5.1700 0.0126 Rejected Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 16.2490 0.0001 Rejected 
Δ Power Consumption does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 5.4790 0.0127 Rejected Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 7.1430 0.0046 Rejected 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ Power Consumption 0.5004 0.6137 Accepted Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 1.3532 0.2811 Accepted 
US 
   
UK 
   
GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 3.5081 0.0485 Rejected GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 7.1520 0.0031 Rejected 
Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 6.1459 0.0079 Rejected Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 1.8301 0.1791 Accepted 
Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 0.1581 0.8548 Accepted Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 8.7066 0.0016 Rejected 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 1.8248 0.1848 Accepted Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 1.5094 0.2431 Accepted 
Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 4.3020 0.0338 Rejected Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 6.5882 0.0057 Rejected 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 0.0509 0.9978 Accepted Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 10.1310 0.0008 Rejected 
Germany 
   
France 
   
GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 4.0663 0.0282 Rejected GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 0.3428 0.7126 Accepted 
Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 2.5025 1.0000 Accepted Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 0.1728 0.8422 Accepted 
Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 2.9887 0.0711 Accepted Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 1.7075 0.2045 Accepted 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 3.6436 0.0430 Rejected Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 0.3187 0.7304 Accepted 
Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 4.7438 0.0085 Rejected Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 3.5748 0.0324 Rejected 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 2.2834 0.0988 Accepted Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 3.3571 0.0393 Rejected 
Italy 
   
Japan 
   
GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 3.4316 0.0465 Rejected GDP does not Granger cause Power Consumption 7.4196 0.0026 Rejected 
Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 2.9784 0.0672 Accepted Power Consumption does not Granger cause GDP 1.1730 0.3242 Accepted 
Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 2.0641 0.1508 Accepted Δ GDP does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 1.2738 0.2996 Accepted 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 4.5466 0.0220 Rejected Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Δ GDP 0.6605 0.5265 Accepted 
Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 3.6980 0.0413 Rejected Load Factor does not Granger cause Δ Capacity 3.1720 0.0388 Rejected 
Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 8.1709 0.0022 Rejected Δ Capacity does not Granger cause Load Factor 1.4729 0.2518 Accepted 
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Model 1 
 
Table 5.12  The Estimation Results of Model 1a and 1b 
A: Model 1a. The Long-run Determinants of the Power Consumption (1980 - 2006) 
 Power Consumption (t) 
 US Germany Italy UK France Japan China 
Real GDP(t-1) 0.7334*** 1.300*** 1.403*** 0.677*** 0.458 0.893*** 0.777*** 
 (8.70) (6.04) (8.41) (6.49) (1.47) (8.76) (31.02) 
Electricity Price(t-1) -0.195 0.161 -0.148** -0.209** -0.252 -0.162 -0.199*** 
 (-1.50) (1.45) (-2.35) (-2.64) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-4.05) 
Economic Structure (t) -0.003 0.026*** 0.002 0.0001 -0.036** -0.011** 0.038*** 
 (-0.57) (3.99) (0.35) (0.03) (-3.49) (-2.86) (9.81) 
Dummy for 1990s 0.049** -0.113*** -0.001 0.031* 0.027 0.015 0.08** 
 (2.87) (-3.72) (-0.05) (1.72) (0.90) (0.56) (3.10) 
Dummy for 2000s 0.024 -0.107** 0.038 0.005 -0.012 0.009 0.035 
 (0.82) (-2.47) (1.30) (0.20) (-0.21) (0.26) (0.80) 
Constant 2.21** -2.99** -1.21 2.45*** 4.63** 1.69* 1.103*** 
 (2.57) (-2.33) (-1.21) (3.42) (2.52) (1.84) (5.12) 
Adjusted R-square 0.9917 0.8864 0.9933 0.9858 0.9854 0.9894 0.9978 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
ADF Test for the Residuals -2.724* -3.352** -5.637*** -3.359** -3.951*** -5.122*** -3.588** 
 
B: Model 1b.  The Short-run Determinants of the Power Consumption (1992 - 2006) 
 △Power Consumption (t) 
 US Germany Italy UK France Japan China 
△Real GDP (t-1) 0.282 0.244 -0.0021 0.617 0.108 -0.4117 0.934** 
 (1.38) (1.03) (-0.01) (1.59) (0.24) (-1.26) (2.48) 
△Real Price (t-1) -0.179** 0.025 -0.022 0.085 -0.184 0.235 -0.778 
 (-2.09) (0.60) (-0.51) (0.54) (-0.96) (1.39) (-0.61) 
△Economic Structure (t) 0.006 0.0097* 0.0124 0.0002 -0.0052 0.0054 0.007 
 (0.86) (1.69) (0.98) (0.03) (-0.29) (0.58) (1.43) 
Dummy for 2000s -0.008 0.007 0.002 -0.0145 -0.0013 -0.016 0.049** 
 (-1.60) (1.08) (0.36) (-1.35) (-0.12) (-1.65) (2.69) 
Constant 0.017 0.0054 0.026*** 0.0039 0.0128 0.032** -0.02 
 (2.19) (0.87) (4.45) (0.32) (0.98) (3.08) (-0.50) 
Adjusted R-square 0.455 0.2113 -0.2411 0.0115 -0.2457 0.1261 0.6050 
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Note: T-statistic significance: * at 10% level, ** at the 5% level, ***, at the 1% level.  The lags in the ADF tests of 
the Model 1a are selected by the AIC tests.   
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According to Table 5.12, the residuals of the long-run model are stationary in terms of 
the seven countries according to the reported ADF test, which suggests that the model 
does not constitute the “spurious correlation”.   
 
The real GDP 
According to results of Model 1a and Model 1b, the real GDP has the significant 
positive impact upon the power consumption in China, in both the long term and the 
short term.  The existing studies (Lin, 2003; Lam, 2004; He, Zhao, Li and Huang, 
2006; Yuan, Zhao, Yu and Hu, 2007) focused on the causality relationship between the 
real GDP and the electricity consumptions in China, and argued that there was only 
unidirectional relationship from the power consumption to the real GDP in China.  
Those studies covered the periods before the reform of the power sector, when the 
power supply in China was the bottleneck for the economic growth in most time.  
However, with the data from the reform years, we provide a different view about the 
relationship between the power consumption and the economic development.   
 
As the Chinese economy relies more and more upon the investment and exports, the 
fluctuation of the global economy could affect the power consumption in China.  
During the Asia financial crisis, the decline in the power consumption growth was 
larger than the decline in the real GDP growth.  It suggests that it might not be the 
right way to recover the economy from the economic downturn by supplying and 
consuming more energy.  It also implies that the economic condition affects the 
power consumption in China.  Some existing studies also confirmed our results.  
Lin (2001) studied the Chinese data from 1956 to 1994 with error correction model 
and found that 1% increase in the real GDP growth would lead to 0.883% increase in 
the power consumption.  Again, Lin (2003) expanded the period from 1952 to 2001 
and found that the real GDP could be the positive reason to explain the power 
consumption in the same period for both the long and short term.  And later on, Wu 
(2009) also found that a 1% increase in the real GDP in China would lead to a 0.38% 
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increase in the power consumption in the long term.  Thus, the effect of GDP on 
power consumption is persistently and has been clearly observed.  During the first 
three months of 2009, the growth of the Chinese GDP decreased by 4.5 percentage 
points to 6.10%
25
, and the power consumption in China shrank sharply by 4.02%
26
.  
And during the first eight months of 2009
27
, the load factor of the coal-fired power 
plants decreased by around 9.95% on the year-on-year basis.  These changes are 
consistent with the results of our study.   
 
Moreover, just as China, the other six countries also show the positive impact of the 
real GDP on the power consumption in the long run, but not in the short run.  The 
coefficients of the real GDP of Germany, Italy and Japan are higher than China, which 
suggests the higher elasticity of power consumption with respect to the GDP in those 
three countries in the long run.  However, in terms of the short run, it‟s observed that 
the real GDP of all those six developed countries has no impact on the power 
consumption, in which this finding is very different from China that has the strong 
relationship in the short-run.  This suggests that firstly, China‟s power consumption 
is very responsive to changes in the GDP, and secondly, the GDP impact on power 
consumption is generalised internationally across countries for the long run, but the 
impact is country-specific for the short run, like only observed in China.   
 
The electricity price 
According to the estimation of Model 1a and 1b, the end-user price have a negative 
impact on the power consumption in the long run, but not in the short run in China 
and in other OECD countries except the US.  On average of the sample countries, a 1% 
of increase in the electricity price will lead to around 0.2% of decrease in the power 
consumption.  A similar long-term relationship between the two variables for the 
case of China was also identified by Lin (2001), but his coefficient was -0.4645, 
higher than our estimated by 0.20.  The difference may be of different sample data.  
                                                             
25 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-04/16/content_11194063.htm, visited on January 15th, 2010. 
26 http://www.chinairn.com/doc/70310/411935.html, visited on January 15th, 2010. 
27 http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-09/14/content_1416848.htm, visited on January 15th, 2010.   
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Lin‟s (2001) data is from 1956 to 1994, when compared with our data from 1980 to 
2006.  Since 1978, the old plan system has been replaced by the market-oriented 
economy in many industries in China.  This change may be the underlying reason for 
this difference.  For the short run, we found that the price elasticity with respect to 
consumption is almost inelastic, because China has the rigidity in changing electricity 
price since the electricity price adjustment is a very complicated and politically 
sensitive issue for the nation.  This makes the state to be very cautious in changing 
the price, in particular, in a large rise.  As a result, we can expect that price adjusted 
will be small or insignificant to affect demand in the short-run.   
 
Again, as same as GDP impact on power consumption, the price impact is almost a 
common phenomenon across the sample countries in the long run, but the impact is 
country-specific in the short run. 
 
The economic structure 
The variable for the economic structure is measured by the industrial outputs in GDP. 
According to the results of Model 1a, for China and Germany, the structure has the 
positive impact on the long-run power consumption.  This finding suggests that 
China would need more power if its economy relies upon the industrial sector more 
and more.  With the Chinese data from 1952 to 2001, Lin (2003) found the similar 
results that the gross output of the light industries has negative relationship with the 
power consumption in the long run.  Wu (2009) studied the cross-sectional data from 
30 Chinese provinces in 2005, and also found that the proportion of the industrial 
sector in GDP has a positive impact upon the regional electric power consumption, 
which is consistent with our finding.   
 
In contrast to China, the long-run impact of the structure does not appear in every 
sample country. Furthermore, two sample countries show a negative impact of the 
structure on the consumption, such as France and Japan.    
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Table 5.13  The Production of Energy-Intensive Industries in China 
Energy Consumption (mtce) 2000 2005 2006 2007 ∆(2000-2007) 
 - Ethylene 5.29  8.11  9.53  10.11  91.27% 
 - Cement 108.06  178.50  199.12  215.07  99.03% 
 - Steel 100.74  252.21  283.34  326.84  224.43% 
Annual Growth of the Production (%) 2000 2004 2005 2007 2000-2007 
 - Ethylene 8.05% 34.01% 19.96% 24.48% 136.28% 
 - Cement 4.19% 61.95% 10.55% 15.71% 137.55% 
 - Steel 3.41% 120.16% 24.86% 18.66% 293.76% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Compared to other six developed counties, the Chinese economic development relies 
upon the energy-intensive industrial sector more and more over the past 30 years.  
From 2000 to 2007, the production of ethylene, cement and steel, which are heavy 
energy-consuming products, has increased by 136.28%, 137.55% and 293.76% 
respectively in China.  The heavy industry has taken up the major part of the 
industrial sector in China, of which the proportion keeps on growing over the time.  
Just as described previously, the heavy industries in China produced 58.03% of the 
total industrial outputs in 1999, and such figure increased to 70.47% in 2007.  And, 
the percentage of the whole industrial sector out of the GDP in China is still growing 
in recent years, i.e. from 45.9% in 2000 to 48.5% in 2007.   
 
Under such a pattern of economic development, China needs more and more 
consumption of energy.  From 2000 to 2007, the energy consumed in China for 
producing the ethylene, the cement and the steel all increased by over 90%.  In 2007, 
the Chinese heavy industry consumed about 91% of the energy and about 89% of the 
electricity supplied to all industrial sectors.  Meanwhile, in the same year, the 
Chinese industrial sector consumed around 71% of the total energy and around 75% 
of the total power supplied for the whole country.  Actually, over the past 10 years in 
China, the average industrial power consumption for each unit of the value-added is 
around 3.5 times and 8.8 times of the agriculture sector and the service sector 
respectively.  He and Zhang (2005) have the similar understanding and argued that 
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the main reason for the recent rise in the energy-intensity could be due to the growth 
of the proportion of the heavy-industries out of the GDP in China.   
 
This argument is consistent with our evidence in Table 5.12 that a significant increase 
in the power consumption can be attributed to the Chinese industry restructuring 
process towards a more heavy-industry dominant structure.  By having more heavy 
industry outputs in the economy, it produces two effects on consumption of power: (a) 
the power intensity effect and (b) the production volume effect.  And increase in 
outputs from heavy industry will change the overall average of power consumption 
intensity in an economy, and the increase in the intensity can lead to a power 
consumption rise.  Recent studies (Rosen and Houser, 2007; Di and Wang, 2008; 
Andrews-Speed, 2009; Kahrl and Roland-Holst, 2009) found that the energy intensity 
of China started to rise up again in recent years.  From 2000 to 2004, the industrial 
energy intensity of China increased by around 10%.  Meanwhile, the industrial 
power intensity in China grows even faster.  From 2000 to 2007, in China, the power 
intensity of the production of the non-metal materials increased by around 33%, while 
the power intensity of the overall industrial sector increased by 23.75%.   
 
For given the power intensity, increasing production volume will increase power 
consumption.  Especially, this is significantly true for the heavy industry.  The 
heavy industry needs a large scale-of-economies, which drives up production to 
massive quantities and so pushing up power consumption.  For instance, over the last 
three decades, industrial outputs have grown by 22 times, and steel production has 
alone increased by almost 3 times from 2000 to 2007 (see Table 5.13).  This explains 
why, with a process of heavy industrialisation, changing economic structure can result 
in a positive impact on power consumption.  This argument is also evident by 
German case where it has a dominant manufacturing sector in the economy.   
 
In contrast, if an economy is under a process of growing its service sector to be more 
and more dominate in the economy, then the change in the economics structure could 
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lead to a reverse impact of the structure on the economy, such as evident by France 
and Japan in our estimation.   
 
The time dummies 
According to the results of the Model 1b, the time dummy for the 2000s has a positive 
relationship with the power consumption.  It means that the growth of the power 
consumption in China would accelerate during the 2000s, which would be caused by 
the further reform of the power sector.  By 2002, the Chinese power industry has 
been freed from the single and vertically integrated mechanism, which stimulated the 
vigorous capacity expansion and production (Varley, 2006).   
 
Estimation of Model 2a and 2b 
 
Table 5.14  Estimation Results of Model 2 
A: The Estimation Results of Supply Capacity Model for China 
 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d 
     
  0.2011**  0.1966*  
 
(1.97)  (1.88)  
   0.1703*  0.1864* 
  (1.66)  (1.79) 
  0.5147** 0.5891*** 0.5117*** 0.5759*** 
 (6.87) (9.60) (6.66) (9.09) 
    -0.0084 -0.0194 
   (-0.40) (-0.90) 
  0.0124** 0.0180*** 0.0127* 0.0186*** 
 (1.96) (2.97) (1.95) (3.03) 
  0.0409*** 0.0517*** 0.0445*** 0.0597*** 
 (5.00) (7.48) (3.60) (5.29) 
Constant -2.3221*** -2.6701*** -2.2673*** -2.5178 
 (-6.77) (-9.45) (-6.03) (-7,62) 
  0.8637 0.8573 0.8648 0.8628 
  0.8378 0.8301 0.8310 0.8286 
Observations 26 26 26 26 
Notes: T-statistic significance: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level 
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B: Estimation Results of Supply Capacity Model 2 for selected OECD Countries 
 US Germany Italy UK France Japan 
       
  -0.1483 0.2546 -0.2550 0.6339** 0.2586 0.0275 
 (-0.60) (0.50) (-1.13) (2.00) (0.63) (0.23) 
  0.1969*** 0.4468*** 0.2120*** 0.2880** 0.2342* 0.1229* 
 (2.58) (3.23) (3.38) (2.28) (1.74) (1.94) 
  0.1283 0.1156 -0.0456 0.2095** 0.2729* 0.0737** 
 (0.96) (0.96) (-1.16) (2.06) (1.81) (2.35) 
 0.0055 0.0457 0.0094 0.0022 -0.0121 N/A 
 (0.42) (0.66) (1.37) (0.65) (-0.32) N/A 
  -0.0366*** 0.0576** -0.0014 -0.0257 -0.0632*** -0.0049 
 (-2.48) (2.33) (-0.20) (-1.52) (-3.41) (-0.76) 
  -0.0022 0.0662*** -0.0010 -0.0425* -0.0958*** -0.1414*** 
 (-0.15) (2.74) (-0.12) (-1.82) (-3.30) (-2.92) 
Constant -0.8600** -2.042*** -0.9360 -1.3271** -2.2369*** -0.8681*** 
 (-2.52) (-3.24) (-3.26) (-2.32) (-2.38) (-2.76) 
  0.4721 0.4260 0.4286 0.6019 0.6168 0.6596 
  0.3463 0.2893 0.2926 0.5072 0.5256 0.5822 
Observations 28 28 27 27 27 28 
Notes: T-statistic significance: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level 
Note: Germany uses  and ; Japan uses  and 
, as  of Japan is stationary; France uses  .   
 
The power consumption 
According to Table 5.14, as expected by the function of power supply capacity, the 
demand shocks have a significant impact on capacity in the long run, evident by the 
Chinese case.  For instance, 1% increase in power consumption leads to some 0.20% 
increase in capacity two years after in China.  This result is consistent when we 
replace the consumption variable with GDP in the estimation, in which GDP has a 
direct impact on the consumption.   
 
However, in contrast, the significantly positive impact of GDP on capacity cannot be 
observed for OECD countries except the UK.  One explanation for China to have a 
significant response of capacity to GDP is because of Country‟s poor transmission and 
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distribution network.  Kroeber (2008) pointed out that due to the poor transmission 
between different regions, it is difficult for power transmitted from one region to 
another, creating a phenomenon that power shortage and power surplus co-exists in 
the economy. In response to the structure shortage of power, more generating capacity 
has to be built near the big users, which is “in excess of actual underlying demand”.  
Thus, it is unavoidable for the repeated and duplicated building of power plants in 
different regions, making capacity highly responsive to change in GDP.   
 
China is responsive to demand shocks by promoting capacity expansion but the 
responsiveness is not high, where 1% growth in demand only brings up 0.2% growth 
in supply capacity.  The inelasticity of capacity with respect to GDP can be 
explained by two reasons.  One is of replacement investment, which replaces small 
power plants with big ones.  Another is of capacity surplus at an aggregate level, in 
which the surplus can absorb excessive demand to some extent.   
 
In terms of the replacement effect, China promotes the replacement of small power 
plants with the big ones via new investment.  This replacement creates productive 
efficiency gains for given capacity, since the big is more efficient than the small.  
The efficiency gains means more productivity and so more outputs that can be 
produced in using the same amount of capacity.  This enables 1% growth of new 
capacity to server more than 1% growth of demand.  The extra capacity gained from 
using more efficient facilities could be significant at an aggregate level for China 
since more than 90% of power firms are small, see Table 5.15.   
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Number Capacity (MW) Number Capacity (MW) 
The UK 
  
  Plants > 1000 MW 30  48,251  31  49,130  
Total 264  77,504  320  78,293  
Per cent 11.36% 62.26% 9.69% 62.75% 
China 
  
  Plants > 1000 MW 129  192,930  
  
Total 3,078  508,410  
  
Per cent 4.19% 37.95% 
  Source: Digest of United Kingdom energy statistics 2006 & 2009, Department of Energy & Climate 
Change of the UK, Table 5.11;  National Bureau of Statistics of China; China Electric Power Yearbook 
2006; “Annual Report of Power Industry in China 2008”, China Economic Information Network, pp. 75 
 
In terms of the surplus effect on capacity, it is obvious.  Table 5.16 shows that there 
is some 50% of capacity that have not been utilised, which helps absorb excess 
demand shocks.  As a result, this weakens the responses of capacity to changes in 
GDP.   
 
Table 5.16  The Spare Power Capacity in China (2008) 
 
% out of  
total capacity 
Load factor 
Thermal efficiency  
(gross calorific value basis) 
 
% % % 
UK 
   
Combined cycle gas turbine stations 34.66 69.3 51.9 
Coal fired stations 30.26 40.5 36 
Nuclear stations 14.36 49.4 37.9 
Overall 100 55.71 42.7 
China 
   
Combined cycle gas turbine stations 0 0 NA 
Coal fired stations 77.15 51.2 NA 
Nuclear stations 2.27 56.7 NA 
Overall 100 51.74 35.21 
Source: The UK data are collected from the Department of Energy & Climate Change of the UK; The Chinese data are 
collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
The load factor 
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As predicted by the capacity function, the load factor is surprisingly strong across all 
of our sample countries including China.  The average load factor of an economy 
implies a state of demand for power since the higher load factor implies the higher 
consumption of electricity.  Apparently, the load factor driving capacity appears in 
every sample country, which appears as a strong international phenomenon in every 
power industry.  The capacity is very responsive to the change in the load factor. For 
instance, in China, 1% increase in the load factor can be responded by 0.59% growth 
of the capacity.  For most of OECD countries, the capacity elasticity with respect to 
the factor is around 0.2.   
 
The dominant impact of the load factor on capacity suggests that a power industry 
does respond to the change in demand through the consumption impact on the 
capacity utilisation of the industry.  The industry does not respond directly to the 
demand shocks in adjusting its long-run supply, except China.  Furthermore, the 
industry is likely not to respond to the change in demand at all if the change does not 
increase the utilisation of the capacity.  That is to say, as long as demand for power 
affects the utilisation, then the industry responds to the demand.  This finding 
suggests that the impact of demand on capacity is indirect.  One possible explanation 
is that, the decision maker may feel uncertain about the future‟s power demand when 
they are making the investment decision.  And the most reliable indicator for the 
power firms is the load factor, which provides a direct and clear record of the power 
surplus and shortages.  It could be especially true for the OECD countries, which 
have experienced the “de-industrialisation”.   
 
The electricity price 
In general, an increase in the price of electricity shall be responded by the firm 
positively to produce more by expanding its capacity in the long run. This expectation 
is evident by Germany, France and Japan, but not in other economies.  The evidence 
shows that the price impact on capacity can be country-specific.  This implies that 
using the price as a policy instrument to promote the growth of power supply in the 
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long run is likely to be in question except an economy possesses the economic 
characteristics of the three OECD countries.   
 
One possible explanation to the failure of the price in affecting the long run supply in 
the EU is because of the electricity cross-board trading, which is a result of the power 
market integration.  A rise in the price in one region could shift demand for power to 
other regions, and therefore it is difficult to expect the supply will increase in 
response to the price since demand could fall as a result of the substitution effect.  
For instance, Italy imported 16% of total electricity consumption from other EU 
countries in 2007 and it is expected that the imports could further increase to 
substitute domestic supply if the price continues arising.   
 
In China, the electricity price does not affect the capacity of power supply.  This may 
be due to the price variable we employed for the estimation, which is of end-users.  
A change in the end-user price will not affect power firms but the grids, since Chinese 
power firms only sell their power to the grids at an on-grid price.  The re-selling 
price of power by the grid does not affect the benefits of up-stream power firms since 
revenues from sales to end-users are all taken by the grids.  As a result, the 
separation of power generation from the grid in the Chinese current model will limit a 
role of electricity price as a signal in directing supply in the long run.  However, this 
does not mean that the price cannot affect supply at all.  What we suggest is that the 
capacity impact of the end prices is not direct but indirect, through affecting the 
demand for power on supply.  As the on-grid price was only formed in 2000s, the 
time-series data could be relatively short for regression model.  The relationship 
between the on-grid price and the supply capacity will be tested by using the panel 
data in the upcoming study, but not in the scope of this study.   
 
The power exports 
In our estimation presented in Table 5.14, exports do not appear significantly in 
determining capacity.  China has a few exports of power, so that we do not estimate 
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it in estimation for it.  For other OECD countries, it seems to suggest that exports do 
not play a significant role in stimulating capacity expansion directly.  The 
non-significance of exports seems to appear as general evidence across all of sample 
countries.   
 
Since opening cross-board trades in the electric power market, we understand that 
France is an electricity exporting nation in the EU.  In 2007, France exported 16.7 
GWh and 15.1 GWh power to Germany and Italy, which are equal to 49% of its total 
export.  Actually, from 2001 to 2007, France exported around 16% of its production 
on average to other countries.  Therefore, we expect that the export impact should 
have an impact on capacity in the French case, but it fails in identifying it in our 
estimation.  The possible explanation is that any increase in the power export could 
be satisfied through various ways, such as increasing the utilisation of the capacity, 
building more capacity, and cutting down the domestic usage of the power, and even 
importing the power from other countries for reselling on the market.  And all those 
factors make the results of the capacity expansion become insignificant.   
 
The time dummies 
The dummies for 1990s and 2000s have some positive significant relationship with 
the growth of capacity in terms of China.  It means that the growth of the power 
supply capacity in China is booming in past two decades.   
 
5.4.  Conclusions 
What determines power supply in the long run?  The committable supply is of 
capacity.  China‟s power supply capacity has been increased by 12 times over the 
last 3 decades, the capacity doubled around every 10 years on average. How can 
China achieve such rapid growth over a long time period?  Can we learn any generic 
experience for other economies?  A general view from existing literature is that 
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power consumption and economic growth are related with each other.  But which 
determines which is not addressed very clearly.  Some argue it is power to drive 
economic growth and some reverses.  However, there is a lack of a rigorous study on 
directly examining a relationship between supply capacity and economic growth, in 
particular, via quantitative examination.  The chapter fills the gap.   
 
China liberalises market any entry and investment on building power plants, but still 
remains state plan control over prices and outputs for each power firm.  The output 
of a firm is allocated according to its capacity (see Chapter 4).  With the price 
regulation and the linkage of plan output with the capacity of the firm, in response to 
demand, the profit-seeking power firm will complete capacity of the firm in order to 
gain more plan outputs and so profits.  The lower plan price will further accelerate 
demand and so stimulate capacity.  Therefore, the Chinese reformed plan 
management model of the power supply can be characterised by which “the state plan 
a lower price of power to promote economic growth and so increase demand, and the 
more demand stimulates the industry to expand capacity for more profits”.   
 
This is contrast to the market-based management system of the industry in response to 
increasing demand by raising both prices and supply, and the price rise limits further 
rise in demand.  China increase supply but not price, so demand grows further.   
 
This argument is evident by our study in this chapter: (1) demand is responsive to the 
prices, in which this is almost a generic phenomenon across countries including China; 
(2) the GDP growth is a driving factor to demand for power consumption , in which 
this factor is particular significant in China; (3) the economic structure adds further 
impact on demand for power consumption, although this impact is country-specific, 
such as China that has been experiencing heavy industrialisation over the last 10 years; 
(4) an increase in power consumption can change the capacity utilisation of the 
industry, promoting further investment in capacity.   
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The evidence above together with findings identified by the last chapter show us a 
clear pattern of China‟s reformed plan model of the power management: to lead the 
industry to compete capacity but not the price, and the low plan price promotes 
growth and so demand, in which the demand leads the industry to decide capacity.  
Clearly, both market and plan play a role in stimulating supply.  This is why the 
reformed plan system can be successful in stimulating supply, and challenging the 
conventional wisdom of the plan creating shortage.   
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Chapter 6.  Conclusions 
The electric power industry is very important for the economic growth of a country, 
particular for China, which has been experiencing the heavy-industrialisation over the 
last 10 years.  The existing studies, such as Wu and Li (1995), Li and Dorian (1995), 
Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000), Yeoh and Rajaraman (2004), Hafsi and Tian (2005), 
and Wang (2007), argued that the plan will result in the high generation costs and low 
thermal efficiency, and power shortage, and then promote a market-oriented 
mechanism to the Chinese policy makers without stating the potential risks of market 
failure and its possible impacts on the industry that this has been experienced by the 
US and noticed by the Western researchers.  A series of studies (Thomas, 2003; 
Graham, 2006; Sweeting, 2007) argued that the dominant generators could obtain the 
extra gain from the market in the West.  But those studies didn‟t refer to the case of 
China.  So a question is raised.  Can the market approach really work in China, in 
terms of stimulating the power supply and productive efficiency and as asserted?  In 
order to address this, our study makes a comprehensive comparison of prices and 
costs of the power supply between China and the OECD countries.  It finds that the 
reformed plan can provide an effective power supply with better protection of the 
small consumers‟ benefits.  In order to explain this further, the investigation into the 
pricing behaviour is needed.  Unfortunately, very few studies focused on this topic, 
except Lam (2004).  He studied the catalogue price in China and argued that the 
electricity prices across China are mainly determined by short-run cost factors.  But 
this study only depicted the situation before the form of independent power producers 
in China.  In order to fill the research gap, we use the on-grid prices to estimate 
southern Chinese provinces over the period from 2003 to 2005, which provides an 
in-depth and extensive view on the price setting of the power supply in China.  
Besides, the capacity expansion is also an important issue for China‟s power supply.  
A general view from the existing literature (Lin, 2003; Shiu and Lam, 2004; Rosen, 
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2007; Kroeber, 2008) is that the power consumption and economic growth are related 
with each other.  But which determines which is not addressed very clearly, where 
some argue it is power to drive economic growth and some reverses.  Besides, there 
is also a lack of a rigorous study on directly examining a relationship between supply 
capacity and economic growth.  This study fills the gap with the rigours model and 
the international comparison with the OECD countries.  The whole study attempts to 
remind the fact that plan may not be always inferior while the market may not be 
always superior in promoting a successful electric power supply system for a nation.   
 
6.1.  Findings and contributions 
Since the 1980s, China has started its long march of economic reform in all industrial 
sectors including the electric power sector.  On one hand, the Chinese power sector 
has been restructured in line with market-oriented reform, such as the separation 
between the grids and generators, opening market entry to power generation business, 
decentralising decision on investment from the state to the power company, and the 
self-accountability of the profits of the power producers.  On another, the features of 
the plan economy still remain.  The transmission, distribution and retailing of the 
electric power are still integrated together under the control of the grids.  The on-grid 
price and the catalogue price of the electricity, the electricity coal price, and the output 
of the power generation are still under the governmental plan control.  In other 
words, the current Chinese power sector is different from the highly integrated 
mechanism under the plan economy, but still far away from the fully unbundling 
market system.  During such transitional process, it‟s very important for the policy 
makers to design, adjust and update the reform schemes carefully, promptly and 
flexibly, so as to respond to the current issues effectively.  In order to pursue a 
suitable reform, we need to learn the lessons and experiences from the past 
internationally.   
 
  227 
Since the reform, the Chinese power sector supply has grown rapidly for last three 
decades, with both the cost and price advantages of generation when compared with 
the West.  Besides, the household price in China was set to the same level of the 
industrial price, which promotes the household benefits better than the West.  
Generally speaking, the reform of the Chinese power industry has achieved great 
successes, in terms of growth, security, sustainable development and affordability of 
the power supply for its economic growth.  As China adopts a mixed plan and 
market economy, the state needs to plan prices to balance the benefits of all of interest 
parties in the supply chain of the electric power, including the coal suppliers, the 
power suppliers, the grids, and the industrial and household users.   
 
At a macro level, China relies upon the coal-fired power heavily.  It generates some 
80% of China‟s total electricity.  And, at the micro level, the fuel costs account a 
substantial part of the generation cost of the coal-fired plant.  Thus, the electricity 
coal price is critical to decide the electricity price.  In order to lower down the 
electricity price, the state sets the electricity coal price below the market coal price.  
However, the cheaper plan coal price does not create incentives for the coal producers 
to sell coal in excess of the plan target to the power producers.  And, the power 
generators have to procure the coal from the market to produce excessive output 
above the plan targets.  Due to the rigidity of plan prices for power producer in 
selling their power, a rise in the coal price will erode the profitability of the power 
producers, which will reduce their incentives to produce more to meet excessive 
demand for power.  Therefore, the shortage of power supply and capacity surplus 
can co-exist in the economy.  This is just an example of the phenomena of the 
Chinese power sector that has still been in plan.  Through our study in this thesis, 
more interesting phenomena are identified for the reformed plan system:   
 
1) The high cost strategy for price bargain 
Inevitably, the integration of power production with coal-mining would be a right 
choice to help the state eliminate the problem of conflict of interest on pricing, where 
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the inflation of the fuel costs can be transferred to the on-grid prices.  Through the 
estimation of the panel data of the coal-fired plants in the southern Chinese provinces, 
we found that the power producers would take the “high cost strategy” to bargain with 
the government for higher prices of the electricity.  Obviously, such behaviour of the 
firms would induce the slack budgets and cost inefficiency of the power generation, 
which would offset their cost advantages.  This price setting in line with costs 
creates a soft price constraint on costs of the firm.   
 
2) The better protection of the benefits for the small consumers 
Obviously, the electricity price is not set for the power sector only, but also for the 
economic development of the whole country.  With the estimation of the time-series 
model, we found that the high electricity price would be welcomed by the power 
suppliers, but it would also supress the power consumption of the end users.  
However, if the end price is set too low to cover the increase in the on-grid price, the 
grids would suffer.  With the international comparison, we found that China adopts a 
different strategy of the end user price from the West, to secure the competitiveness of 
the industrial production and also protect the benefits for the small consumers.  
China sets the household price of electricity lower than the West in an absolute term.  
Although China has a lot of cost advantages, this does not help China gain significant 
cost advantage in supply of power to the industrial production when compared with 
the West.  For example, China has lower costs of investments, fuel, labour and 
environmental protection.  Thus means that China limits the profits for the power 
industry in order to protect the benefits for both industrial and household users.  In 
contrast, some OECD countries allow power producers or traders to charge small 
household users twice more than the industrial users.  Apparently, price 
discrimination in China is used for providing subsidies to the poor, but the 
discrimination is adopted to make more profits in particular at expense of 
small-quantity users‟ welfare.  Thus, it‟s reasonable to argue that the plan mechanism 
in the Chinese power industry better protects the benefits for the small consumers 
than some market-mechanism-based OECD countries.  Therefore, the plan is not 
  229 
always evil and market is not always successful for protection of the small consumers‟ 
benefits, and promotion of outputs.   
 
3) The competition in capacity 
As mentioned above, the price and output are controlled by the government.  It 
means that the electricity price is not determined by the equilibrium of the demand 
and supply.  It also implies that there is no competition in the electricity price, as 
there is no market mechanism in the Chinese power sector.  It has been exactly 
proved by the insignificant relationship between the electricity price and the regional 
market share of the plant.  However, the government restriction on capacity 
investment into the power generation sector was removed at the very beginning of the 
economic reform, which stimulates capacity expansion.  According to the previous 
studies, the power supply was thought to be the bottleneck of the economic 
development in China.  But, in turn, economic growth could demand for more power 
supply, as shown by our empirical evidence in this study that the power consumption 
is driven by GDP in China.  However, output is planned by the state for each firm 
according to its capacity.  For given plan price, the firm‟s profits can be increased by 
asking more plan outputs, which drives the firm to increase capacity.  As long as the 
demand is there, the capacity increase can always help gain more outputs.  The 
positive relationship between capacity and power consumption in China exactly 
confirmed such demand-capacity-outputs link in China‟s power industrial 
development.  For the power producers, the larger capacity will bring the larger 
quota of the output and the cheaper electricity coal, which could easily converted to 
the higher revenue and profits.  Thus, competition among the power producers is not 
the price but the capacity expansion for making more profits.   
 
How does the firm respond to more demand?  Western firms respond to it by 
increasing both prices and supply capacity.  But the price rise will provide a counter 
force for bringing down demand and so slow down supply, so that capacity will not 
have a rapid increase.  In contrast, the Chinese counterpart will respond to demand 
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by not changing price but purely increasing supply.  Thanks for plan that retains the 
low price, which removes the counter force to limit demand growth and so supply, so 
that capacity can grow rapidly in response to demand that is fuelled up by a lower 
plan price.  Apparently, China takes pro-economic-growth policy to manage power 
supply, which is very different from a market-based power management system.   
 
6.2.  Implications for future reform 
Although the Chinese power sector has achieved dramatic expansion, the current plan 
mechanism of the Chinese power supply is not perfect.  According to the analysis 
above, we could derive some implications for the reform of the power supply system 
in the future:   
 
1) The price freedom of the power supply chain  
As mentioned above, the “coal-power linkage” increases the on-grid price, which 
would erode the profits of the grids.  Some previous studies claimed that 
governmental control over the electricity price should be fully removed so that the 
inflation in the coal price will be able to pass to the end users.  We should notice the 
consequence of such kind of action.  Obviously, the removal of the governmental 
control over the electricity and coal prices would be very helpful for the participants 
on the power supply chain to realise higher profits.  According to the Western 
experience, the market dominators would simply exert their market power to set 
higher price for higher profits at the expenses of the benefits of the end users of the 
electric power.  Due to the insufficient facilities of the transmission network in China, 
it‟s very easy for the large power producer to take the monopoly or duopoly position 
in a particular region.  So, if the governmental control of the electricity price were 
completely removed, it‟s reasonable to expect that the similar results in the West 
could happen in China.   
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Another concern is about the efficiency of the energy utilisation.  The advocators of 
the price liberalisation argued that the increase in the end price will push the end users 
to enhance the efficiency of the energy utilisation in China.  And they prefer the 
increase in the household price rather than the industrial price, in order to promote the 
energy-savings technology for the household use.  As most of the power is supplied 
to industrial users rather than the household users, the energy save in the household 
usage will be very limited under such arrangement.  In another aspect, if the 
industrial price doesn‟t increase, the industrial users will not be pushed to improve 
their energy efficiency, as there is no the pressure from the increase of the electricity 
price.   
 
However, no matter who undertakes the inflation of the electricity price, the 
immediate consequence of the full price liberalisation in the power supply chain 
would be either the losses in the industrial competition or the losses in the industrial 
competiveness or the losses in benefits for small consumers.   
 
2) The insufficient facilities of the grids and the excessive capacity of the power 
generation 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the grids facilities are insufficient in China to 
undertake the tasks of the power transmission from the energy-rich inland regions to 
the economy-advanced coastal regions.  It would result in poor utilisation and 
allocation of the social resources.  On one hand, the power producers have to build 
the excessive capacity of the power generation repeatedly in the high-power-demand 
regions.  On another, the energy source in the energy-rich regions could not be able 
to get fully developed.  Besides, the transport of the energy source, like coal, would 
again increase the fuel cost.  Thus, it's not strange to find the co-existence of the 
capacity surplus and the power shortages in China.  The best solution for this 
structure shortage problem would be further investment in transmission facilities, 
rather than more power generation capacities.  So, the proper distribution of the 
profits on the power supply chain should be carefully designed to attract the 
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investments into the power transmission sector.   
 
3) The risks of the capacity idle in the economic downturn 
The existing literature suggests that the economic growth would continue, as long as 
more electric power would be supplied.  However, this study revealed another fact 
that the economic growth would also impact the power consumption in China.  The 
empirical evidence shows that, more power will be supplied and consumed in the 
economy-expansion periods.  The high power demand would deliver the positive 
signal to the power producers to build more generation capacity.  However, as 
mentioned previously, the industrial sector is the largest consumer of the power 
supply in China, and also the largest contributor of the economy in China.  The 
global economy downturn will heavily strike the manufacturing industry in China, 
which would then result in the decline in the power demand and power production.  
It could be especially true at the present, and the newly-built capacity would face the 
idleness during the current economy downturn.  There is a risk that the rapid 
capacity expansion in recent years would induce considerable economic pressure 
upon the power producers in China in foreseeable future.   
 
6.3.  Further studies 
As mentioned above, China heavily relies on the coal-fired power generation, which 
is a large polluter of environment.  In order to improve its energy profile and protect 
environment, China must take several actions, such as changing the structure of the 
power supply, closing the small power plants and implementing advanced 
technologies to improve the efficiency of the power generation.  Thus, how much 
will the technological change affect the productivity of the Chinese power generation 
sector?  And how much will those actions of the environmental protection improve 
the overall energy profile in China?  Those questions need to be addressed in the 
future research.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1  The Power Self-sufficiency and the Industrial Value-added at Provincial Level in China 




Industrial Value Added 
per Capita (1000 Yuan) 
Power Generation 
to Consumption 
Industrial Value Added 
per Capita (1000 Yuan) 
Beijing 0.32 11.32 0.34 11.17 
Tianjin 0.83 21.25 0.79 22.63 
Hebei 1.49 5.63 0.76 6.14 
Shanxi 1.43 6.16 1.28 6.69 
Inner Mongolia 2.89 6.73 1.63 7.99 
Liaoning 0.83 8.99 0.78 10.00 
Jilin 1.10 5.15 1.06 5.83 
Heilongjiang 1.11 6.64 1.09 7.10 
Shanghai 0.72 24.27 0.68 24.05 
Jiangsu 0.91 13.40 0.89 14.49 
Zhejiang 0.97 11.55 0.90 12.18 
Anhui 1.13 2.86 1.10 3.24 
Fujian 1.04 7.44 1.04 8.19 
Jiangxi 0.99 2.66 0.88 3.08 
Shandong 1.17 11.98 1.05 13.34 
Henan 1.18 4.50 1.04 5.18 
Hubei 1.60 4.05 1.58 4.57 
Hunan 1.08 3.12 0.92 3.55 
Guangdong 1.45 11.36 0.88 12.22 
Guangxi 1.49 2.24 1.11 2.55 
Hainan 1.75 2.43 1.14 2.86 
Chongqing 0.73 2.98 0.77 3.39 
Sichuan 1.49 3.29 1.01 3.83 
Guizhou 2.95 1.84 2.13 1.96 
Yunnan 2.03 2.69 1.36 2.80 
Tibet 1.16 0.74 1.03 0.83 
Shaanxi 1.15 4.30 1.12 4.74 
Gansu 1.04 2.95 0.99 3.20 
Qinghai 1.22 4.36 1.04 4.79 
Ningxia 1.02 4.30 1.02 4.57 
Xinjiang 1.36 5.58 1.03 5.82 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value added, the power generation and power consumption from the Development 
Research Centre of the State Council; the population data from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Appendix 2.2  The Electricity End Price and the Economic Power Efficiency at Provincial Level in China 
 2006 2007 
Province Industrial Value Added 





Industrial Value Added 





Beijing 2.93 0.53 2.74 0.63 
Tianjin 5.27 0.53 5.10 0.54 
Hebei 4.05 0.44 2.11 0.46 
Shanxi 2.03 0.41 1.68 0.42 
Inner Mongolia 3.41 0.35 1.73 0.34 
Liaoning 3.18 0.51 3.16 0.52 
Jilin 3.51 0.49 3.44 0.53 
Heilongjiang 4.44 0.48 4.32 0.52 
Shanghai 4.46 0.65 4.17 0.66 
Jiangsu 4.22 0.59 3.74 0.59 
Zhejiang 3.44 0.57 2.82 0.57 
Anhui 2.72 0.50 2.57 0.51 
Fujian 3.04 0.49 2.93 0.49 
Jiangxi 2.88 0.51 2.63 0.52 
Shandong 5.61 0.48 4.83 0.49 
Henan 3.19 0.43 2.68 0.43 
Hubei 2.79 0.52 2.63 0.53 
Hunan 3.04 0.50 2.57 0.51 
Guangdong 6.44 0.68 4.00 0.69 
Guangxi 3.33 0.45 2.19 0.46 
Hainan 3.76 0.62 2.55 0.61 
Chongqing 2.26 0.51 2.14 0.53 
Sichuan 3.40 0.47 2.64 0.49 
Guizhou 2.10 0.38 1.35 0.39 
Yunnan 3.61 0.39 2.05 0.39 
Tibet 1.59 0.51 1.60 0.51 
Shaanxi 3.19 0.42 2.78 0.43 
Gansu 1.52 0.36 1.36 0.37 
Qinghai 1.06 0.29 0.93 0.31 
Ningxia 0.68 0.36 0.63 0.38 
Xinjiang 4.83 0.42 3.10 0.45 
Source: The provincial data of the industrial value-added, the electricity end price the power generation 
and power consumption are obtained from the Development Research Centre of the State Council. 
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  Unit 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Total Unit Cost Yuan/MWh 118.05  204.96  179.57  230.63  197.64  203.07  391.49  
Unit Cost of Sales Yuan/MWh 115.43  204.86  179.81  231.67  188.37  200.50  378.70  
Unit Variable Costs Yuan/MWh 69.94  133.14  125.28  164.92  125.89  139.01  NA 
Unit Fuel Costs Yuan/MWh 68.95  126.84  120.40  164.92  125.69  137.44  205.32  
Unit Water Costs Yuan/MWh 0.98  6.30  4.88  0.00  0.20  1.57  NA 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA 
Unit Fixed Costs Yuan/MWh 45.49  71.72  54.53  66.75  62.47  61.50  NA 
Unit Material Costs Yuan/MWh 4.00  4.98  3.83  4.20  3.04  3.68  NA 
Unit Salary Yuan/MWh 11.24  23.93  10.67  120.03  12.07  12.12  17.49  
Unit Depreciation Yuan/MWh 8.08  16.39  18.50  31.11  24.92  25.06  21.86  
Unit Maintenance Expenses Yuan/MWh 9.73  6.09  3.93  5.99  10.49  6.94  23.12  
Unit Transportation Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Other Unit Costs Yuan/MWh 12.44  20.33  17.61  11.96  11.95  13.69  59.56  
Unit Business Taxes Yuan/MWh 1.34  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.09  0.00  
Unit Other Profit Yuan/MWh 0.64  1.04  0.30  3.95  0.26  1.84  49.56  
Unit Administrative Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  11.44  
Unit Financial Expenses Yuan/MWh 1.37  1.10  0.17  2.25  9.37  3.67  51.48  
Unit Interest Paid Yuan/MWh 1.42  1.16  0.09  5.66  9.55  5.33  67.05  
Unit Interest Received Yuan/MWh 0.05  0.09  0.07  3.51  0.18  1.74  15.57  
Unit Subsidies Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Unit Non-operational Income Yuan/MWh 0.10  0.24  1.34  0.01  0.01  0.41  1.66  
Unit Non-Operational Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.66  0.44  1.19  0.42  0.17  0.57  NA  
Electricity Price Yuan/MWh 134.39  203.84  195.59  275.08  248.16  241.23  363.93  
Total Unit Cost Yuan/MWh 118.05  204.96  179.57  230.63  197.64  203.07  391.49  
Unit Profit before Taxation Yuan/MWh 16.34  (1.12) 16.02  44.45  50.52  38.16  (27.56) 
Dark Spread Yuan/MWh 73.45  89.31  85.95  118.47  127.57  103.79  158.61 
Unit Institutional and Managerial Costs Yuan/MWh 9.42  16.39  18.50  31.36  24.92  25.65  33.30  
Unit Income Taxation Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.32  44.45  3.90  2.61  (23.25) 
Unit Minority Interests Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  26.92  0.00  
Unit Gross Profit Yuan/MWh 17.63  (1.02) 15.78  43.16  59.79  40.64  158.61  
Unit Operational Profit Yuan/MWh 16.90  (1.08) 15.90  44.86  50.68  38.31  36.44  
Unit Net Profit Yuan/MWh 16.34  (1.12) 15.70  0.00  46.62  8.62  (4.31) 
Interest Rate % 4.58% 2.08% NA 6.67% 5.81% 4.46% 8.00% 
Coal Equivalent Price Yuan/Tonne 182.42  323.38  349.50  476.68  372.76  401.14 NA 
Coal Price Yuan/Tonne 109.95 187.68 218.11 361.87 273.01 282.45 587.85  
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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  Unit 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Total Unit Cost % 87.84% 100.55% 91.81% 83.84% 79.64% 84.18% 107.57% 
Unit Cost of Sales % 85.89% 100.50% 91.93% 84.22% 75.91% 83.12% 104.06% 
Unit Variable Costs % 52.04% 65.31% 64.05% 59.95% 50.73% 57.63% NA 
Unit Fuel Costs % 51.31% 62.22% 61.56% 59.95% 50.65% 56.98% 56.42% 
Unit Water Costs % 0.73% 3.09% 2.49% 0.00% 0.08% 0.65% NA 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Fixed Costs % 33.85% 35.18% 27.88% 24.27% 25.17% 25.49% NA 
Unit Material Costs % 2.98% 2.44% 1.96% 1.53% 1.23% 1.52% NA 
Unit Salary % 8.36% 11.74% 5.46% 43.64% 4.86% 5.03% 4.81% 
Unit Depreciation % 6.02% 8.04% 9.46% 11.31% 10.04% 10.39% 6.01% 
Unit Maintenance Expenses % 7.24% 2.99% 2.01% 2.18% 4.23% 2.88% 6.35% 
Unit Transportation Expenses % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other Unit Costs % 9.26% 9.97% 9.00% 4.35% 4.82% 5.67% 16.37% 
Unit Business Taxes % 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 
Unit Other Profit % 0.48% 0.51% 0.15% 1.44% 0.11% 0.76% 13.62% 
Unit Administrative Expenses % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 3.14% 
Unit Financial Expenses % 1.02% 0.54% 0.09% 0.82% 3.78% 1.52% 14.15% 
Unit Interest Paid % 1.06% 0.57% 0.04% 2.06% 3.85% 2.21% 18.42% 
Unit Interest Received % 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 1.28% 0.07% 0.72% 0.84% 
Unit Subsidies % 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Unit Non-operational Income % 0.07% 0.12% 0.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 0.46% 
Unit Non-Operational Expenses % 0.49% 0.22% 0.61% 0.15% 0.07% 0.23% NA 
Electricity Price % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Total Unit Cost % 87.84% 100.55% 91.81% 83.84% 79.64% 84.18% 107.57% 
Unit Profit before Taxation % 12.16% -0.55% 8.19% 16.16% 20.36% 15.82% -7.57% 
Dark Spread % 54.65% 43.81% 43.94% 43.07% 51.40% 43% 44% 
Unit Institutional  
and Managerial Costs 
% 7.01% 8.04% 9.46% 11.40% 10.04% 10.63% 9.15% 
Unit Income Taxation % 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 16.16% 1.57% 1.08% -6.39% 
Unit Minority Interests % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.16% 0.00% 
Unit Gross Profit % 13.12% -0.50% 8.07% 15.69% 24.09% 16.85% 43.58% 
Unit Operational Profit % 12.58% -0.53% 8.13% 16.31% 20.42% 15.88% 10.01% 
Unit Net Profit % 12.16% -0.55% 8.03% 0.00% 18.79% 3.57% -1.18% 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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  Unit 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Total Unit Cost % -69.84% -47.65% -54.13% -41.09% -49.52% -48.13% 
Unit Cost of Sales % -69.52% -45.91% -52.52% -38.83% -50.26% -47.05% 
Unit Variable Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Fuel Costs % -66.42% -38.22% -41.36% -19.68% -38.78% -33.06% 
Unit Water Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Fixed Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Material Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Salary % -35.76% 36.80% -38.99% 586.27% -31.01% -30.69% 
Unit Depreciation % -63.02% -25.03% -15.41% 42.30% 14.00% 14.63% 
Unit Maintenance Expenses % -57.94% -73.67% -83.02% -74.09% -54.64% -69.97% 
Unit Transportation Expenses % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Other Unit Costs % -79.11% -65.86% -70.44% -79.92% -79.93% -77.02% 
Unit Business Taxes % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Other Profit % -98.70% -97.90% -99.40% -92.03% -99.47% -96.29% 
Unit Administrative Expenses % -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -95.64% 
Unit Financial Expenses % -97.34% -97.86% -99.67% -95.63% -81.80% -92.88% 
Unit Interest Paid % -97.88% -98.26% -99.87% -91.55% -85.75% -92.05% 
Unit Interest Received % -98.20% -97.12% -97.72% 15.07% -94.00% -43.01% 
Unit Subsidies % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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Unit Non-operational Income % -94.13% -85.44% -19.34% -99.66% -99.62% -75.04% 
Unit Non-Operational Expenses % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Electricity Price % -63.07% -43.99% -46.26% -24.41% -31.81% -33.72% 
Total Unit Cost % -69.84% -47.65% -54.13% -41.09% -49.52% -48.13% 
Unit Profit before Taxation % -159.28% -95.94% -158.12% -261.28% -283.30% -238.44% 
Dark Spread % -54% -44% -46% -25% -20% -35% 
Unit Institutional and Managerial Costs % -71.71% -50.78% -44.46% -5.82% -25.15% -22.98% 
Unit Income Taxation % -100.00% -100.00% -101.36% -291.14% -116.76% -111.24% 
Unit Minority Interests % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Gross Profit % -88.89% -100.64% -90.05% -72.79% -62.30% -74.38% 
Unit Operational Profit % -53.62% -102.96% -56.35% 23.11% 39.09% 5.13% 
Unit Net Profit % -479.37% -74.00% -464.60% -100.00% -1182.62% -300.20% 
Interest Rate pp -42.78% -74.00% NA -16.70% -27.34% -44.22% 
Coal Equivalent Price % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Coal Price % -81% -68% -63% -38% -54% -52% 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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 Unit 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Total Unit Cost Yuan/MWh 140.84  261.74  209.40  248.49  217.88  215.45  376.78  
Unit Cost of Sales Yuan/MWh 139.44  256.90  208.87  246.21  209.08  208.90  454.92  
Unit Variable Costs Yuan/MWh 92.91  179.15  153.70  177.00  156.74  152.01  NA 
Unit Fuel Costs Yuan/MWh 92.04  173.41  148.72  177.00  156.52  150.46  295.41  
Unit Water Costs Yuan/MWh 0.87  5.74  4.98  0.00  0.22  1.55  NA 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  51.28  
Unit Fixed Costs Yuan/MWh 46.54  77.75  55.17  69.21  52.35  56.89  NA  
Unit Material Costs Yuan/MWh 4.21  5.97  3.46  2.97  2.75  3.22  NA  
Unit Salary Yuan/MWh 7.30  21.61  12.08  15.96  12.29  12.50  18.70  
Unit Depreciation Yuan/MWh 10.02  16.20  14.94  29.31  21.89  20.27  19.92  
Unit Maintenance Expenses Yuan/MWh 12.96  11.17  5.68  6.62  6.82  7.37  20.56  
Unit Transportation Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA 
Other Unit Costs Yuan/MWh 12.04  22.79  19.01  14.36  8.59  13.53  48.92  
Unit Business Taxes Yuan/MWh 0.74  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.18  NA 
Unit Other Profit Yuan/MWh 0.67  0.10  0.12  3.21  0.26  1.66  NA 
Unit Administrative Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.54  15.87  
Unit Financial Expenses Yuan/MWh 1.43  4.59  (0.03) 5.08  8.83  2.10  58.42  
Unit Interest Paid Yuan/MWh 1.50  3.07  0.05  4.88  9.01  4.32  73.52  
Unit Interest Received Yuan/MWh 0.07  0.08  0.08  0.30  0.18  2.32  15.10  
Investment Income Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  (4.11) (75.19) 
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Unit Subsidies Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA 
Unit Non-operational Income Yuan/MWh 0.16  0.20  0.42  0.98  0.00  0.41  NA 
Unit Non-Operational Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  169.20  
Unit Other Costs and Expenses Yuan/MWh 0.05  0.56  1.10  1.14  0.23  0.69  NA 
Electricity Price Yuan/MWh 162.93  253.01  227.70  290.49  267.16  247.34  546.17  
Total Unit Cost Yuan/MWh 140.84  261.74  209.40  248.49  217.88  215.45  376.78  
Profit Before Taxation Yuan/MWh 22.10  (8.73) 18.30  42.00  49.28  31.89  169.39  
Unit Gross Profit Yuan/MWh 22.75  (3.89) 18.83  44.03  58.08  38.26  250.04  
Unit Operational Profit Yuan/MWh 21.99  (8.37) 18.97  42.16  49.50  36.28  227.81  
Unit Income Taxation Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  3.15  3.90  1.74  2.46  (12.08) 
Unit Minority Interests Yuan/MWh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.23  0.00  
Unit Profit Yuan/MWh 22.10  (8.73) 15.15  38.11  47.53  24.19  181.47  
Dark Spread Yuan/MWh 82.39  99.55  92.30  122.74  117.84  96.88  250.76 
Unit Institutional  
and Managerial Costs 
Yuan/MWh 10.77  16.20  14.94  29.56  21.89  21.99  35.79  
Interest Rate % 1.16% 3.47% 0.03% 5.09% 5.94% 2.40% 5.55% 
Coal Equivalent Price Yuan/Tonne 243.89  429.92  433.59  515.18  471.90  436.34  NA 
Coal Price Yuan/Tonne 145.40 244.44 271.14 384.87 330.90 293.21 510.61 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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 Unit 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Total Unit Cost % 86.44% 103.45% 91.96% 85.54% 81.56% 87.11% 68.99% 
Unit Cost of Sales % 85.58% 101.54% 91.73% 84.76% 78.26% 84.46% 83.29% 
Unit Variable Costs % 57.02% 70.81% 67.50% 60.93% 58.67% 61.46% NA 
Unit Fuel Costs % 56.49% 68.54% 65.32% 60.93% 58.59% 60.83% 54.09% 
Unit Water Costs % 0.53% 2.27% 2.19% 0.00% 0.08% 0.63% 0.00% 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.39% 
Unit Fixed Costs % 28.56% 30.73% 24.23% 23.83% 19.59% 23.00% NA 
Unit Material Costs % 2.58% 2.36% 1.52% 1.02% 1.03% 1.30% 0.00% 
Unit Salary % 4.48% 8.54% 5.31% 5.49% 4.60% 5.05% 3.42% 
Unit Depreciation % 6.15% 6.40% 6.56% 10.09% 8.19% 8.19% 3.65% 
Unit Maintenance Expenses % 7.96% 4.42% 2.49% 2.28% 2.55% 2.98% 3.77% 
Unit Transportation Expenses % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% NA 
Other Unit Costs % 7.39% 9.01% 8.35% 4.94% 3.21% 5.47% 8.96% 
Unit Business Taxes % 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 
Unit Other Profit % 0.41% 0.04% 0.05% 1.11% 0.10% 0.67% NA 
Unit Administrative Expenses % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.62% 2.91% 
Unit Financial Expenses % 0.88% 1.81% -0.01% 1.75% 3.31% 0.85% 10.7% 
Unit Interest Paid % 0.92% 1.22% 0.02% 1.68% 3.37% 1.75% 13.46% 
Unit Interest Received % 0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 0.07% 0.94% 2.76% 
Investment Income % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.66% -13.77% 
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Unit Subsidies % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unit Non-operational Income % 0.10% 0.08% 0.19% 0.34% 0.00% 0.16% 0.00% 
Unit Non-Operational Expenses % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 30.98% 
Unit Other Costs and Expenses % 0.03% 0.22% 0.48% 0.39% 0.09% 0.28% 0.00% 
Electricity Price % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Total Unit Cost % 86.44% 103.45% 91.96% 85.54% 81.56% 87.11% 68.99% 
Profit Before Taxation % 13.56% -3.45% 8.04% 14.46% 18.44% 12.89% 31.01% 
Unit Gross Profit % 13.96% -1.54% 8.27% 15.16% 21.74% 15.47% 45.78% 
Unit Operational Profit % 13.50% -3.31% 8.33% 14.51% 18.53% 14.67% 41.71% 
Unit Income Taxation % 0.00% 0.00% 1.38% 1.34% 0.65% 1.00% -2.21% 
Unit Minority Interests % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.12% 0.00% 
Unit Net Profit % 13.56% -3.45% 6.65% 13.12% 17.79% 9.78% 33.23% 
Dark Spread % 50.57% 39.35% 40.53% 42.25% 44.11% 39.2% 45.8% 
Unit Institutional 
and Managerial Costs 
% 6.61% 6.40% 6.56% 10.17% 8.19% 8.89% 6.55% 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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Appendix 3.6  Percentage Difference of Unit Costs compared to Drax for the Year 2005 












  Unit 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Total Unit Cost % -62.62% -30.53% -44.42% -34.05% -42.17% -42.82% 
Unit Cost of Sales % -69.35% -43.53% -54.09% -45.88% -54.04% -54.08% 
Unit Variable Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Fuel Costs % -68.84% -41.30% -49.66% -40.08% -47.02% -49.07% 
Unit Water Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Electricity Procurement Costs % -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 
Unit Fixed Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Material Costs % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Salary % -60.96% 15.57% -35.38% -14.68% -34.27% -33.15% 
Unit Depreciation % -49.69% -18.66% -25.03% 47.12% 9.89% 1.75% 
Unit Maintenance Expenses % -36.96% -45.67% -72.39% -67.79% -66.82% -64.18% 
Unit Transportation Expenses % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Other Unit Costs % -75.39% -53.41% -61.14% -70.65% -82.45% -72.34% 
Unit Business Taxes % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Other Profit % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Administrative Expenses % -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -90.27% 
Unit Financial Expenses % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Interest Paid % -97.96% -95.82% -99.93% -93.36% -87.74% -94.13% 
Unit Interest Received % -99.50% -99.45% -99.48% -98.02% -98.81% -84.65% 
Investment Income % -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -94.53% 
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Unit Subsidies % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Non-operational Income % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Non-Operational Expenses % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Other Costs and Expenses % -92% -83% -100% -84% -69% -92% 
Electricity Price % -70.17% -53.68% -58.31% -46.81% -51.08% -54.71% 
Total Unit Cost % -62.62% -30.53% -44.42% -34.05% -42.17% -42.82% 
Profit Before Taxation % -86.95% -105.15% -89.20% -75.20% -70.91% -81.18% 
Unit Gross Profit % -90.90% -101.56% -92.47% -82.39% -76.77% -84.70% 
Unit Operational Profit % -90.35% -103.67% -91.67% -81.49% -78.27% -84.07% 
Unit Income Taxation % -100.00% -100.00% -126.10% -132.25% -114.44% -120.38% 
Unit Minority Interests % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Unit Profit % -87.82% -104.81% -91.65% -79.00% -73.81% -86.67% 
Dark Spread % -67% -60% -63% -51% -53% -61% 
Unit Institutional  and Managerial Costs % -69.92% -54.73% -58.27% -17.42% -38.84% -38.56% 
Interest Rate pp -79.05% -37.56% -99.51% -8.22% 7.11% -56.79% 
Coal Equivalent Price % NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Coal Price % -72% -52% -47% -25% -35% -43% 
Source: 1) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of Drax, and 2) Annual reports 2004 and 2005 of CPID. 
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Appendix 5.1  The Power Intensity by Sector of China and OECD Countries 
Unit: kWh/USD 1971 1980 1981 1990 1991 2000 2006 
China  
Overall 1.3055 1.5428 1.5048 1.3224 1.3158 1.0481 1.28 
Industry 2.1619 2.4045 2.4243 2.0529 1.992 1.3222 1.7051 
Agriculture 0.4595 0.6599 0.6213 0.3987 0.4537 0.4189 0.437 
Service NA NA NA 0.1555 0.1517 0.1605 0.1694 
France  
Overall 0.1906 0.236 0.2431 0.2598 0.2759 0.271 0.2666 
Industry 0.2921 0.2973 0.2935 0.3452 0.3483 0.3885 0.4019 
Agriculture 0.0168 0.0331 0.0345 0.0449 0.0534 0.0634 0.0988 
Service 0.052 0.071 0.0716 0.0917 0.0976 0.0925 0.0979 
Germany  
Overall 0.2755 0.3078 0.3072 0.2806 0.267 0.2375 0.2427 
Industry 0.307 0.3568 0.3597 0.3382 0.3251 0.3313 0.3495 
Agriculture 0.1477 0.2172 0.2205 0.2828 0.3745 0.2823 0.437 
Service 0.0758 0.0756 0.0776 0.0769 0.0842 0.0816 0.0836 
Italy  
Overall 0.1755 0.1831 0.1807 0.193 0.1944 0.2105 0.227 
Industry 0.2793 0.2764 0.2714 0.3049 0.3098 0.376 0.3926 
Agriculture 0.0222 0.0483 0.0551 0.1069 0.1027 0.1321 0.1864 
Service 0.0373 0.0411 0.0423 0.0548 0.0566 0.062 0.0785 
Japan  
Overall 0.2493 0.2537 0.2476 0.2514 0.2508 0.2798 0.2662 
Industry 0.385 0.387 0.3683 0.2818 0.2786 0.3266 0.285 
Agriculture 0.011 0.0154 0.0172 0.0211 0.0196 0.0265 0.0157 
Service 0.0327 0.0471 0.049 0.1203 0.121 0.135 0.1413 
UK  
Overall 0.3377 0.3171 0.3156 0.2856 0.2961 0.2687 0.2389 
Industry 0.2986 0.2693 0.2658 0.2894 0.3081 0.3213 0.3294 
Agriculture 0.1956 0.2369 0.2359 0.2042 0.224 0.3309 0.3086 
Service 0.112 0.1265 0.1288 0.1126 0.1156 0.1007 0.0882 
US 
Overall 0.4736 0.5018 0.5005 0.4712 0.4967 0.4505 0.4152 
Industry 0.528 0.5321 0.5155 0.5404 0.626 0.5935 0.4452 
Agriculture 0.1451 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Service 0.1807 0.21 0.2213 0.2079 0.2084 0.1952 0.1848 
Source: Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) and UN data. 
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Table 5.2  Mix of the Installed Capacity by Types of Generators 
  China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 





















1990 73.86% 26.14% 0.00% 21.93% 23.93% 54.14% 70.02% 7.01% 22.97% 65.92% 33.19% 0.89% 64.18% 19.43% 16.39% 79.15% 5.32% 15.52% 73.16% 12.59% 14.25% 
1991 74.99% 25.01% 0.00% 21.64% 23.71% 54.65% 73.61% 7.23% 19.15% 66.04% 32.96% 1.00% 63.60% 19.56% 16.84% 77.85% 5.98% 16.17% 73.28% 12.63% 14.10% 
1992 75.57% 24.43% 0.00% 21.36% 23.62% 55.03% 72.81% 7.46% 19.72% 67.82% 31.39% 0.79% 63.80% 19.23% 16.97% 76.87% 6.24% 16.89% 73.37% 12.78% 13.85% 
1993 75.62% 24.38% 0.00% 21.79% 23.15% 55.05% 72.26% 7.68% 20.06% 68.24% 30.97% 0.79% 63.05% 18.73% 18.22% 76.31% 6.15% 17.55% 73.33% 12.97% 13.70% 
1994 74.41% 24.54% 1.05% 21.90% 23.31% 54.80% 71.95% 7.70% 20.35% 68.44% 30.77% 0.79% 62.56% 18.94% 18.50% 76.22% 6.11% 17.67% 73.54% 12.93% 13.53% 
1995 75.01% 24.02% 0.97% 22.18% 23.22% 54.60% 71.72% 7.64% 20.64% 69.13% 30.10% 0.77% 62.48% 19.10% 18.42% 75.50% 6.02% 18.48% 73.64% 12.89% 13.48% 
1996 75.62% 23.50% 0.89% 22.25% 22.86% 54.89% 70.91% 7.78% 21.32% 70.11% 29.11% 0.78% 62.59% 18.94% 18.47% 76.32% 5.77% 17.90% 74.02% 12.47% 13.51% 
1997 75.68% 23.49% 0.83% 22.72% 21.98% 55.30% 70.92% 7.75% 21.33% 70.73% 28.32% 0.94% 62.87% 18.27% 18.85% 75.95% 5.86% 18.19% 74.12% 12.58% 13.31% 
1998 75.69% 23.47% 0.84% 22.70% 22.29% 55.01% 70.18% 7.79% 22.03% 71.34% 27.66% 1.01% 63.65% 18.07% 18.28% 76.08% 5.81% 18.11% 74.42% 12.56% 13.02% 
1999 74.78% 24.42% 0.79% 22.83% 21.89% 55.29% 69.16% 7.71% 23.12% 71.19% 27.68% 1.13% 63.91% 18.01% 18.08% 76.70% 5.65% 17.65% 74.70% 12.38% 12.92% 
2000 74.39% 24.85% 0.76% 22.73% 21.91% 55.36% 68.25% 7.59% 24.16% 71.77% 26.94% 1.29% 64.48% 17.78% 17.73% 78.09% 5.45% 16.46% 75.08% 12.17% 12.75% 
2001 74.53% 24.45% 1.02% 23.51% 21.70% 54.80% 66.09% 7.82% 26.10% 71.49% 26.85% 1.65% 64.57% 17.58% 17.85% 78.28% 5.54% 16.19% 77.23% 10.48% 12.28% 
2002 74.47% 24.14% 1.39% 23.88% 21.65% 54.47% 64.23% 7.52% 28.25% 71.27% 26.81% 1.92% 65.04% 17.31% 17.65% 77.67% 5.70% 16.63% 78.79% 9.64% 11.58% 
2003 74.03% 24.25% 1.72% 23.74% 21.59% 54.67% 64.26% 6.60% 29.14% 71.57% 26.38% 2.05% 65.13% 17.26% 17.61% 78.46% 5.46% 16.08% 79.35% 9.60% 11.05% 
2004 73.72% 24.57% 1.71% 23.85% 21.46% 54.69% 62.94% 6.64% 30.42% 72.28% 25.50% 2.21% 65.02% 16.98% 18.00% 78.71% 5.34% 15.95% 79.70% 9.37% 10.94% 
2005 75.56% 22.92% 1.53% 23.12% 21.60% 55.27% 61.08% 6.67% 32.24% 72.71% 24.55% 2.74% 63.92% 17.05% 19.03% 78.26% 5.26% 16.48% 79.75% 9.25% 10.99% 
2006 77.82% 20.67% 1.51% 22.52% 21.61% 55.87% 59.98% 6.84% 33.18% 73.53% 23.55% 2.93% 63.79% 16.99% 19.22% 79.33% 5.11% 15.56% 79.63% 9.21% 11.16% 
2007 77.73% 20.36% 1.91% 22.03% 21.56% 56.41% 58.63% 6.48% 34.89% 73.74% 22.56% 3.70% 63.91% 16.95% 19.15% 79.00% 5.05% 15.95% 79.27% 9.16% 11.56% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) 
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Table 5.3  Mix of the Power Production by Type of Generators 
 China France Germany Italy Japan UK US 





















1990 79.67% 20.33% 0.00% 11.20% 13.63% 75.17% 67.73% 3.60% 28.68% 82.27% 16.20% 1.54% 63.14% 11.38% 25.48% 76.97% 2.25% 20.78% 68.72% 8.98% 22.30% 
1991 81.58% 18.42% 0.00% 13.25% 13.49% 73.26% 68.15% 3.47% 28.38% 77.90% 20.56% 1.54% 61.95% 12.11% 25.94% 76.00% 1.90% 22.09% 68.42% 9.44% 22.14% 
1992 82.56% 17.44% 0.00% 10.84% 15.64% 73.53% 65.30% 3.94% 30.76% 78.01% 20.24% 1.75% 62.87% 10.22% 26.92% 73.52% 2.22% 24.26% 69.12% 8.35% 22.53% 
1993 81.67% 18.02% 0.31% 7.26% 14.36% 78.38% 65.45% 4.12% 30.43% 78.13% 19.96% 1.90% 58.63% 11.88% 29.50% 70.08% 1.78% 28.14% 69.74% 8.88% 21.38% 
1994 80.50% 17.98% 1.52% 7.00% 16.99% 76.01% 65.37% 4.51% 30.12% 77.67% 20.59% 1.74% 62.05% 8.01% 29.94% 70.27% 2.01% 27.72% 69.83% 8.19% 21.99% 
1995 80.18% 18.55% 1.27% 7.72% 15.37% 76.91% 64.87% 4.89% 30.25% 80.90% 17.35% 1.75% 58.92% 9.41% 31.67% 70.72% 1.91% 27.36% 68.36% 9.43% 22.21% 
1996 81.36% 17.32% 1.32% 8.35% 13.68% 77.97% 64.58% 4.80% 30.63% 78.80% 19.26% 1.95% 58.73% 9.03% 32.23% 70.84% 1.41% 27.75% 68.00% 10.24% 21.75% 
1997 81.57% 17.16% 1.27% 7.63% 13.37% 79.00% 63.28% 3.79% 32.93% 79.28% 18.51% 2.21% 56.84% 9.89% 33.26% 69.47% 1.61% 28.92% 70.04% 9.70% 20.26% 
1998 81.09% 17.65% 1.26% 10.55% 12.92% 76.53% 64.55% 3.82% 31.63% 79.30% 18.23% 2.47% 55.55% 10.06% 34.39% 69.58% 1.86% 28.56% 70.80% 8.41% 20.80% 
1999 81.48% 17.27% 1.26% 9.65% 14.65% 75.70% 62.75% 4.21% 33.04% 77.76% 19.49% 2.75% 58.43% 9.22% 32.36% 70.61% 2.24% 27.15% 70.21% 7.74% 22.04% 
2000 80.96% 17.76% 1.28% 9.14% 13.28% 77.58% 62.69% 4.50% 32.81% 78.72% 18.40% 2.88% 58.65% 9.15% 32.20% 73.94% 2.06% 23.99% 71.12% 6.91% 21.97% 
2001 81.17% 17.60% 1.23% 8.24% 14.32% 77.44% 62.22% 4.65% 33.14% 77.41% 19.33% 3.27% 58.37% 9.03% 32.60% 72.82% 1.68% 25.50% 71.71% 5.56% 22.74% 
2002 81.74% 16.60% 1.66% 9.14% 11.79% 79.07% 62.29% 4.75% 32.97% 79.80% 16.57% 3.63% 61.50% 8.68% 29.82% 73.02% 1.92% 25.06% 70.56% 7.20% 22.24% 
2003 82.88% 14.76% 2.36% 9.83% 11.35% 78.82% 63.18% 4.03% 32.79% 80.78% 15.07% 4.15% 65.01% 9.95% 25.04% 73.66% 1.50% 24.84% 70.82% 7.49% 21.69% 
2004 82.64% 15.00% 2.36% 9.55% 11.33% 79.12% 61.48% 4.53% 33.99% 78.97% 16.45% 4.58% 62.05% 9.58% 28.37% 74.89% 1.90% 23.21% 70.93% 7.14% 21.93% 
2005 81.55% 15.97% 2.49% 10.67% 9.80% 79.53% 62.15% 4.31% 33.54% 80.94% 14.13% 4.93% 62.13% 7.86% 30.00% 73.88% 1.97% 24.15% 71.69% 6.94% 21.38% 
2006 83.35% 14.73% 1.92% 9.66% 10.64% 79.70% 60.92% 4.29% 34.79% 80.99% 13.82% 5.19% 61.26% 8.69% 30.05% 74.88% 2.12% 22.99% 70.89% 7.39% 21.72% 
2007 83.08% 14.99% 1.93% 9.92% 11.17% 78.91% 62.06% 4.33% 33.61% 81.83% 12.42% 5.75% 67.52% 7.41% 25.07% 77.37% 2.28% 20.34% 72.04% 6.07% 21.88% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) 
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Table 5.4  Load factor by types of generators 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
China 
Thermal 55.49% 55.55% 56.48% 56.38% 57.33% 56.56% 56.04% 54.89% 51.06% 51.33% 53.24% 54.35% 58.13% 62.20% 63.50% 59.97% 55.59% 55.55% 
Hydro 39.99% 37.61% 36.90% 38.58% 38.81% 40.87% 38.39% 37.19% 35.84% 33.31% 34.97% 35.91% 36.42% 33.84% 34.59% 38.72% 37.00% 38.25% 
Nuclear 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 76.65% 69.58% 77.73% 78.28% 71.23% 74.66% 82.21% 60.20% 63.19% 76.16% 78.27% 90.47% 66.08% 52.51% 
Total 51.44% 51.06% 51.70% 52.20% 52.99% 52.92% 52.09% 50.93% 47.66% 47.11% 48.92% 49.90% 52.96% 55.57% 56.65% 55.57% 51.91% 51.97% 
France 
Thermal 23.72% 30.50% 25.51% 16.71% 16.23% 18.24% 20.06% 16.94% 24.09% 22.12% 21.64% 18.98% 20.91% 22.95% 22.43% 26.12% 24.21% 25.14% 
Hydro 26.45% 28.35% 33.30% 31.09% 37.01% 34.69% 31.97% 30.71% 30.04% 35.01% 32.63% 35.75% 29.74% 29.13% 29.59% 25.67% 27.78% 28.92% 
Nuclear 64.31% 66.62% 66.99% 71.21% 70.23% 73.59% 75.64% 71.80% 71.81% 71.23% 75.01% 76.08% 78.80% 79.46% 80.76% 81.48% 81.24% 79.35% 
Total 46.45% 49.83% 50.28% 50.13% 50.77% 52.41% 53.43% 50.48% 51.84% 52.31% 53.83% 54.15% 54.62% 55.43% 56.04% 56.59% 56.45% 55.81% 
Germany 
Thermal 62.13% 48.25% 47.61% 47.47% 47.80% 47.73% 50.23% 49.27% 51.39% 50.21% 51.07% 52.47% 51.44% 54.45% 55.07% 57.65% 56.11% 58.01% 
Hydro 32.98% 24.97% 28.05% 28.10% 30.85% 33.76% 34.01% 26.99% 27.38% 30.18% 33.00% 33.12% 33.49% 33.79% 38.47% 36.56% 34.65% 36.60% 
Nuclear 77.68% 74.61% 80.20% 77.23% 75.74% 76.54% 79.73% 87.14% 82.69% 86.91% 86.45% 87.32% 80.41% 87.89% 92.80% 91.34% 94.49% 79.39% 
Total 64.23% 52.12% 53.09% 52.41% 52.61% 52.77% 55.16% 55.22% 55.87% 55.34% 55.60% 55.73% 53.05% 55.38% 56.38% 56.66% 55.24% 54.80% 
Italy 
Thermal 54.56% 51.60% 48.20% 45.84% 46.80% 48.94% 45.92% 45.69% 45.45% 44.85% 45.87% 45.32% 47.66% 48.35% 46.51% 45.14% 44.14% 42.55% 
Hydro 21.33% 27.29% 27.01% 25.82% 27.60% 24.11% 27.04% 26.64% 26.96% 28.91% 28.56% 30.13% 26.30% 24.46% 27.46% 23.34% 23.53% 21.11% 
Nuclear 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 43.72% 43.75% 41.90% 40.04% 41.24% 41.82% 40.86% 40.76% 40.89% 41.06% 41.82% 41.86% 42.57% 42.84% 42.57% 40.55% 40.07% 38.34% 
Japan 
Thermal 48.56% 48.47% 48.02% 44.20% 48.31% 45.86% 45.24% 43.05% 40.46% 42.51% 42.18% 40.69% 42.59% 44.09% 42.59% 43.95% 43.27% 49.88% 
Hydro 28.92% 30.82% 25.88% 30.13% 20.60% 23.96% 22.99% 25.78% 25.81% 23.79% 23.86% 23.12% 22.58% 25.45% 25.19% 20.84% 23.04% 20.65% 
Nuclear 72.97% 72.95% 73.69% 73.83% 75.80% 80.40% 80.77% 80.52% 83.85% 79.88% 81.25% 79.54% 73.38% 59.90% 68.42% 70.17% 70.02% 60.88% 
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Total 49.36% 49.76% 48.73% 47.53% 48.71% 48.64% 48.21% 47.62% 46.36% 46.50% 46.37% 45.01% 45.04% 44.17% 44.63% 45.21% 45.06% 47.21% 
UK 
Thermal 48.48% 51.18% 51.93% 49.43% 49.82% 50.94% 50.59% 50.20% 51.60% 51.28% 51.99% 51.21% 54.09% 54.47% 53.34% 52.69% 51.62% 52.60% 
Hydro 21.06% 16.70% 19.33% 15.55% 17.77% 17.29% 13.31% 15.10% 18.05% 22.05% 20.78% 16.74% 19.40% 15.92% 19.95% 20.90% 22.73% 24.28% 
Nuclear 66.11% 70.93% 77.23% 85.76% 83.72% 79.58% 83.67% 86.54% 87.66% 83.82% 77.77% 82.37% 81.93% 85.42% 77.05% 78.61% 78.52% 64.86% 
Total 49.86% 52.43% 54.30% 53.82% 54.03% 54.38% 54.51% 54.88% 56.42% 55.70% 54.91% 55.05% 57.54% 58.02% 56.05% 55.81% 54.69% 53.71% 
US 
Thermal 47.05% 47.09% 47.07% 48.69% 48.83% 48.90% 49.24% 50.76% 53.02% 52.27% 53.93% 44.81% 42.47% 40.22% 40.37% 41.23% 40.55% 41.79% 
Hydro 35.71% 37.70% 32.67% 35.07% 32.55% 38.54% 44.03% 41.43% 37.30% 34.78% 32.32% 25.58% 35.43% 35.18% 34.56% 34.39% 36.53% 30.50% 
Nuclear 75.59% 79.19% 77.95% 74.87% 77.71% 81.44% 83.60% 76.97% 82.71% 88.94% 92.09% 94.40% 97.71% 90.65% 94.35% 93.59% 93.85% 95.73% 
Total 50.09% 50.43% 49.97% 51.19% 51.42% 52.67% 53.60% 53.71% 55.73% 55.61% 56.93% 48.27% 47.42% 45.07% 45.36% 45.87% 45.55% 45.98% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Electricity Information 2009 (IEA) 
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